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<TEI.2><text><body><div1 type="book" n="22" org="uniform" sample="complete"><p><milestone unit="chapter" n="44" />
								<milestone unit="section" n="1" />The consuls, after making a sufficient reconnaissance of the roads, followed the Phoenicians until they came to Cannae, where, having the enemy in view, they divided their forces, as they had done before, and fortified two camps, at about the same distance from one another as at Gereonium.<note place="unspecified" anchored="yes">At chap. xl. § 5 we were not told how far apart the camps were, but only that the smaller one was nearer Hannibal than the larger one.</note>
								<milestone unit="section" n="2" /> The river Aufidus, flowing past both their camps, was readily accessible to water-carriers at such spots as were convenient for each, though not without fighting;
								<milestone unit="section" n="3" /> it was, however, from the smaller camp, which was situated across the Aufidus,<note place="unspecified" anchored="yes">Neither Livy nor Polybius (III. cx.) states explicitly that the larger camp of the Romans was on the left, or western bank, but that such was the fact may fairly be inferred from Livy's <hi rend="italics">trans Aufidum</hi> (§ 3) and Polybius's <foreign lang="greek">πέραν, ἀπὸ διαβάσεως πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολάς</foreign> (III. cx. 10), both of which phrases are used of the smaller camp, and such is the view of Professor Kromayer. (See map.)</note> that the Romans could fetch water more freely, since the enemy had no troops posted on the further bank.</p> 
			<p><milestone unit="section" n="4" />Hannibal had conceived a hope that the consuls would give him an opportunity of fighting in a place that was formed by nature for a cavalry action, in which arm he was invincible. He therefore drew out his men in battle array and ordered the Numidians to make a sally and provoke the enemy.
				<milestone unit="section" n="5" /> This caused the camp of the Romans to be once more the scene of strife amongst the soldiers and dissension between the consuls. Paulus cast in Varro's teeth the recklessness of Sempronius and Flaminius;
				<milestone unit="section" n="6" /> Varro retorted that Fabius was a specious example for timid and slothful generals, and called on gods and men to witness that it was through no fault of his that Hannibal had by now acquired as it were a <pb id="p.349" />prescriptive right to Italy, for he was kept in fetters<note type="margin" place="unspecified" anchored="yes">B.C. 216</note> by his colleague, and the soldiers, enraged as they were and eager to fight, were deprived of swords and arms.
				<milestone unit="section" n="7" /> Paulus rejoined that if anything untoward should befall the legions, recklessly abandoned to an ill-advised and rash engagement, he would himself be guiltless of all blame, but would share in all the consequences; let Varro, he said, see to it, that where tongues were bold and ready, hands —when it came to fighting —were no less so.</p> <p>
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