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Extract from the Preface

SUCH are the most conspicuous transactions of this
142d Olympiad, B. C. 212-208.
Olympiad, that is, of the four years which an Olympiad must be reckoned to contain; and I shall endeavour to include the history of them in two books.

I am quite aware that my history has an element of austerity in it, and is adapted to, and will be approved by only one class of readers, owing to the uniformity of its plan. Nearly all other historians, or at any rate most, attract a variety of readers by entering upon all the various branches of history. The curious reader is attracted by the genealogical style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations, origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in Ephorus; the student of polities by the story of tribes, cities, and dynasties. It is to this last branch of the subject that I have had a single eye, and have devoted my whole work; and accordingly have, as I said before, accommodated all my plans to one particular class of narrative. The result is that I have made my work by no means attractive reading to the majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history, and deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling actions, I have already stated at length; however, there is no reason why I should not briefly remind my readers of it again in this place, for the sake of impressing it upon them.

Why Focus on Actions

Seeing that many writers have discussed in many varieties of style the question of genealogies, myths, and colonisations, as well as of the foundations of cities and the consanguinity of peoples, there was nothing left for a writer at this date but to copy the words of others and claim them as his own,—than which nothing could be more dishonourable; or, if he did not choose to do that, to absolutely waste his labour, being obliged to acknowledge that he is composing a history and bestowing thought on what has already been sufficiently set forth and transmitted to posterity by his predecessors. For these and sundry other reasons I abandoned such themes as these, and determined on writing a history of actions: first, because they are continually new and require a new narrative, —as of course one generation cannot give us the history of the next; and secondly, because such a narrative is of all others the most instructive. This it has always been: but it is eminently so now, because the arts and sciences have made such an advance in our day, that students are able to arrange every event as it happens according to fixed rules, as it were, of scientific classification. Therefore, as I did not aim so much at giving pleasure to my readers, as at profiting those who apply to such studies, I omitted all other themes and devoted myself wholly to this. But on these points, those who give a careful attention to my narrative will be the best witnesses to the truth of what I say. . . .

The Hannibalian War

In the previous year (212 B. C.) Syracuse had fallen: the two Scipios had been conquered and killed in Spain: the siegeworks had been constructed round Capua, at the very time of the fall of Syracuse, i. e. in the autumn, Hannibal being engaged in fruitless attempts upon the citadel of Tarentum. See Livy, 25, 22.

Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius,

B. C. 211. Coss. Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus, P. Sulpicius Galba. The Romans were still engaged in the siege of Capua.
Hannibal at first skirmished, and tried all he could to tempt him to come out and give him battle. But as no one attended to him, his attack became very like an attempt to storm the camp; for his cavalry charged in their squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their javelins inside the entrenchments, and the infantry attacked in their regular companies, and tried to pull down the palisading round the camp.
Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the Consuls of the previous year, were continued in command there, with orders not to leave the place till it fell. Livy, 26, 1. Hannibal tries to raise the siege.
But not even so could he move the Romans from their purpose: they employed their light-armed troops to repulse those who were actually attacking the palisade, but protecting themselves with their heavy shields against the javelins of the enemy, they remained drawn up near their standards without moving. Discomfited at being neither able to throw himself into Capua, nor induce the Romans to leave their camp, Hannibal retired to consult as to what was best to be done.

It is no wonder, in my opinion, that the Carthaginians

The determination and cautious tactics of the Romans.
were puzzled. I think any one who heard the facts would be the same. For who would not have received with incredulity the statement that the Romans, after losing so many battles to the Carthaginians, and though they did not venture to meet them on the field, could not nevertheless be induced to give up the contest or abandon the command of the country? Up to this time, moreover, they had contented themselves with hovering in his neighbourhood, keeping along the skirts of the mountains; but now they had taken up a position on the plains, and those the fairest in all Italy, and were besieging the strongest city in it; and that with an enemy attacking them, whom they could not endure even the thought of meeting face to face: while the Carthaginians, who beyond all dispute had won the battles, were sometimes in as great difficulties as the losers. I think the reason of the strategy adopted by the two sides respectively was, that they both had seen that Hannibal's cavalry was the main cause of the Carthaginian victory and Roman defeat. Accordingly the plan of the losers after the battles, of following their enemies at a distance, was the natural one to adopt; for the country through which they went was such that the enemy's cavalry would be unable to do them any damage. Similarly what now happened at Capua to either side was natural and inevitable.

The Siege of Capua

For the Roman army did not venture to come out
Carthaginian difficulties.
and give battle, from fear of the enemy's horse, but remained resolutely within their entrenchment; well knowing that the cavalry, by which they had been worsted in the battles, could not hurt them there. While the Carthaginians, again, naturally could not remain any longer encamped with their cavalry, because all the pastures in the surrounding country had been utterly destroyed by the Romans with that very view; and it was impossible for animals to come from such a distance, carrying on their backs hay and barley for so large a body of cavalry, and so many beasts of burden; nor again did they venture, when encamped without their cavalry, to attack an enemy protected by a palisade and fosse, with whom a contest, even without these advantages in their favour, was likely to be a doubtful one if they had not got their cavalry. Besides this they were much alarmed about the new Consuls, lest they should come and encamp against them, and reduce them to serious straits by cutting off their supplies of provisions.

These considerations convinced Hannibal that it was

Hannibal determines on creating a diversion by threatening Rome.
impossible to raise the siege by an open attack, and he therefore changed his tactics. He imagined that if by a secret march he could suddenly appear in the neighbourhood of Rome, he might by the alarm which he would inspire in the inhabitants by his unexpected movement, perhaps do something worth while against the city itself; or, if he could not do that, would at least force Appius either to raise the siege of Capua, in order to hasten to the relief of his native town, or to divide the Roman forces; which would then be easier for him to conquer in detail.

Hannibal Advances Upon Rome

With this purpose in his mind he sent a letter-carrier
Hannibal informs the Capuans of his purpose
into Capua. This he did by persuading one of his Libyans to desert to the Roman camp, and thence to Capua. He took this trouble to secure the safe delivery of his letter, because he was very much afraid that the Capuans, if they saw him departing, would consider that he despaired of them, and would therefore give up hope and surrender to the Romans. He wrote therefore an explanation of his design, and sent the Libyan the day after, in order that the Capuans, being acquainted with the purpose of his departure, might go on courageously sustaining the siege.

When the news had arrived at Rome that Hannibal had

Excitement and activity at Rome
encamped over against their lines, and was actually besieging their forces, there was a universal excitement and terror, from a feeling that the result of the impending battle would decide the whole war. Consequently, with one heart and soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to sending out reinforcements and making preparations for this struggle. On their part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of Hannibal's letter, and by thus learning the object of the Carthaginian movement, to stand by their determination, and to await the issue of this new hope.
Hannibal starts.
At the end of the fifth day, therefore, after his arrival on the ground, Hannibal ordered his men to take their supper as usual, and leave their watch-fires burning; and started with such secrecy, that none of the enemy knew what was happening. He took the road through Samnium, and marched at a great pace and without stopping, his skirmishers always keeping before him to reconnoitre and occupy all the posts along the route: and while those in Rome had their thoughts still wholly occupied with Capua and the campaign there, he crossed the Anio without being observed; and having arrived at a distance of not more than forty stades from Rome, there pitched his camp.

Rome Saved by Luck

On this being known at Rome, the utmost confusion
Terror at Rome.
and terror prevailed among the inhabitants,— this movement of Hannibal's being as unexpected as it was sudden; for he had never been so close to the city before. At the same time their alarm was increased by the idea at once occurring to them, that he would not have ventured so near, if it were not that the armies at Capua were destroyed. Accordingly, the men at once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in the defences of the town; while the women went round to the temples of the gods and implored their protection, sweeping the pavements of the temples with their hair: for this is their customary way of behaving when any serious danger comes upon their country. But just as Hannibal had encamped, and was intending to attempt the city itself next day, an extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate for the preservation of Rome.

For Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already

The Consular levies fortunately being at Rome enable the Romans to make a counter-demonstration
enrolled one consular army, had bound the men with the usual oath to appear at Rome armed on that very day; and were also engaged on that day in drawing out the lists and testing the men for the other army:1 whereby it so happened that a large number of men had been collected in Rome spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the Consuls boldly led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there, checked Hannibal's intended movement. For the Carthaginians were at first eager to advance, and were not altogether without hope that they would be able to take Rome itself by assault.
Hannibal devastates the Campagna.
But when they saw the enemy drawn up in order, and learnt before long from a prisoner what had happened, they abandoned the idea of attacking the city, and began devasting the country-side instead, and setting fire to the houses. In these first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty, for the field of plunder upon which they were entered was one into which no one had ever expected an enemy to set foot.

Hannibal In Sight of Rome

But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp
Hannibal starts on his return.
within ten stades of him, Hannibal broke up his quarters before daylight. He did so for three reasons:—first, because he had collected an enormous booty; secondly, because he had given up all hope of taking Rome; and lastly, because he reckoned that the time had now come at which he expected, according to his original idea, that Appius would have learnt the danger threatening Rome, and would have raised the siege of Capua and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or at any rate would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment to carry on the siege.
The passage of the Anio.
Publius had caused the bridges over the Anio to be broken down, and thus compelled Hannibal to get his army across by a ford; and he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were engaged in making the passage of the stream and caused them great distress. They were not able however to strike an important blow, owing to the number of Hannibal's cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part of the field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the greater part of the booty from them, and killed about three hundred men; and then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a hasty retreat in a panic, they followed in their rear, keeping along the line of hills.
Hannibal turns upon his pursuers.
At first Hannibal continued to march at a rapid pace, being anxious to meet the force which he expected; but at the end of the fifth day, being informed that Appius had not left the siege of Capua, he halted; and waiting for the enemy to come up, made an attack upon his camp before daylight, killed a large number of them, and drove the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he saw the Romans in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which they had retired, he decided not to continue his attack upon them; but marching through Daunia and Bruttium he appeared at Rhegium, so unexpectedly, that he was within an ace of capturing the city, and did cut off all who were out in the country; and during this excursion captured a very large number of the Rhegini.

Epaminondas and Hannibal Compared

It seems to me that the courage and determination both of the Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and merit quite as much admiration as the conduct of Epaminondas, which I will describe here for the sake of pointing the comparison.

He reached Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that

The rapid march of Epaminondas to Sparta and back again to Mantinea. See Xenophon, Hell. 7, 5, 8 sq. B. C. 362.
the Lacedaemonians with their own forces in full were come to Mantinea, and that their allies had mustered together in the same city, with the intention of offering the Thebans battle; having given orders to his men to get their supper early, he led his army out immediately after nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to seize certain posts with a view to the coming battle. But having impressed this idea upon the common soldiers, he led them along the road to Lacedaemon itself; and having arrived at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary to all expectation, and finding Sparta destitute of defenders, he forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the quarters of the town which slope down to the river. Then however a contretemps occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what was going on.
A Cretan warns Agesilaus.
Assistance accordingly arrived just as the city was on the point of being taken; and Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope. But having caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to march back again by the same road, calculating that, as the Lacedaemonians and their allies had come to the relief of Sparta, Mantinea would in its turn be left undefended: which turned out to be the case. So he exhorted the Thebans to exert themselves; and, after a rapid night march, arrived at Mantinea about mid-day, finding it entirely destitute of defenders.

But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had arrived in virtue of their treaty of alliance; and just as the Theban vanguard reached the temple of Poseidon, seven stades from the town, it happened that the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the hill overhanging Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and resist the attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are justified in speaking with some dissatisfaction of these events,2 when they say that the leader did everything which a good general could, but that, while conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune.

When Audacity is the Truest Safety

Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who can refrain from regarding with respect and admiration a general capable of doing what he did? First he attempted by harassing the enemy with skirmishing attacks to raise the siege: having failed in this he made direct for Rome itself: baffled once more by a turn of fortune entirely independent of human calculation, he kept his pursuers in play,3 and waited till the moment was ripe to see whether the besiegers of Capua stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his determination, swept down upon his enemies to their destruction, and all but depopulated Rhegium. One would be inclined however to judge the Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this crisis. For the Lacedaemonians rushed off en masse at the first message and relieved Sparta, but, as far as they were concerned, lost Mantinea. The Romans guarded their own city without breaking up the siege of Capua: on the contrary, they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit.

I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on either the Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I have already remarked upon more than once: but for the sake of those who are in office among the one or the other people, or who are in future times to direct the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual contemplation, of exploits such as these they may be inspired with emulation. For in an adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns out that audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity;4 and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of deliberate thought. . . .

When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the

The Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily to relieve Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the people, B. C. 211. Livy, 26, 20.
admiral of the Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; and being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the earnest supplication of the people to depart. . . .

The Spoils of Syracuse: Works of Art Taken To Rome

A city is not really adorned by what is brought from without, but by the virtue of its own inhabitants. . . .

The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their own city and to leave nothing behind.

Syracuse was taken in the autumn, B. C. 212. "The ornaments of the city, statues and pictures were taken to Rome." Livy, 25, 40, cp. 26, 21.
Whether they were right in doing so, and consulted their true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting of much discussion; but I think the balance of argument is in favour of believing it to have been wrong then, and wrong now. If such had been the works by which they had exalted their country, it is clear that there would have been some reason in transferring thither the things by which they had become great. But the fact was that, while leading lives of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things imply, they yet conquered the men who had always possessed them in the greatest abundance and of the finest quality. Could there have been a greater mistake than theirs? Surely it would be an incontestable error for a people to abandon the habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the conquered; and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which is the most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs to others, without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for the losers. But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and a people to accumulate into its own hands all the possessions of the rest of the world, and moreover to invite in a way the plundered to share in the spectacle they present, in that case surely the mischief is doubled. For it is no longer a case of the spectators pitying their neighbours, but themselves, as they recall the ruin of their own country. Such a sight produces an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage against the victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves to enhance their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and silver, however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without crippling the means of the rest of the world, and securing the same kind of resources for themselves. But they might have left in their original sites things that had nothing to do with material wealth; and thus at the same time have avoided exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation of their country: adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with dignity of character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over others, that they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities, the misfortunes of others are an honour to their own country. The Romans, however, when they transferred these things to Rome, used such of them as belonged to individuals to increase the splendour of private establishments, and such as belonged to the state to adorn the city. . . .


The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had
The two Scipios fall in B. C. 212.
conquered their enemies, could not control themselves: and having made up their minds
Hasdrubal Gisconis tertius Carthaginiensium dux.Livy, 24, 41, cp. 25, 37.
that they had put an end to the Roman war, they began quarrelling with each other, finding continual subjects of dispute through the innate covetousness and ambition of the Phoenician character; among whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his authority to such a pitch of iniquity as to demand a large sum of money from Andobales, the most faithful of all their Iberian friends, who had some time before lost his chieftainship for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but recently recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales, trusting to his long fidelity to Carthage, refused this demand, Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled him to give up his daughters as hostages. . . .

On the Art of Commanding Armies

The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions require great circumspection; and it is possible to provide for all of them with precision, provided that a man gives his mind to the conduct of his plan of campaign. Now that fewer operations in war are carried out openly and by mere force, than by stratagem and the skilful use of opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history of the past. And again that operations depending on the choice of opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved from experience. Nor can there be any doubt that the greater part of such failures are due to the folly or carelessness of the leaders. It is time therefore to inquire into the rules of this art of strategy.

Such things as occur in campaigns without having been calculated upon in any way we must not speak of as operations, but as accidents or casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact plan that I am to set forth: omitting all such things as do not fall under a scientfic rule, and have no fixed design.

