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[1017b] [1] (4.) Again, "to be" <or "is"> means that some of these statements can be made in virtue of a potentiality and others in virtue of an actuality.For we say that both that which sees potentially and that which sees actually is "a seeing thing." And in the same way we call "understanding" both that which can use the understanding, and that which does ; and we call "tranquil" both that in which tranquillity is already present, and that which is potentially tranquil.Similarly too in the case of substances. For we say that Hermes is in the stone,1 and the half of the line in the whole; and we call "corn" what is not yet ripe. But when a thing is potentially existent and when not, must be defined elsewhere.2

"Substance" means (a) simple bodies, e.g. earth, fire, water and the like; and in general bodies, and the things, animal or divine, including their parts, which are composed of bodies. All these are called substances because they are not predicated of any substrate, but other things are predicated of them.(b) In another sense, whatever, being immanent in such things as are not predicated of a substrate, is the cause of their being; as, e.g., the soul is the cause of being for the animal.(c) All parts immanent in things which define and indicate their individuality, and whose destruction causes the destruction of the whole; as, e.g., the plane is essential to the body (as some3 hold) and the line to the plane. [20] And number in general is thought by some4 to be of this nature, on the ground that if it is abolished nothing exists, and that it determines everything.(d) Again, the essence , whose formula is the definition, is also called the substance of each particular thing.

Thus it follows that "substance" has two senses: the ultimate subject, which cannot be further predicated of something else; and whatever has an individual and separate existence. The shape and form of each particular thing is of this nature.

"The same" means (a) accidentally the same. E.g., "white" and "cultured" are the same because they are accidents of the same subject; and "man" is the same as "cultured," because one is an accident of the other; and "cultured" is the same as "man" because it is an accident of "man"; and "cultured man" is the same as each of the terms "cultured" and "man," and vice versa; for both "man" and "cultured" are used in the same way as "cultured man," and the latter in the same way as the former.Hence none of these predications can be made universally. For it is not true to say that every man is the same as "the cultured"; because universal predications are essential to things,

1 Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.5.6.

2 Aristot. Met. 9.9.

3 The Pythagoreans and Platonists.

4 The Pythagoreans and Platonists.

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