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[612a] because it now feasts on earth, cling to it in wild profusion of earthy and stony accretion by reason of these feastings that are accounted happy.1 And then one might see whether in its real nature2 it is manifold3 or single in its simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how.4 But for the present we have, I think, fairly well described its sufferings and the forms it assumes in this human life of ours.” “We certainly have,” he said.

“Then,” said I, “we have met all the other demands [612b] of the argument, and we have not invoked the rewards and reputes of justice as you said Homer and Hesiod5 do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ring of Gyges6 or not,7 or the helmet of Hades8 to boot.” “Most true,” he said. “Then,” said I, “Glaucon, there can no longer be any objection,9 can there, to our assigning to justice and [612c] virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and, after his death?” “There certainly can be none,” he said. “Will you, then, return to me what you borrowed10 in the argument?” “What, pray?” “I granted to you that the just man should seem and be thought to be unjust and the unjust just; for you thought that, even if the concealment of these things from gods and men was an impossibility in fact, nevertheless, it ought to be conceded for the sake of the argument,11 in order that the decision might be made [612d] between absolute justice and absolute injustice. Or do you not remember?” “It would be unjust of me,12” he said, “if I did not.” “Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, I demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute that she in fact enjoys13 from gods and men, and I ask that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that she may gather in the prizes14 which she wins from the seeming and bestows on her possessors, since she has been proved to bestow the blessings that come from the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek and win her.” “That is a just demand,” he said. [612e] “Then,” said I, “will not the first of these restorations be that the gods certainly15 are not unaware16 of the true character of each of the two, the just and the unjust?” “We will restore that,” he said. “And if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the gods17 and the other hateful to them, as we agreed in the beginning.18” “That is so.” “And shall we not agree that all things that come from the gods

1 Cf. Charm. 158 A, Laws 695 A, 783 A. See λεγόμενα ἀγαθά491 C, 495 A, Laws 661 C.

2 Cf. Phaedo 246 A. In Tim. 72 D Plato says that only God knows the truth about the soul. See Laws 641 D, and Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 42.

3 Cf. Phaedr. 271 A.

4 ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως: cf. 621 B, Phaedo 100 D, Tim. 37 A-B, Laws 652 A, 834 E, 899 A and B.

5 363 B-C.

6 359 D f.

7 Cf. 367 E.

8 Iliad v. 845, Blaydes on Aristoph.Acharn. 390.

9 Cf. Soph. 243 A, Laws 801 Eἄνευ φθόνων, Eurip.Hippol. 497οὐκ ἐπίφθονον, Aeschines, De falsa legatione 167 (49). Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 406 does object and finds the passage inconsistent with the idealism of 592 and with Laws 899 D ff. and 905 B. Cf. Renan, Averroes, pp. 156-157, Guyau, Esquisse d'une morale, pp. 140-141. See Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 80 and n. 612, Idea of Justice in Plato's Republic, pp. 197-198. Gomperz, ignoring this passage and interpreting the Republic wholly from 367 E, strangely argues that Phaedo 107 C proves that the Phaedo must have been composed at a time when Plato was less sure of the coincidence of justice and happiness. A religious thinker may in his theodicy justify the ways of God to man by arguing that worldly happiness is not the real happiness, and yet elsewhere remark that, as a rule, the righteous is not forsaken even in this world. Cf. Psalm 37.25 ff., Prov. 10.3 and passim. See Renan, Hist. du Peuple d'Israel, p. 376: “Il en est de ces passages comme de tant de préceptes de l’Evangile, insensés si on en fait des articles de code, excellents si on n'y voit, que l'expression hyperbolique de hauts sentiments moraux.”

10 Cf. Polit. 267 A.

11 τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα: not the same as λόγου ἕνεκα. See on 581 C, p. 374, note a.

12 Cf.εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ608 D.

13 For the idiom ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης cf. 365 Aὡς . . . ἔχουσι τιμῆς, 389 Cὅπως . . . πράξεως ἔχει, Thucyd. i. 22ὡς . . . μνήμης ἔχοι. For the thought cf. Isoc. viii. 33.

14 Cf. Phileb. 22 B and E.

15 γεvi termini. Cf. 379 A and Class. Phil. x. p. 335.

16 Cf. 365 D.

17 Cf. Phileb. 39 E.

18 Cf. 352 B.

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