Scientific Strategy

Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a period and place for its execution,
The points of inherent importance in the conduct of a campaign,—time, place, secrecy, code of signals, agents, and method.
secrecy, definite signals, persons by whom and with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan for conducting it. It is evident that the man who has rightly provided for each of these details will not fail in the ultimate result, while he who has neglected any single one of them will fail in the whole. Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant circumstance will suffice for failure, while for success rigid perfection of every detail is barely enough.

Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting such expeditions.

Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and

Things necessary. 1. Silence.
not to allow either joy at the appearance of an unexpected hope, or fear, or familiarity, or natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it to those and those alone without whom it is impossible to complete his plan; and not even to them a moment sooner than necessary, but only when the exigencies of the particular service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover, not only to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind. For it has happened to many generals before now, while preserving an inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts either by the expression of their countenances or by their actions.

The second requisite is to know accurately the conditions

2. Knowledge of the capabilities of the force in moving.
under which marches by day or night may be performed, and the distances to which they can extend; and not only marches on land, but also voyages by sea.

The third and most important is to have some knowledge of the seasons, and to be able to adapt the design to them.

Nor again is the selection of the ground for the operation to be regarded as unimportant, since it often happens that it is this which makes what seems impossible possible, and what seemed possible impossible.

Finally there must be no neglect of the

3. Care in concerting signals. 4. Care in selecting men.
subject of signals and counter signals; and the choice of persons by whom and with whom the operation is to be carried out.

Generals Also Need to Know Science

Of these points some are learnt by experience, some
5. Knowledge of localities.
from history, and others by the study of scientific strategy. It is a most excellent thing too that the general should have a personal knowledge both of the roads, and the locality which he has to reach, and its natural features; as well as of the persons by whom and with whom he is to act. If that is not possible, the next best thing is that he should make careful inquiries and not trust just any one: and men who undertake to act as guides to such places should always deposit security with those whom they are conducting.

These,—and other points like them, it is perhaps possible

6. Accurate knowledge of natural phenomena enabling a general to make accurate calculation of time.
that leaders may learn sufficiently from the mere study of strategy, whether practical or in books. But scientific investigation requires scientific processes and demonstrations, especially in astronomy and geometry; the working out of which is not much to our present point, though their results are important, and may contribute largely to the success of such undertakings.

The most important operation in astronomy is the calculation of the lengths of the days and nights. If these had been uniform it would not have been a matter requiring any study, but the knowledge would have been common to all the world: since however they not only differ with each other but also with themselves, it is plainly necessary to be acquainted with the increase and diminution of both the one and the other. How can a man calculate a march, and the distance practicable in a day or in a night, if he is unacquainted with the variation of these periods of time? In fact nothing can be done up to time without this knowledge,—it is inevitable otherwise that a man should be sometimes too late and sometimes too soon. And these operations are the only ones in which being too soon is a worse fault than being too late. For the general who overstays the proper hour of action only misses his chance, since he can find out that he has done so before he arrives, and so get off safely: but he that anticipates the hour is detected when he comes up; and so not only misses his immediate aim, but runs a risk of ruining himself altogether.

Mode of Calculating Time

In all human undertakings opportuneness is the most important thing, but especially in operations of war. Therefore a general must have at his fingers' ends the season of the summer and winter solstice, the equinoxes, and the periods between them in which the days and nights increase and diminish. For it is by this knowledge alone that he can compute the distance that can be done whether by sea or land.
The divisions of the day;
Again, he must necessarily understand the subdivisions both of the day and the night, in order to know at what hour to order the reveille, or the march out; for the end cannot be attained unless the beginning be rightly taken. As for the periods of the day, they may be observed by the shadows or by the sun's course, and the quarter of the heaven in which it has arrived, but it is difficult to do the same for the night, unless a man is familiar with the phenomenon of the twelve signs of the Zodiac, and their law and order: and this is easy to those who have studied astronomy.
of the night.
For since, though the nights are unequal in length, at least six of the signs of the Zodiac are nevertheless above the horizon every night, it is plain that in the same portions of every night equal portions of the twelve signs of the Zodiac rise. Now as it is known what portion of the sphere is occupied by the sun during the day, it is evident that when he has set the are subtended by the diameter of his are must rise. Therefore the length of the night is exactly commensurate with the portion of the Zodiac which appears above the horizon after sunset. And, given that we know the number and size of the signs of the Zodiac, the corresponding divisions of the night are also known. If however the nights be cloudy, the moon must be watched, since owing to its size its light as a general rule is always visible, at whatsoever point in the heaven it may be. The hour may be guessed sometimes by observing the time and place of its rising, or again of its setting, if you only have sufficient acquaintance with this phenomenon to be familiar with the daily variation of its rising. And the law which it too follows admits of being easily observed; for its revolution is limited by the period of one month, which serves as a model to which all subsequent revolutions conform.

Example: Ulysses

And here one may mention with admiration that
The example of Ulysses. See Odyss. 5, 270 sq.
Homer represents Ulysses, that truest type of a leader of men, taking observations of the stars, not only to direct his voyages, but his operations on land also. For such accidents as baffle expectation, and are incapable of being accurately reckoned upon, are quite sufficient to bring us to great and frequent distress, for instance, downpours of rain and rise of torrents, excessive frosts and snows, misty and cloudy weather, and other things like these;—but if we also neglect to provide for those which can be foreseen, is it not likely that we shall have ourselves to thank for frequent failures? None of these means then must be neglected, if we wish to avoid those errors into which many others are said to have fallen, as well as the particular generals whom I am about to mention by way of examples.

Failures Arising From Ignorance

When Aratus, the Strategus of the Achaean league,
Aratus fails at Cynaetha.
attempted to take Cynaetha by treachery, he arranged a day with those in the town who were co-operating with him, on which he was to arrive on the banks of the river which flows past Cynaetha, and to remain there quietly with his forces: while the party inside the town about midday, when they got an opportunity, were to send out one of their men quietly, wrapped in a cloak, and order him to take his stand upon a tomb agreed upon in front of the city; the rest were to attack the officers who were accustomed to guard the gate while taking their siesta. This being done, the Achaeans were to rise from their ambush and to make all haste to occupy the gate. These arrangements made, and the time having come, Aratus arrived; and having concealed himself down by the river, waited there for the signal. But about an hour before noon, a man, whose profession it was to keep a fine kind of sheep near the town, wishing to ask some business question of the shepherd, came out of the gate with his cloak on, and standing upon the same tomb looked round to find the shepherd. Whereupon Aratus, thinking that the signal had been given, hurried with all his men as fast as he could towards the gate. But the gate being hurriedly closed by the guard, owing to no preparations having yet been made by the party in the town, the result was that Aratus not only failed in his attempt but was the cause of the worst misfortunes to his partisans. For being thus detected they were dragged forward and put to death. What is one to say was the cause of this catastrophe? Surely that the general arranged only for a single signal, and being then quite young had no experience of the accuracy secured by double signals and counter-signals. On so small a point in war does the success or failure of an operation turn.

Cleomenes Tries to Take Megalopolis

Again the Spartan Cleomenes, when proposing to take
Cleomenes. See 2, 55.
Megalopolis by a stratagem, arranged with the guards of that part of the wall near what is called the Cavern to come out with all their men in the third watch, the hour at which his partisans were on duty on the wall; but not having taken into consideration the fact that at the time of the rising of the Pleiads the nights are very short, he started his army from Sparta about sunset.
May 12.
The result was that he was not able to get there in time, but being overtaken by daybreak, made a rash and ill-considered attempt to carry the town, and was repulsed with considerable loss and the danger of a complete overthrow. Now if he had, in accordance with his arrangement, hit the proper time, and led in his men while his partisans were in command of the entrance, he would not have failed in his attempt.

