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But the heart's desire is the pleasantest—,
” for the best activities possess them all; and it is the best activities, or one activity which is the best of all, in which according to our definition happiness consists.  Nevertheless it is manifest that happiness also requires external goods in addition, as we said; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary equipment.4 For many noble actions
1 Not an experience of the body （cf. 10.3.6）, even the case of ‘bodily pleasures.’ This brings pleasure within the definition of happiness as “an activity of the soul.”
2 Morally inferior people like things that are only pleasant ‘accidentally,’ i.e. owing not to some quality inherent in the thing but to something extraneous to it, viz. some depravity of taste or temporary affection in the person. Hence not only do different people think different things pleasant but the same person thinks the same thing pleasant at one time and unpleasant at another—and so repents today of his indulgence yesterday; or he desires two incompatible things at once, or desires a thing with one part of his nature that he dislikes with another, so that there is a conflict between his desires, or between his desire for pleasure and his wish for what he thinks good （see Bk. 9.4, esp. 4.8-10, and contrast 4.5.）
3 The word is especially used of an amulet hung round the neck or fastened round a limb
4 It was one of the public duties of rich citizens at Athens to equip the chorus and actors of a drama at their own expense. One so doing was called χορηγός （chorus-leader, as no doubt originally he was）, and the dresses, etc., he supplied, χορηγία. The latter term is frequently used by Aristotle to denote the material equipment of life, and has almost or quite ceased to be felt as a metaphor.