Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, chapter 7, section 15

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Again, Righteous Indignation is the observance of a mean between Envy and Malice,¹ and these qualities are concerned with pain and pleasure felt at the fortunes of one's neighbors. The righteously indignant man is pained by undeserved good fortune; the jealous man exceeds him and is pained by all the good fortune of others;² while the malicious man so far falls short of being pained that he actually feels pleasure.

1 See 6.18 （and note）: there envy and ‘rejoicing-in-evil’ come in a list of emotions in which a due mean is impossible; and in Aristot. Rh. 1386b 34 they are said to be two sides of the same character. The present attempt to force them into the scheme as opposite extremes is not very successful, and it is noteworthy that this group of qualities is omitted in Bk. 4.

2 It is difficult not to think that some words have been lost here, such as ‘and the righteously indignant man is pained by the undeserved misfortune of others.’

Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.

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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

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H. Rackham, Ed.