(4.) Again, "to be" <or
"is"> means that some of these statements can be made in virtue
of a potentiality and others in virtue of an actuality.For we say that both that which
sees potentially and that which sees actually is
seeing thing." And in the same way we call "understanding" both that
use the understanding, and that which
; and we call "tranquil" both that in which
tranquillity is already present, and that which is potentially
too in the case of substances. For we say that Hermes is in the
and the half of the line in the whole; and we call "corn" what is not
yet ripe. But when a thing is potentially existent and when not, must
be defined elsewhere.2
"Substance" means (a) simple
bodies, e.g. earth, fire, water and the like; and in general bodies,
and the things, animal or divine, including their parts, which are
composed of bodies. All these are called substances because they are
not predicated of any substrate, but other things are predicated of
them.(b) In another
sense, whatever, being immanent in such things as are not predicated
of a substrate, is the cause of their being; as, e.g., the soul is the
cause of being for the animal.(c) All parts immanent in things which define
and indicate their individuality, and whose destruction causes the
destruction of the whole; as, e.g., the plane is essential to the body
hold) and the line to the plane.
And number in general is thought
to be of this nature, on the ground that if
it is abolished nothing exists, and that it determines
Again, the essence
, whose formula is the definition, is
also called the substance of each particular thing.
Thus it follows that "substance" has two senses:
the ultimate subject, which cannot be further predicated of something
else; and whatever has an individual and separate existence. The shape
and form of each particular thing is of this nature.
same" means (a) accidentally the same. E.g., "white" and "cultured"
are the same because they are accidents of the same subject; and "man"
is the same as "cultured," because one is an accident of the other;
and "cultured" is the same as "man" because it is an accident of
"man"; and "cultured man" is the same as each of the terms "cultured"
and "man," and vice versa; for both "man" and "cultured" are used in
the same way as "cultured man," and the latter in the same way as the
former.Hence none of
these predications can be made universally. For it is not true to say
that every man is the same as "the cultured"; because universal
predications are essential to things,