[1028a]
[10]
The term "being" has several senses,
which we have classified in our discussion1 of the number of senses in which terms are
used. It denotes first the " what " of a thing, i.e. the
individuality; and then the quality or quantity or any other such
category. Now of all these senses which "being" has, the primary sense
is clearly the "what," which denotes the substance
(because when we describe
the quality of a particular thing we say that it is "good or bad," and
not "five feet high" or "a man"; but when we describe
what it is, we say not that it is "white" or "hot" or
"five feet high," but that it is "a man" or "a god"), and all other
things are said to "be" because they are either quantities or
qualities or affections or some other such thing.
[20]
Hence one might
raise the question whether the terms "to walk" and "to be well" and
"to sit" signify each of these things as "being," or not; and
similarly in the case of any other such terms; for not one of them by
nature has an independent existence or can be separated from its
substance. Rather, if anything it is the thing which
walks or sits or is well that is existent.The reason why these things are more truly
existent is because their subject is something definite; i.e. the
substance and the individual, which is clearly implied in a
designation of this kind, since apart from it we cannot speak of "the
good" or "sitting." Clearly then it is by reason of the substance that
each of the things referred to exists.Hence that which is primarily,
not in a qualified sense but absolutely, will be substance.Now "primary" has several meanings; but
nevertheless substance is primary in all senses, both in definition
and in knowledge and in time. For none of the other categories can
exist separately, but substance alone;and it is primary also in definition, because
in the formula of each thing the formula of substance must be
inherent; and we assume that we know each particular thing most truly
when we know what "man" or "fire" is—
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