Similarly, once more, King Philip, as I have already

Philip's attack on Meliteia. See 5.97.
stated, when carrying on an intrigue in the city of Meliteia, made a mistake in two ways. The ladders which he brought were too short for their purpose, and he mistook the time. For having arranged to arrive about midnight, when every one was fast asleep, he started from Larissa and arrived in the territory of Meliteia too early, and was neither able to halt, for fear of his arrival being announced in the city, nor to get back again without being discovered. Being compelled therefore to continue his advance, he arrived at the city while the inhabitants were still awake. Consequently he could neither carry the wall by an escalade, because of the insufficient length of the ladders; nor enter by the gate, because it was too early for his partisans inside to help him. Finally, he did nothing but irritate the people of the town; and, after losing a considerable number of his own men, retired unsuccessful and covered with disgrace; having only given a warning to the rest of the world to distrust him and be on their guard against him.

Example: Why Nicias Failed at Syracuse

Again Nicias, the general of the Athenians, had it in his power to have saved the army besieging Syracuse, and had selected the proper time of the night for escaping the observation of the enemy, and retiring to a place of safety.
Nicias, B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7, 50.
And then because the moon was eclipsed, regarding it superstitiously as of evil portent, he stopped the army from starting. Thanks to this it came about that, when he started the next day, the enemy had obtained information of his intention, and army and generals alike fell into the hands of the Syracusans. Yet if he had asked about this from men acquainted with such phenomena, he might not only have avoided missing his opportunity for such an absurd reason, but have also used the occurrence for his own benefit owing to the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of their neighbours contributes more than anything else to the success of the instructed.

Such then are examples of the necessity of studying celestial

The method of judging of the length necessary for scaling ladders.
phenomena. But as for securing the proper length of scaling ladders, the following is the method of making the calculation. Suppose the height of the wall to be given by one of the conspirators within, the measurement required for the ladders is evident; for example, if the height of the wall is ten feet or any other unit, the ladders must be full twelve; and the interval between the wall and the foot of the ladder must be half the length of the ladder, that the ladders may not break under the weight of those mounting if they are set farther away, nor be too steep to be safe if set nearer the perpendicular. But supposing it not to be possible to measure or get near the wall: the height of any object which rises perpendicularly on its base can be taken by those who choose to study mathematics.

Need of Some Knowledge of Mathematics

Once more, therefore, those who wish to succeed in military projects and operations must have studied geometry, not with professional completeness, but far enough to have a comprehension of proportion and equations. For it is not only in such cases that these are necessary, but also for raising the scale of the divisions of a camp. For sometimes the problem is to change the entire form of the camp, and yet to keep the same proportion between all the parts included: at other times to keep the same shape in the parts, and to increase or diminish the whole area on which the camp stands, adding or subtracting from all proportionally. On which point I have already spoken in more elaborate detail in my Notes on Military Tactics. For I do not think that any one will reasonably object to me that I add a great burden to strategy, in urging on those who endeavour to acquire it the study of astronomy and geometry: for, while rather rejecting all that is superfluous in these studies, and brought in for show and talk, as well as all idea of enjoining their prosecution beyond the point of practical utility, I am most earnest and eager for so much as is barely necessary. For it would be strange if those who aim at the sciences of dancing and flute-playing should study the preparatory sciences of rhythms and music, (and the like might be said of the pursuits of the palaestra), from the belief that the final attainment of each of these sciences requires the assistance of the latter; while the students of strategy are to feel aggrieved if they find that they require subsidiary sciences up to a certain point. That would mean that men practising common and inferior arts are more diligent and energetic than those who resolve to excel in the best and most dignified subject; which no man of sense would admit. . . .

The Computation of the Size of Cities

Most people calculate the area merely from the
Sparta and Megalopolis.
length of the circumference [of towns or camps]. Accordingly, when one says that the city of Megalopolis has a circuit of fifty stades, and that of Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta is twice the size of Megalopolis, they look upon the assertion as incredible. And if one, by way of increasing the difficulty, were to say that a city or camp may have a circuit of forty stades and yet be double the size of one having a perimeter of a hundred, the statement would utterly puzzle them. The reason of this is that we do not remember the lessons in geometry taught us at school. I was led to make these remarks because it is not only common people, but actually some statesmen and military commanders, who have puzzled themselves sometimes by wondering whether it were possible that Sparta should be bigger, and that too by a great deal, than Megalopolis, while having a shorter circuit; and at other times by trying to conjecture the number of men by considering the mere length of a camp's circuit. A similar mistake is also made in pronouncing as to the number of the inhabitants of cities. For most people imagine that cities in which the ground is broken and hilly contain more houses than a flat site. But the fact is not so; because houses are built at right angles not to sloping foundations but to the plains below, upon which the hills themselves are excrescences. And this admits of a proof within the intelligence of a child. For if one would imagine houses on slopes to be raised until they were of the same height; it is evident that the plane of the roofs of the houses thus united will be equal and parallel to the plane underlying the hills and foundations.

So much for those who aspire to be leaders and statesmen and are yet ignorant and puzzled about such facts as these. . . .

Those who do not enter upon undertakings with good will and zeal cannot be expected to give real help when the time comes to act. . . .

The Hannibalian War, B.C. 211

Such being the position of the Romans and Carthaginians, Fortune continually oscillating between the two, we may say with the poet

"Pain hard by joy possessed the souls of each."5 . . .

There is profound truth in the observation which I have often made, that it is impossible to grasp or get a complete view of the fairest of all subjects of contemplation, the tendency of history as a whole, from writers of partial histories. . . .

Estimate of Hannibal

Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good or bad, the cause was one man and one mind,—Hannibal. For it is notorious that he managed the Italian campaigns in person, and the Spanish by the agency of the elder of his brothers, Hasdrubal, and subsequently by that of Mago, the leaders who killed the two Roman generals in Spain about the same time. Again, he conducted the Sicilian campaign at first through Hippocrates and afterwards through Myttonus6 the Libyan. So also in Greece and Illyria: and, by brandishing before their faces the dangers arising from these latter places, he was enabled to distract the attention of the Romans, thanks to his understanding with Philip. So great and wonderful is the influence of a Man, and a mind duly fitted by original constitution for any undertaking within the reach of human powers.

But since the position of affairs has brought us to an inquiry into the genius of Hannibal, the occasion seems to me to demand that I should explain in regard to him the peculiarities of his character which have been especially the subject of controversy. Some regard him as having been extraordinarily cruel, some exceedingly grasping of money. But to speak the truth of him, or of any person engaged in public affairs, is not easy. Some maintain that men's real natures are brought out by their circumstances, and that they are detected when in office, or as some say when in misfortunes, though they have up to that time completely maintained their secrecy.

ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει. Bias, in Aristot. Eth. 5, 1.
I, on the contrary, do not regard this as a sound dictum. For I think that men in these circumstances are compelled, not only occasionally but frequently, either by the suggestions of friends or the complexity of affairs, to speak and act contrary to their real principles.

Examples of Actions Contrary to Principles

And there are many proofs of this to be found in past
Examples to the contrary. 1. Agathocles.
history if any one will give the necessary attention. Is it not universally stated by the historians that Agathocles, tyrant of Sicily, after having the reputation of extreme cruelty in his original measures for the establishment of his dynasty, when he had once become convinced that his power over the Siceliots was firmly established, is considered to have become the most humane and mild of rulers? Again, was not Cleomenes of Sparta a most excellent king, a most cruel tyrant, and then again as a private individual most obliging and benevolent? And yet it is not reasonable to suppose the most opposite dispositions to exist in the same nature.
2. Cleomenes.
They are compelled to change with the changes of circumstances: and so some rulers often display to the world a disposition as opposite as possible to their true nature. Therefore the natures of men not only are not brought out by such things, but on the contrary are rather obscured. The same effect is produced also not only in commanders, despots, and kings, but in states also, by the suggestions of friends.
3. Athens.
For instance, you will find the Athenians responsible for very few tyrannical acts, and of many kindly and noble ones, while Aristeides and Pericles were at the head of the state: but quite the reverse when Cleon and Chares were so.
4. Sparta.
And when the Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all the measures taken by King Cleombrotus were conceived in the interests of their allies, but those by Agesilaus not so. The characters of states therefore vary with the variations of their leaders.
5. Philip V.
King Philip again, when Taurion and Demetrius were acting with him, was most impious in his conduct, but when Aratus or Chrysogonus, most humane.

