but not of
one and the same thing, nor
yet equivocally. The term "medical" is applied to a body and a
function and an instrument, neither equivocally nor in one sense, hut
in relation to one thing.1
However, in whichever way one chooses to speak of these things, it
matters nothing; but this point is clear: that the primary and
unqualified definition, and the essence, belong to substances. It is
true that they belong equally to other things too, but not
. For if we assume this, it does not
necessarily follow that there is a definition of anything which means
the same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of
formula, i.e. the formula of one thing—one not by continuity like the
, or things which are arbitrarily combined,
but in one of the proper senses of "one." And "one" has the same
variety of senses as "being." "Being" means sometimes the individual
thing, sometimes the quantity, sometimes the quality. Hence even
"white man" will have a formula and definition; but in a different
sense from the definition of "whiteness" and "substance."
The question arises: If one denies that a formula involving an added
determinant is a definition, how can there be a definition of terms
which are not simple but coupled? Because they can only be explained
by adding a determinant.I
mean, e.g., there is "nose" and "concavity" and "snubness," the term
compounded of the two, because the one is present in the other.
Neither "concavity" nor "snubness" is an accidental, but a per se
affection of the nose.2
Nor are they attributes in the sense that "white"
is of Callias or a man, because Callias is white and is by accident a
man; but in the sense that "male" is an attribute of animal, and
equality of quantity, and all other attributes which we say belong per
se.That is, all
things which involve the formula or name of the subject of the
affection, and cannot be explained apart from it. Thus "white" can be
explained apart from "man," but not "female" apart from "animal." Thus
either these terms have no essence or definition, or else they have it
in a different sense, as we have said.
But there is also
another difficulty about them. If "snub nose" is the same as "concave
nose," "snub" will be the same as "concave." But if not, since it is
impossible to speak of "snub" apart from the thing of which it is a
per se affection (because "snub" means a concavity in the nose),
either it is impossible to call the nose snub, or it will be a
tautology, "concave-nose nose" because "snub nose" will equal
it is absurd that such terms as these should have an essence.
Otherwise there will be an infinite regression; for in "snub-nose
nose" there will be yet another nose.