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And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul,1 and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as ‘fond of’ so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theater, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and acts conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue.

1 Not an experience of the body (cf. 10.3.6), even the case of ‘bodily pleasures.’ This brings pleasure within the definition of happiness as “an activity of the soul.”

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