Estimate of Hannibal

The case of Hannibal seems to me to be on a par
Hannibal mastered by circumstances.
with these. His circumstances were so extraordinary and shifting, his closest friends so widely different, that it is exceedingly difficult to estimate his character from his proceedings in Italy. What those circumstances suggested to him may easily be understood from what I have already said, and what is immediately to follow; but it is not right to omit the suggestions made by his friends either, especially as this matter may be rendered sufficiently clear by one instance of the advice offered him. At the time that Hannibal was meditating the march from Iberia to Italy with his army, he was confronted with the extreme difficulty of providing food and securing provisions, both because the journey was thought to be of insuperable length, and because the barbarians that lived in the intervening country were so numerous and savage.
His cruelty.
It appears that at that time this difficulty frequently came on for discussion at the council; and that one of his friends, called Hannibal Monomachus, gave it as his opinion that there was one and only one way by which it was possible to get as far as Italy. Upon Hannibal bidding him speak out, he said that they must teach the army to eat human flesh, and make them accustomed to it. Hannibal could say nothing against the boldness and effectiveness of the idea, but was unable to persuade himself or his friends to entertain it. It is this man's acts in Italy that they say were attributed to Hannibal, to maintain the accusation of cruelty, as well as such as were the result of circumstances.

Hannibal's Greed

Fond of money indeed he does seem to have
His avarice.
been to a conspicuous degree, and to have had a friend of the same character—Mago, who commanded in Bruttium. That account I got from the Carthaginians themselves; for natives know best not only which way the wind lies, as the proverb has it, but the characters also of their fellow-countrymen. But I heard a still more detailed story from Massanissa, who maintained the charge of money-loving against all Carthaginians generally, but especially against Hannibal and Mago called the Samnite. Among other stories, he told me that these two men had arranged a most generous subdivision of operations between each other from their earliest youth; and though they had each taken a very large number of cities in Iberia and Italy by force or fraud, they had never taken part in the same operation together; but had always schemed against each other, more than against the enemy, in order to prevent the one being with the other at the taking of a city: that they might neither quarrel in consequence of things of this sort, nor have to divide the profit on the ground of their equality of rank.

Hannibal Treats Different Cities in Different Ways

The influence of friends then, and still more that of circumstances, in doing violence to and changing the natural character of Hannibal, is shown by what I have narrated and will be shown by what I have to narrate.
Effect of the fall of Capua, B. C. 211.
For as soon as Capua fell into the hands of the Romans the other cities naturally became restless, and began to look round for opportunities and pretexts for revolting back again to Rome. It was then that Hannibal seems to have been at his lowest point of distress and despair. For neither was he able to keep a watch upon all the cities so widely removed from each other,—while he remained entrenched at one spot, and the enemy were manœuvering against him with several armies,— nor could he divide his force into many parts; for he would have put an easy victory into the hands of the enemy by becoming inferior to them in numbers, and finding it impossible to be personally present at all points. Wherefore he was obliged to completely abandon some of the cities, and withdraw his garrisons from others: being afraid lest, in the course of the revolutions which might occur, he should lose his own soldiers as well. Some cities again he made up his mind to treat with treacherous violence, removing their inhabitants to other cities, and giving their property up to plunder; in consequence of which many were enraged with him, and accused him of impiety or cruelty. For the fact was that these movements were accompanied by robberies of money, murders, and violence, on various pretexts at the hands of the outgoing or incoming soldiers in the cities, because they always supposed that the inhabitants that were left behind were on the verge of turning over to the enemy. It is, therefore, very difficult to express an opinion on the natural character of Hannibal, owing to the influence exercised on it by the counsel of friends and the force of circumstances. The prevailing notion about him, however, at Carthage was that he was greedy of money, at Rome that he was cruel.7 . . .


The city of Agrigentum is not only superior to most
Agrigentum taken by Marcus Valerius Laevinus, late in the year B. C. 210, “jam magna parte anni circumacta.Livy, 26, 40.
cities in the particulars I have mentioned, but above all in beauty and elaborate ornamentation. It stands within eighteen stades of the sea, so that it participates in every advantage from that quarter; while its circuit of fortification is particularly strong both by nature and art. For its wall is placed on a rock, steep and precipitous, on one side naturally; on the other made so artificially. And it is enclosed by rivers: for along the south side runs the river of the same name as the town, and along the west and south-west side the river called Hypsas. The citadel overlooks the city exactly at the south-east, girt on the outside by an impassable ravine, and on the inside with only one approach from the town. On the top of it is a temple of Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius as at Rhodes: for as Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians, it is natural that this deity should have the same appellation as at Rhodes. The city is sumptuously adorned in other respects also with temples and colonnades. The temple of Zeus Olympius is still unfinished, but in its plan and dimensions it seems to be inferior to no temple whatever in all Greece. . . .

Marcus Valerius persuaded these refugees,

The treatment of the refugees and desperadoes who had collected at Agathyrna in Sicily. See Livy, 26, 40 fin.
on giving them a pledge for the security of their lives, to leave Sicily and go to Italy, on condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium for plundering Bruttium, and retain all booty obtained from hostile territory. . . .

Greece: Philip Reduces Thessaly

Speech of Chlaeneas, the Aetolian, at Sparta. In the autumn of B. C. 211 the Consul-designate, M. Valerius Laevinus, induced the Aetolians, Scopas being their Strategus, to form an alliance with them against Philip. The treaty, as finally concluded, embraced also the Eleans, Lacedaemonians, King Attalus of Pergamum, the Thracian King Pleuratus, and the Illyrian Scerdilaidas. A mission was sent from Aetolia to persuade the Lacedaemonians to join. See Livy, 26, 24. "That the Macedonian supremacy, men of Sparta, was the beginning of slavery to the Greeks, I am persuaded that no one will venture to deny; and you may satisfy yourselves by looking at it thus. There was a league of Greeks living in the parts towards Thrace who were colonists from Athens and Chalcis, of which the most conspicuous and powerful was the city of Olynthus.
B. C. 347.
Having enslaved and made an example of this town, Philip not only became master of the Thraceward cities, but reduced Thessaly also to his authority by the terror which he had thus set up.
Battle of Chaeronea, B. C. 338.
Not long after this he conquered the Athenians in a pitched battle, and used his success with magnanimity, not from any wish to benefit the Athenians—far from it, but in order that his favourable treatment of them might induce the other states to submit to him voluntarily. The reputation of your city was still such that it seemed likely, that, if a proper opportunity arose, it would recover its supremacy in Greece. Accordingly, without waiting for any but the slightest pretext, Philip came with his army and cut down everything standing in your fields, and destroyed the houses with fire.
Succession of Alexander the Great, B. C. 336.
And at last, after destroying towns and open country alike, he assigned part of your territory to the Argives, part to Tegea and Megalopolis, and part to the Messenians: determined to benefit every people in spite of all justice, on the sole condition of their injuring you.
Destruction of Thebes, B. C. 335.
Alexander succeeded Philip on the throne, and how he destroyed Thebes, because he thought that it contained a spark of Hellenic life, however small, you all I think know well.

