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<TEI.2><text><body><div1 type="Book" n="7" org="uniform" sample="complete"><p><milestone n="523d" unit="section" />equally a finger,<note anchored="yes" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">This anticipates Aristotle's doctrine that “substances”
                        do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.</note> and in this respect
                    it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either
                    extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of
                    this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to
                    question the reason and to ask what in the world is a finger, since the faculty
                    of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite
                    of a finger.” “Why, no, it does not,” he said.
                    “Then,” said I, “it is to be expected that such a
                    perception will not provoke or awaken<note anchored="yes" resp="Loeb" place="unspecified">We should
                        never press synonyms which Plato employs for <foreign lang="greek">ποικιλία</foreign> of style or to avoid falling into a rut of terminology.</note>
                    </p></div1></body></text></TEI.2>