[72]
not even those special pleas, in which questions of
competence make themselves most evident, give rise to
the same species of question as those laws under
which the action is brought, so that the enquiry is
[p. 447]
really concerned with the name of a given act,1 with
the letter of the law and its meaning, or with something that requires to be settled by argument? The
basis originates from the question, and in cases of
competence it is not the question concerning which
the advocate argues that is involved, but the question
on account of which he argues.2
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