Speech of Chlaeneas

"And why need I speak in detail of how the successors of this king have treated the Greeks? For surely there is no man living, so uninterested in public affairs, as not to have heard how Antipater in his victory at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians, as well as the other Greeks; and how he went so far in violence and brutality as to institute man-hunters, and send them to the various cities to catch all who had ever spoken against, or in any way annoyed, the royal family of Macedonia: of whom some were dragged by force from the temples, and others from the very altars, and put to death with torture, and others who escaped were forced to leave Greece entirely; nor had they any refuge save the Aetolian nation alone.
Battle of Crannon, ending the Lamian war, 7th Aug., B. C. 322.
For the Aetolians were the only people in Greece who withstood Antipater in behalf of those unjustly defrauded of safety to their lives: they alone faced the invasion of Brennus and his barbarian army: and they alone came to your aid when called upon, with a determination to assist you in regaining your ancestral supremacy in Greece.8
Defeat of Brennus at Delphi, B. C. 279. Pausan. 10, 15; 20-23.
Who again is ignorant of the deeds of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas? For owing to their recency the knowledge of them still remains distinct. Some of them by introducing garrisons, and others by implanting despots in the cities, effectually secured that every state should share the infamous brand of slavery. But passing by all these I will now come to the last Antigonus,9 lest any of you, viewing his policy unsuspiciously, should consider that you are under an obligation to the Macedonians. For it was with no purpose of saving the Achaeans that he undertook the war against you, nor from any dislike of the tyranny of Cleomenes inducing him to free the Lacedaemonians. If any man among you holds this opinion, he must be simple indeed. No! It was because he saw that his own power would not be secure if you got the rule of the Peloponnese; and because he saw that Cleomenes was of a nature well calculated to secure this object, and that fortune was splendidly seconding your efforts, that he came in a tumult of fear and jealousy, not to help Peloponnesians, but to destroy your hopes and abase your power. Therefore you do not owe the Macedonians so much gratitude for not destroying your city when they had taken it, as hostility and hatred, for having more than once already stood in your way, when you were strong enough to grasp the supremacy of Greece.

Impiety of Philip

"Again, what need to speak more on the wickedness of
Philip V.
Philip? For of his impiety towards the gods his outrages on the temples at Thermus are a sufficient proof; and of his cruelty towards man, his perfidy and treachery to the Messenians.

"So much for the past. But as to the present resolution before you, it is in a way necessary to draft it, and vote on it, as though you were deciding on war, and yet in real truth not to regard it as a war. For it is impossible for the Achaeans, beaten as they are, to damage your territory: but I imagine that they will be only too thankful to heaven if they can but protect their own, when they find themselves surrounded by war with Eleans and Messenians as allied to us, and with ourselves at the same time. And Philip, I am persuaded, will soon desist from his attack, when involved in a war by land with Aetolians, and by sea with Rome and King Attalus. The future may be easily conjectured from the past. For if he always failed to subdue Aetolians when they were his only enemies, can we conceive that he will be able to support the war if all these combine?

Conclusion of the Speech

"I have said thus much with the deliberate purpose of showing you that you are not hampered by previous engagements, but are entirely free in your deliberations as to which you ought to join—Aetolians or Macedonians. If you are under an earlier engagement, and have already made up your minds on these points, what room is there for further argument? For if you had made the alliance now existing between yourselves and us, previous to the good services done you by Antigonus, there might perhaps have been some reason for questioning whether it were right to neglect an old treaty in gratitude for recent favours. But since it was subsequent to this much vaunted freedom and security given you by Antigonus, and with which they are perpetually taunting you, that, after deliberation and frequent consideration as to which of the two you ought to join, you decided to combine with us Aetolians; and have actually exchanged pledges of fidelity with us, and have fought by our side in the late war against Macedonia, how can any one entertain a doubt on the subject any longer? For the obligations of kindness between you and Antigonus and Philip were cancelled then. It now remains for you to point out some subsequent wrong done you by Aetolians, or subsequent favour by Macedonians: or if neither of these exist, on what grounds are you now, at the instance of the very men to whom you justly refused to listen formerly, when no obligation existed, about to undo treaties and oaths—the strongest bonds of fidelity existing among mankind."

Such was the conclusion of what was considered a very cogent speech by Chlaeneas.

Lyciscus Replies To Chlaeneas

After him the ambassador of the Acarnanians, Lyciscus, came forward: and at first he paused, seeing the multitude talking to each other about the last speech; but when at last silence was obtained, he began his speech as follows:—

"I and my colleagues, men of Sparta, have been sent to

Speech of Lyciscus, envoy from Acarnania, which country was to fall to the Aetolians by the proposed new treaty. See Livy, 26, 24.
you by the common league of the Acarnanians; and as we have always shared in the same prospects as the Macedonians, we consider that this mission also is common to us and them. For just as on the field of war, owing to the superiority and magnitude of the Macedonian, force, our safety is involved in their valour; so, in the controversies of diplomacy, our interests are inseparable from the rights of the Macedonians. Now Chlaeneas in the peroration of his address gave a summary of the obligations existing between the Aetolians and yourselves. For he said, If subsequent to your making the alliance with them any fresh injury or offence had been committed by Aetolians, or any kindness done by Macedonians, the present proposal ought properly to be discussed as a fresh start; but that if, nothing of the sort having taken place, we believe that by quoting the services of Antigonus, and your former decrees, we shall be able to annul existing oaths and treaties, we are the greatest simpletons in the world.' To this I reply by acknowledging that I must indeed be the most foolish of men, and that the arguments I am about to put forward are indeed futile, if, as he maintains, nothing fresh has happened, and Greek affairs are in precisely the same position as before. But if exactly the reverse be the case, as I shall clearly prove in the course of my speech,—then I imagine that I shall be shown to give you some salutary advice, and Chlaeneas to be quite in the wrong. We are come, then, expressly because we are convinced that it is needful for us to speak on this very point: namely, to point out to you that it is at once your duty and your interest, after hearing of the evils threatening Greece, to adopt if possible a policy excellent and worthy of yourselves by uniting your prospects with ours; or if that cannot be, at least to abstain from this movement for the present.

Defence of Macedonian Policy

"But since the last speaker has ventured to go back to ancient times for his denunciations of the Macedonian royal family, I feel it incumbent on me also to say a few words first on these points, to remove the misconception of those who have been carried away by his words.

"Chlaeneas said, then, that Philip son of Amyntas became

Sacred war, B. C. 357-346. Onomarchus killed near the gulf of Pagasae. B. C. 352. See Diodor, 16, 32-35.
master of Thessaly by the ruin of Olynthus. But I conceive that not only the Thessalians, but the other Greeks also, were preserved by Philip's means. For at the time when Onomarchus and Philomelus, in defiance of religion and law, seized Delphi and made themselves masters of the treasury of the god, who is there among you who does not know that they collected such a mighty force as no Greek dared any longer face? Nay, along with this violation of religion, they were within an ace of becoming lords of all Greece also. At that crisis Philip volunteered his assistance; destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple, and became the author of freedom to the Greeks, as is testified even to posterity by the facts.
Philip elected generalissimo against Persia in the congress of allies at Corinth, B. C. 338.
For Philip was unanimously elected general-in-chief by land and sea, not, as my opponent ventured to assert, as one who had wronged Thessaly; but on the ground of his being a benefactor of Greece: an honour which no one had previously obtained. 'Ay, but,' he says, 'Philip came with an armed force into Laconia.' Yes, but it was not of his own choice, as you know: he reluctantly consented to do so, after repeated invitations and appeals by the Peloponnesians, under the name of their friend and ally. And when he did come, pray observe, Chlaeneas, how he behaved. Though he could have availed himself of the wishes of the neighbouring states for the destruction of these men's territory and the humiliation of their city, and have won much gratitude too by his act, he by no means lent himself to such a policy; but, by striking terror into the one and the other alike, he compelled both parties to accommodate their differences in a congress, to the common benefit of all: not putting himself forward as arbitrator of the points in dispute, but appointing a joint board of arbitration selected from all Greece. Is that a proceeding which deserves to be held up to reproach and execration?

Contrast Between Alexander and the Aetolians

"Again, you bitterly denounced Alexander, because,
Alexander's services to Greece.
when he believed himself to be wronged, he punished Thebes: but of his having exacted vengeance of the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks you made no mention at all; nor of his having released us all in common from heavy miseries, by enslaving the barbarians, and depriving them of the supplies which they used for the ruin of the Greeks,—sometimes pitting the Athenians against the ancestors of these gentlemen here, at another the Thebans; nor finally of his having subjected Asia to the Greeks.

