or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust?” “Really,” I said, “if the choice rested with me.” “Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me: do you agree that there is a kind of goodAristotle borrows this classification from Plato ( 118 b 20-22), but liking to differ from his teacher, says in one place that the good which is desired solely for itself is the highest. The Stoics apply the classification to “preferables” (Diogenes Laertius vii. 107). Cf. Hooker, . i. 11. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes goods of the soul, of the body, and of possessions ( 697 B, 727-729) or as the first Alcibiades puts it (131) the self, the things of the self, and other things. which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures are harmlessPlato here speaks of harmless pleasures, from the point of view of common sense and prudential morality. Cf. . 59 Dἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονήν, Milton's “Mirth that after no repenting draws.” But the (583 D) like the (493 E-494 C) knows the more technical distinction of the (42 C ff., 53 C ff.) between pure pleasures and impure, which are conditioned by desire and pain. and nothing results from them afterwards save to have and to hold the enjoyment.”