On Organization
In dealing with
the sum of money under discussion and the other matters referred to this
Assembly, I see no difficulty, men of
Athens, in either of two methods: I may attack the officials
who assign and distribute the public funds and may thus gain credit with those
who regard this system as detrimental to the State, or I may approve and commend
the right to receive these doles and so gratify those who are especially in need
of them. For neither class has the interest of the State in view, when they
approve or complain of the system, but they are prompted respectively by their
poverty or their affluence.
[
2]
I myself would
neither propose such a distribution of the doles, nor oppose the right to
receive them; but I do urge you to reflect seriously in your own minds that
while the sum of money you are discussing is a trifle, the habit of mind that it
fosters is a serious matter. Now if you so organize the receipt of money that it
is associated with the performance of duties, so far from injuring, you will
actually confer on the State and on yourselves the greatest benefit; but if a
festival or any other pretext is good enough to justify a dole, and yet you
refuse even to listen to the suggestion that there is any obligation attached to
it, beware lest you end by acknowledging that what you now consider a proper
practice was a grievous error.
[
3]
My idea of our
duty—do not drown with your clamor what I am about to say, but hear me
before you judge—my idea is that, as we have devoted a meeting of the
Assembly to the question of receiving the dole, so we ought also to devote a
meeting to organization and to equipment for war; and everyone must show himself
not merely ready to hear what is said, but also willing to act, so that you may
depend on yourselves, Athenians, for your hopes of success, and not be always
asking what service this individual or that is rendering.
[
4]
The total revenues of the State, including your own
resources, now squandered on unnecessary objects, and the contributions of your
allies, must be shared by each citizen equally, as pay by those of military age
and as overseers' fees, or whatever you like to call it, by those beyond the
age-limit; and you must serve in person and not resign that duty to others,
[
5]
but our army must be a national force,
equipped from the resources I have named, so that you may be well provided for
the performance of your task, and that we may have no repetition of what usually
happens now, when you are always bringing your generals to trial and the net
result of your exertions is the announcement that “So-and-so, the son
of So-and-so, has impeached So-and-so.”
[
6]
But what is to be the result for you? In the first place, that your
allies may be kept loyal, not by maintaining garrisons among them, but by making
their interests identical with yours; next, that our generals may not lead
mercenaries to the plunder of our allies without even coming in sight of the
enemy, so that the profit is all their own, while the State at large incurs the
hatred and the abuse, but that they may have their own citizens at their back,
and may so deal with our enemies as they now deal with our friends.
[
7]
But apart from this, many operations demand your
actual presence, and beside the advantage of using a national force in a
national quarrel, this is necessary on every other ground. For if you were
content to let things slide and not worry about the state of
Greece, it would be another matter.
[
8]
But, as it is, you claim to take the lead and to
determine the rights of other states; yet neither in the past nor today have you
furnished a sufficient force to superintend and secure this claim. On the
contrary, it was when you stood utterly aloof and indifferent that the
democracies of
Mytilene and of
Rhodes were destroyed.
“Yes, but
Rhodes was our
enemy,” you may say.
[
9]
But you should
consider, men of
Athens, that our
hostility towards oligarchies, purely on the ground of principle, is stronger
than our hostility towards democracies on any grounds whatever. But to return to
my point. My view is that you must be brought under a system, and there must be
a uniform scheme for receiving public money and for performing necessary
services. I have addressed you before on this subject and have described the
method of organizing you, whether you serve in the infantry or the cavalry or in
other ways, and also how ample provision may be ensured for all alike.
[
10]
I will tell you without any concealment
what has caused me most disappointment. It is that though the many reforms
proposed were all of them important and honorable, no one remembers any of them,
but everyone remembers the two obols.
1 Yet these can
never be worth more than two obols, but the other reforms, together with those
that I proposed, are worth all the wealth of the Great King—that a
city, so well provided with infantry, triremes, cavalry, and revenues, should be
duly organized and equipped.
[
11]
Why then, you may ask, do I choose the present time for
these remarks? Because I think that, as the principle that all citizens should
serve for pay is displeasing to some people, and yet the advantage of
organization and equipment is approved by all, you ought to begin the business
at this point, giving everyone a chance of stating his views on the subject. For
the case stands thus: if you are convinced that now is the opportunity for these
reforms, all things will be ready when the need of them arrives, but if you pass
over the opportunity as unsuitable, then, just when you want to use them, you
will be compelled to begin your preparations.
[
12]
It has been before now remarked, men of
Athens, by some
speaker—not one of the great body of citizens, but one of those who
are likely to have a fit if these reforms are carried
out—“What good have we ever got from the speeches of
Demosthenes? He comes forward, whenever he thinks well, fills our ears with
phrases, denounces our present state, extols our ancestors, and then descends
from the platform after raising our hopes and inflating our pride.”
[
13]
But if I could only induce you to accept
any of my proposals, I think that I should confer such benefits on the State
that if I tried to describe them now, many of you would disbelieve them, as
being too good to be true. And yet even this too I consider no mean benefit, if
I accustom you to listen to the best advice. For he who would benefit the State,
Athenians, must first purge your ears, for they have been poisoned; so many lies
have you been accustomed to hear—anything, in fact, rather than the
best advice.
