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[1037a] [1] Indeed there will be matter in some sense in everything which is not essence or form considered independently, but a particular thing. Thus the semicircles will be parts not of the universal circle but of the particular circles, as we said before1—for some matter is sensible, and some intelligible.It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance, and the body matter; and "man" or "animal" is the combination of both taken universally. And " Socrates" or "Coriscus" has a double sense, that is if the soul too can be called Socrates (for by Socrates some mean the soul and some the concrete person); but if Socrates means simply this soul and this body, the individual is composed similarly to the universal.

Whether there is some other material component of these substances besides their matter, and whether we should look for some further substance in them, such as numbers or something of that kind, must be considered later.2 It is with a view to this that we are trying to determine the nature of sensible substances, since in a sense the study of sensible substances belongs to physics or secondary philosophy; for the physicist must know not only about the matter, but also about the substance according to the formula; this is even more essential.And in the case of definitions, in what sense the elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and why the definition is one formula (for the thing is clearly one, [20] but in virtue of what is it one, seeing that it has parts?); this must be considered later.3

We have stated, then, in a general account which covers all cases, what essence is, and how it is independent; and why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others does not; and we have shown that the material parts of a thing cannot be present in the formula of the substance (since they are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete substance; and of this in one sense there is a formula, and in another sense there is not.There is no formula involving the matter, for this is indeterminate; but there is a formula in accordance with the primary substance, e.g., in the case of a man, the formula of the soul; because the substance is the indwelling form, of which and of the matter the so called concrete substance is composed. E.g., concavity is such a form, since from this and "nose" is derived "snub nose" and "snubness"—for "nose" will be present twice over in these expressions);but in the concrete substance, e.g. snub nose or Callias, matter will be present too.4 We have stated also that the essence and the individual are in some cases the same,

1 Aristot. Met. 7.10.17.

2 In Books 13 and 14.

3 Aristot. Met. 8.6.

4 Chapters. 10-11; and cf. Aristot. Met. 7.4.

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