Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7, chapter 11, section 3

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[3]

Now （1） some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether essentially or accidentally. They argue that Good and Pleasure are two distinct things.

（2） Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.

（3） There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless pleasure cannot be the Supreme Good.¹

1 Of these three views, the first is that of Speusippus, Plato's successor as head of the Academy; the second is that of Plato's Philebus; the third, which appears at the end of the Philebus, is that of Aristotle in Book 10 below.

Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.

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