The art of oratory, as taught by most authorities, and those the best, consists of five parts:-
invention, arrangement, expression, memory,
(the two latter terms being used synonymously). But all speech expressive of purpose involves
also a subject
If such expression is brief
and contained within the limits of one sentence, it
may demand nothing more, but longer speeches
require much more. For not only what we say
and how we say it is of importance, but also
the circumstances under which we say it. It is here
that the need of arrangement comes in. But it will
be impossible to say everything demanded by the
subject, putting each thing in its proper place, without
the aid of memory.
It is for this reason that memory
forms the fourth department. But a delivery, which
is rendered unbecoming cither by voice or gesture,
spoils everything and almost entirely destroys the
effect of what is said. Delivery therefore must be
assigned the fifth place.
Those (and Albutins is among them), who maintain
that there are only three departments on the ground
that memory and delivery (for which I shall give
instructions in their proper place1
) are given us by
nature not by art, may be disregarded, although
Thrasymachus held the same views as regards delivery.
Some have added a sixth department, subjoining judgment
on the ground that it is
necessary first to invented
and then to exercise our judgment.
For my own part I do not believe that invention
can exist apart from judgement,
since we do not say that a
speaker has invented
incousistent, two-edged or foolish
arguments, but merely that he has failed to avoid
them. It is true that Cicero in his Rhetorica2
but in my opinion
is so inextricably mingled with the first
three departments of rhetoric (for without judgment
are possible), that
I think that even delivery owes much to it. I say
this with all the greater confidence because Cicero in
his Partitiones oratoriae3
arrives at the same five-fold
division of which I have just spoken. For after an
initial division of oratory into invention
he assigns matter and arrangement
to invention, words
and makes memory
department common to them all and acting as their
guardian. Again in the Orator4
he states that eloquence consists of five things, and in view of the fact
that this is a later work we may accept this as his
more settled opinion.
Others, who seem to me to
have been no less desirous than those mentioned
above to introduce some novelty, have added order,
although they had already mentioned arrangement,
as though arrangement
was anything else than the
marshalling of arguments in the best possible order.
Dion taught that oratory consisted only of invention
but added that each of these departments was twofold in nature, being concerned with
words and things, so that expression
must be added as a fifth department. The followers
of Theodorus divide invention
into two parts, the one
concerned with matter
and the other with expression,
and then add the three remaining departments.
Hermagoras places judgment, division, order
everything relating to expression
under the heading
a Greek word meaning the management
of domestic affairs which is applied metaphorically to
oratory and has no Latin equivalent.
A further question arises at this point, since
some make memory
in the list of
departments, while others make it follow arrangement.
Personally I prefer to place it fourth. For we ought
not merely to retain in our minds the fruits of our
in order that we may be able to arrange
them, or to remember our arraangement
in order that
we may express it, but we must also commit to
memory the words which we propose to use, since
embraces everything that goes to the compposition of a speech.
There are also not a few who have held that these
are not parts
of rhetoric, but rather duties
observed by the orator. For it is his business to
invent, arrange, express, etcetera. If, however, we
accept this view, we leave nothing to art.
although the orator's task is to speak well, rhetoric
is the science of speaking well. Or if we adopt
another view, the task of the artist is to persuade,
while the power of persuasion resides in the art.
Consequently, while it is the duty of the orator to
invent and arrange, intention
regarded as belonging to rhetoric.
At this point
there has been much disagreement, as to whether
these are parts
of rhetoric, or, as Athenaeus
of rhetoric, which the Greeks call
But they cannot correctly be called elements.
For in that case we should have to regard
them merely as first-principles, like the moisture, fire,
matter or atoms of which the universe is said to be
composed. Nor is it correct to call them duties, since
they are not preformed by others, but perform something themselves. We must therefore conclude that
they are parts.
For since rhetoric is composed of
them, it follows that:, since a whole consists of parts,
these must be parts of the whole which they compose. Those who have called them duties
me to have been further influenced by the fact that
they wished to reserve the name of parts
division of rhetoric: for they asserted that the parts
of rhetoric were, panegyric, deliberative
oratory. But if these are parts, they are parts rather
of the material than of the art.
For each of them
contains the whole of rhetoric, since each of them
requires invention, arrangement, expression, memory
Consequently some writers have thought
it better to say that there are three kinds
those whom Cicero5
has followed seem to me to
have taken the wisest course in terming them kinds