[1062b]
[1]
(I mean "that the same thing can at one
and the same time be and not be") will be true;because just as, when they are
separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, so in
the same way, if the complex statement is taken as a single
affirmation, the negation will be just as true as the whole statement
regarded as an affirmation.And further, if nothing can be truly affirmed, then this very
statement—that there is no such thing as a true
affirmation—will be false. But if there is such a thing, the
contentions of those who raise objections of this kind and utterly
destroy rational discourse may be considered to be refuted.1 Very similar to
the views which we have just mentioned is the dictum of
Protagoras2; for he said that man is the measure of
all things, by which he meant simply that each individual's
impressions are positively true.But if this is so, it follows that the same
thing is and is not, and is bad and good, and that all the other
implications of opposite statements are true; because often a given
thing seems beautiful to one set of people and ugly to another, and
that which seems to each individual is the measure.
[20]
This difficulty will be solved if we consider
the origin of the assumption. It seems probable that it arose in some
cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others
from the fact that everyone does not form the same opinion about the
same things, but to some a given thing seems sweet and to others the
contrary.For that
nothing comes from what is not, but everything from what is, is a
doctrine common to nearly all natural philosophers.3 Since, then, a thing
does not become white which was before completely white and in no
respect not-white, that which becomes white must come from what was
not-white. Hence according to this theory there would be generation
from what is not, unless the same thing were originally white
and not-white.However, it is not hard to solve this
difficulty. We have explained in the Physics4 in what sense
things which are generated are generated from what is not, and in what
sense from what is.But to attach equal
importance to the opinions and impressions of opposing parties is
foolish, because clearly one side or the other must be wrong.5 This is evident from what happens in the
sphere of sensation;
1 Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.8.4, 5.
2 This chapter forms a summary of Aristot. Met. 4.5-8. sect. 1-3=Aristot. Met. 4.5.1-5.
3 With sect. 4, 5 cf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.6.
4 Aristot. Physics 1.7-9.
5 sect. 5-7=Aristot. Met. 4.5.23-27.
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