"As for Alexander's successors how had you the audacity

The Diadochi.
to mention them? They were indeed, according to the circumstances of the time, on many occasions the authors of good to some and of harm to others: for which perhaps others might be allowed to bear them a grudge.
The Aetolian policy.
But to you Aetolians it is in no circumstance open to do so,— you who have never been the authors of anything good to any one, but of mischief to many and on many occasions! Who was it that called in Antigonus son of Demetrius to the partition of the Achaean league? Who was it that made a sworn treaty with Alexander of Epirus for the enslaving and dismembering of Acarnania? Was it not you? What nation ever sent out military commanders duly accredited of the sort that you have? Men that ventured to do violence to the sanctity of asylum itself! Timaeus violated the sanctuary of Poseidon on Taenarum, and of Artemis at Lusi. Pharylus and Polycritus plundered, the former the sacred enclosure of Here in Argos, the latter that of Poseidon at Mantinea. What again about Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did not they make a treacherous attack on the assembly of the Pan-Boeotians in time of peace, committing outrages worthy of Scythians and Gauls? You will find no such crimes as these committed by the Diadochi.

Services of Macedonians To Greece

"Not being able to say anything in defence of
B.C. 279.
any of these acts, you talk pompously about your having resisted the invasion of Delphi by the barbarians, and allege that for this Greece ought to be grateful to you. But if for this one service some gratitude is owing to the Aetolians; what high honour do the Macedonians deserve, who throughout nearly their whole lives are ceaselessly engaged in a struggle with the barbarians for the safety of the Greeks? For that Greece would have been continually involved in great dangers, if we had not had the Macedonians and the ambition of their kings as a barrier, who is ignorant? And there is a very striking proof of this.
Defeat and death of Ptolemy Ceraunus in the battle with the Gauls, B.C. 280. See Pausan. 10.19.7.
For no sooner had the Gauls conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, by their victory over Ptolemy Ceraunus, than, thinking the rest of no account, Brennus promptly marched into the middle of Greece. And this would often have happened if the Macedonians had not been on our frontiers.

"However, though I have much that I could say on the past, I think this is enough. Of all the actions of Philip, they have selected his destruction of the temple, to fasten the charge of impiety upon him. They did not add a word about their own outrage and crime, which they perpetrated in regard to the temples in Dium, and Dodona, and the sacred enclosures of the gods. The speaker should have mentioned this first. But anything you Aetolians have suffered you recount to these gentlemen with exaggeration: but the things you have inflicted unprovoked, though many times as numerous as the others, you pass over in silence; because you know full well that everybody lays the blame of acts of injustice and mischief on those who give the provocation by unjust actions themselves.

Sparta Should Have Allied Herself with the Macedonians

"Of Antigonus I will only make mention so far, as to avoid appearing to despise what was done, or to treat as unimportant so great an undertaking. For my part I think that history does not contain the record of a more admirable service than that which Antigonus performed for you: indeed it appears to me to be unsurpassable. And the following facts will show this. Antigonus went to war with you and conquered you in a pitched battle. By force of arms he became master of your territory and city at once. He might have exercised all the rights of war upon you: but he was so far from inflicting any hardships upon you, that, besides other benefits, he expelled your tyrant and restored your laws and ancestral constitution. In return for which, in the national assemblies, calling the Greeks to witness your words, you proclaimed Antigonus your benefactor and preserver.

"What then ought to have been your policy? I will speak what I really think, gentlemen of Sparta: and you will I am sure bear with me. For I shall do this now from no wish to go out of my way to bring railing accusations against you, but under the pressure of circumstances, and for the common good. What then am I to say? This: that both in the late war you ought to have allied yourselves not with Aetolians but with Macedonians; and now again, in answer to these invitations, you ought to join Philip rather than the former people. But, it may be objected, you will be breaking a treaty. Which will be the graver breach of right on your part,—to neglect a private arrangement made with Aetolians, or one that has been inscribed on a column and solemnly consecrated in the sight of all Greece? On what ground are you so careful of breaking faith with this people, from whom you have never received any favour, while you pay no heed to Philip and the Macedonians, to whom you owe even the very power of deliberating to-day? Do you regard it as a duty to keep faith with friends? Yet it is not so much a point of conscience to confirm written pledges of faith, as it is a violation of conscience to go to war with those who preserved you: and this is what, in the present instance, the Aetolians are come to demand of you.

A Mightly Cloud is Coming From the West

"Let it, however, be granted that what I have now said may in the eyes of severe critics be regarded as beside the subject. I will now return to the main point at issue, as they state it. It was this: 'If the circumstances are the same now as at the time when you made alliance with the Aetolians, then your policy ought to remain on the same lines.' That was their first proposition. 'But if they have been entirely changed, then it is fair that you should now deliberate on the demands made to you as on a matter entirely new and unprejudiced.' I ask you therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, who were your allies on the former occasion when you invited this people to join you? Were they not all the Greeks? But with whom are you now united, or to what kind of federation are you now inviting this people? Is it not to one with the foreigner? A mighty similarity exists, no doubt, in your minds, and no diversity at all! Then you were contending for glory and supremacy with Achaeans and Macedonians, men of kindred blood with yourselves, and with Philip their leader; now a war of slavery is threatening Greece against men of another race, whom you think to bring against Philip, but have really unconsciously brought against yourselves and all Greece. For just as men in the stress of war, by introducing into their cities garrisons superior in strength to their own forces, while successfully repelling all danger from the enemy, put themselves at the mercy of their friends,—just so are the Aetolians acting in the present case. For in their desire to conquer Philip and humble Macedonia, they have unconsciously brought such a mighty cloud from the west, as for the present perhaps will overshadow Macedonia first, but which in the sequel will be the origin of heavy evils to all Greece.

Contrast of the Aetolian Policy

"All Greeks indeed have need to be on the alert
B.C. 492. Herod 6, 48; 7, 133.
for the crisis which is coming on: but Lacedaemonians above all. For why was it, do you suppose, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, when Xerxes sent an ambassador to your town demanding earth and water, thrust the man into a well, and, throwing earth upon him, bade him take back word to Xerxes that he had got from the Lacedaemonians what he had demanded from them,—earth and water? Why was it again, do you suppose, that Leonidas and his men started forth to a voluntary and certain death? Was it not that they might have the glory of being the forlorn hope, not only of their own freedom, but of that of all Greece also? And it would indeed be a worthy action for descendants of such heroes as these to make a league with the barbarians now, and to serve with them; and to war against Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Thessalians, and in fact against nearly every Greek state except Aetolians! To these last it is habitual to act thus: and to regard nothing as disgraceful, so long only as it is accompanied by an opportunity of plunder.
B.C. 480.
It is not so, however, with you. And what must we expect these people to do, now that they have obtained the support of the Roman alliance? For when they obtained an accession of strength and support from the Illyrians, they at once set about acts of piracy at sea, and treacherously seized Pylus; while by land they stormed the city of Cleitor, and sold the Cynethans into slavery. Once before they made a treaty with Antigonus, as I said just now, for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian races; and now they have done the same with Rome for the destruction of all Greece.

Sparta Must Be On Guard Against Attack from Rome

"With a knowledge of such transactions before his eyes
Herod. 7, 132.
who could help suspecting an attack from Rome, and feeling abhorrence at the abandoned conduct of the Aetolians in daring to make such a treaty? They have already wrested Oeniadae and Nesus from the Acarnanians, and recently seized the city of the unfortunate Anticyreans, whom, in conjunction with the Romans, they have sold into slavery.10 Their children and women are led off by the Romans to suffer all the miseries which those must expect who fall into the hands of aliens; while the houses of the unhappy inhabitants are allotted among the Aetolians. Surely a noble alliance this to join deliberately! Especially for Lacedaemonians: who, after conquering the barbarians, decreed that the Thebans, for being the only Greeks that resolved to remain neutral during the Persian invasion, should pay a tenth of their goods to the gods.

"The honourable course then, men of Sparta, and the one becoming your character, is to remember from what ancestors you are sprung; to be on your guard against an attack from Rome; to suspect the treachery of the Aetolians. Above all to recall the services of Antigonus: and so once more show your loathing for dishonest men; and, rejecting the friendship of the Aetolians, unite your hopes for the future with those of Achaia and Macedonia. If, however, any of your own influential citizens are intriguing against this policy, then at least remain neutral, and do not take part in the iniquities of these Aetolians. . . ."

In the autumn of B. C. 211, Philip being in Thrace, Scopas made a levy of Aetolians to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanians sent their wives, children, and old men to Epirus, while the rest of them bound themselves by a solemn execration never to rejoin their friends except as conquerors of the invading Aetolians. Livy, 26, 25.

Philip in Thessaly

When the Acarnanians heard of the intended invasion of the Aetolians, in a tumult of despair and fury they adopted a measure of almost frantic violence. . .

If any one of them survived the battle and fled from the danger, they begged that no one should receive him in any city or give him a light for a fire. And this they enjoined on all with a solemn execration, and especially on the Epirotes, to the end that they should offer none of those who fled an asylum in their territory. . . .

When Philip was informed of the invasion he advanced promptly to the relief of Acarnania; hearing of which the Aetolians returned home. Livy, l. c.

Zeal on the part of friends, if shown in time, is of great service; but if it is dilatory and late, it renders the assistance nugatory,—supposing, of course, that they wish to keep the terms of their alliance, not merely on paper, but by actual deeds.11 . . .

Investment of Echinus by Philip

Having determined to make his approach upon the
In the campaigns of Philip, during the time that Publius Sulpicius Galba as Proconsul commanded a Roman fleet in Greek waters, i.e. from B. C. 209 to B. C. 206. See Livy, 26, 22, 28; 28, 5-7; 29, 12.
town at the two towers, he erected opposite to them diggers' sheds and rams; and opposite the space between the towers he erected a covered way between the rams, parallel to the wall. And when the plan was complete, the appearance of the works was very like the style of the wall. For the superstructures on the pent-houses had the appearance and style of towers, owing to the placing of the wattles side by side; and the space between looked like a wall, because the row of wattles at the top of the covered way were divided into battlements by the fashion in which they were woven. In the lowest division of these besieging towers the diggers employed in levelling inequalities, to allow the stands of the batteringrams to be brought up, kept throwing on earth, and the ram was propelled forward: in the second story were water vessels and other appliances for quenching fires, and along with them the catapults: and on the third a considerable body of men were placed to fight with all who tried to damage the rams; and they were on a level with the city towers. From the covered way between the besieging towers a double trench was to be dug towards the wall, between the city towers. There were also three batteries for stone-throwing machines, one of which carried stones of a talent weight, and the other two half that weight. From the camp to the pent-houses and diggers' sheds underground tunnels had been constructed, to prevent men, going to the works from the camp or returning from the works, being wounded in any way by missiles from the town. These works were completed in a very few days, because the district round produced what was wanted for this service in abundance. For Echinus is situated on the Melian Gulf, facing south, exactly opposite the territory of Thronium, and enjoys a soil rich in every kind of produce; thanks to which circumstance Philip had no scarcity of anything he required for his purpose. Accordingly, as I said, as soon as the works were completed, they begun at once pushing the trenches and the siege machinery towards the walls. . . .
Spring of B. C. 209.12

Asia and Egypt

While Philip was investing Echinus, and had secured his position excellently on the side of the town, and had strengthened the outer line of his camp with a trench and wall, Publius Sulpicius, the Roman pro-consul, and Dorimachus, Strategus of the Aetolians, arrived in person,—Publius with a fleet, and Dorimachus with an army of infantry and cavalry,—and assaulted Philip's entrenchment. Their repulse led to greater exertions on Philip's part in his attack upon the Echinaeans, who in despair surrendered to him. For Dorimachus was not able to reduce Philip by cutting off his supplies, as he got them by sea. . . .

When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the

Aegina taken before the end of 208 B. C., for Sulpicius wintered there between 208-207 B. C. See Livy, 27, 32.
inhabitants as had not escaped crowded together at the ships, and begged the pro-consul to allow them to send ambassadors to cities of their kinsmen to obtain ransom. Publius at first returned a harsh answer, saying, that "When they were their own masters was the time that they ought to have sent ambassadors to their betters to ask for mercy, not now when they were slaves. A little while ago they had not thought an ambassador from him worthy of even a word; now that they were captives they expected to be allowed to send ambassadors to their kinsfolk: was that not sheer folly?" So at the time he dismissed those who came to him with these words. But next morning he called all the captives together and said that, as to the Aeginetans, he owed them no favour; but for the sake of the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send ambassadors to get ransom, since that was the custom of their country. . . .

Nature of the Euphrates River

The Euphrates rises in Armenia and flows through Syria and the country beyond to Babylonia. It seems to discharge itself into the Red Sea; but in point of fact it does not do so: for its waters are dissipated among the ditches dug across the fields before it reaches the sea. Accordingly the nature of this river is the reverse of that of others. For in other rivers the volume of water is increased in proportion to the greater distance traversed, and they are at their highest in winter and lowest in midsummer; but this river is fullest of water at the rising of the dog-star, and has the largest volume of water in Syria, which continually decreases as it advances.
July 26.
The reason of this is that the increase is not caused by the collection of winter rains, but by the melting of the snows; and its decrease by the diversion of its stream into the land, and its subdivision for the purposes of irrigation.
The transport of the army of Antiochus in his eastern campaigns. See supra, 8, 25.
It was this which on this occasion made the transport of the army slow, because as the boats were heavily laden, and the stream very low, the forces of the current did exceedingly little to help them down. . . .

Embassy from Rome to Ptolemy

The Romans sent ambassadors to Ptolemy, wishing
M. Atilius and Manius Glabrio sent to Alexandria with presents to Ptolemy Philopator and Queen Cleopatra. Livy, 27, 4, B. C. 210.
to be supplied with corn, as they were suffering from a great scarcity of it at home; and, moreover, when all Italy had been laid waste by the enemy's troops up to the gates of Rome, and when all supplies from abroad were stopped by the fact that war was raging, and armies encamped, in all parts of the world except in Egypt. In fact the scarcity at Rome had come to such a pitch, that a Sicilian medimnus was sold for fifteen drachmae.13 But in spite of this distress the Romans did not relax in their attention to the war.

1 Or "legion," according to others. But as both Consuls are engaged in the business, it seems reasonable to refer it to the two consular armies of two legions each.

2 That is "blaming Fortune or Providence." Schw. quotes Xenophon Hellen. 7, 5, 12,ἔξεστι μὲν τὸ θεῖον αἰτιᾶσθαι.

3 συμπέμψαι, a difficult word. See Strachan-Davidson's note. It seems to me to be opposed to φυγεῖν or some such idea. Hannibal was not in flight, but kept the enemy with him, as it were, in a kind of procession, until the moment for striking.

4 There is some word wanting in the text here which has been variously supplied. I have ventured to conjecture τὰ γὰρ δοκοῦντα παράβολον κ.τ.λ., and to translate accordingly: for it is the boldness and apparent rashness of Hannibal's movement that Polybius seems to wish to commend.

5 Cp. Homer, Odyss. 19, 471.

6 Livy, 25, 40, calls him Mutines.

7 See 3, 86, note. Cp. Cicero de Am. § 8,cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia decertatum est, Pyrrho et Annibale. Ab altero propter probitatem ejus non nimis alienos animos habemus; alterum propter crudelitatem semper hacc civitas oderit.

8 The paragraph "For the Aetolians. . . in Greece," follows "the Messenians" in ch. 30, in the Greek texts. But it is evidently out of place there, and falls naturally into this position.

9 Antigonus Doson.

10 B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24-26.

11 On the margin of one MS. is written "For such is the characteristic always maintained by the Athenian State." But its relevancy is not very apparent; and at any rate it seems more likely to be a comment of the Epitomator, than a sentence from Polybius.

12 Scopas (B.C. 211-210) must have gone out of office, i.e. it was after autumn of 210 B. C.

13 That is, 10s. 3 3/4d. for about a bushel and a half. See on 2, 15.

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