[
14]
Let me give you an instance, and
let no one interrupt me till I have finished my story. You know that a day or
two ago the treasury of the Parthenon
2 was broken into. So the speakers in the Assembly, one and
all, cried that the democracy was overthrown, that the laws were null and void,
and so on. And yet, Athenians, though the culprits—mark whether my
words are true—deserved death, it is not through them that the
democracy is endangered. Again, a few oars were stolen. “Scourge the
thieves torture them,” cried the orators; “the democracy is
in danger.” But what is my opinion I say, like the others, that the
thief deserves death, but not that the democracy is endangered by such means.
[
15]
The real danger to democracy no one is
bold enough to name; but I will name it. It is in danger when you, men of
Athens, are wrongly led, when in
spite of your numbers you are helpless, unarmed, unorganized and at variance,
when no general or anyone else pays any heed to your resolutions, when no one
cares to tell you the truth or set you right, when no one makes an effort to
remedy this state of things. And that is what always happens now.
[
16]
Yes, by heavens, men of
Athens, and there are other phrases, false
and injurious to the State, that have passed into your common speech, such as
“In the law-courts lies your salvation,” and “It
is the ballot-box that must save the State.” I know that these courts
are sovereign to uphold the rights of citizen against citizen, but it is by arms
that you must conquer the enemy, and upon arms depends the safety of the State.
[
17]
For resolutions will not give your men
victory in battle, but those who with the help of arms conquer the enemy shall
win for you power and security to pass resolutions and to do what you will. For
in the field you ought to be terrible, but in the courts sympathetic.
[
18]
If my speeches seem to
be greater than my own worth, that is itself a virtue in them. For a speech, if
it is to be delivered on behalf of this great city and our wide interests, ought
always to appear greater than the individual who utters it; it ought to
approximate to your reputation, not to the reputation of the speaker. But none
of the men whom you delight to honor speaks like that, and I will tell you what
their excuse is.
[
19]
Men who aim at office and at
official rank go to and fro cringing to the favours of the electorate; each
one's ambition is to join the sacred ranks of the generals, not to do a man's
work. If anyone is really capable of undertaking a job, he thinks that by
exploiting the reputation and renown of
Athens, profiting by the absence of opposition, holding out
hopes to you and nothing but hopes, he will be sole inheritor of your
advantages—and so he is; but if you act as your own agents in every
case, he will only have his equal share with the rest, both in the labours and
also in their results.
[
20]
The politicians,
absorbed in their profession, neglect to devise the best policy for you and have
joined the ranks of the office-seekers; and you conduct your party-politics as
you used to conduct your tax-paying—by syndicates.
3 There is an
orator for chairman, with a general under him, and three hundred to do the
shouting. The rest of you are attached now to one party and now to another.
Hence all that you gain is that So-and-so has a public statue and So-and-so
makes his fortune—just one or two men profiting at the expense of the
State. The rest of you are idle witnesses of their prosperity, surrendering to
them, for the sake of an easy life from day to day, the great and glorious
prosperity which is yours by inheritance.
[
21]
Yet consider how things were managed in the
days of your ancestors, for you need not go abroad for examples to teach you
your duty. Take Themistocles, who was your general in the sea-fight at
Salamis, and Miltiades, who
commanded at Marathon, and many more whose good services were far greater than
those of our present generals: verily our ancestors put up no bronze statues to
them, but rewarded them as men in no way superior to themselves.
[
22]
For truly, men of
Athens, they never robbed themselves of any of their
achievements, nor would anyone dream of speaking of Themistocles' fight at
Salamis, but of the Athenians'
fight, nor of Miltiades' battle at Marathon, but of the Athenians' battle. But
now we often hear it said that Timotheus took
Corcyra, that Iphicrates cut up the Spartan detachment, or that
Chabrias won the sea-fight off
Naxos.
4 For you seem to waive your own right to these successes
by the extravagant honors which you have bestowed on each of these officers.
[
23]
Rewards to citizens, rightly thus granted
by our ancestors, are wrongly granted by you. But how about foreigners? When
Meno of
Pharsalus gave twelve talents
of silver towards the war at
Eion near
Amphipolis5 and supported us with two hundred cavalry of his
own vassals, our ancestors did not vote him the citizenship, but only gave him
immunity from taxes.
[
24]
On an earlier occasion,
when Perdiccas,
6 who was king of
Macedonia at the time of the Persian
invasions, destroyed the barbarians who were retreating after their defeat at
Plataea and so completed the
discomfiture of the Great King, they did not vote him the citizenship, but only
gave him immunity from taxes; because, I presume, they regarded their own
country as great, glorious, and venerable, and as something greater than any
service rendered. But now, Athenians, you make citizens of the scum of mankind,
menial sons of menial fathers, charging a price for it as for any other
commodity.
[
25]
You have got into the habit of
acting thus, not because in ability you are inferior to your ancestors, but
because it was second nature with them to have a high opinion of themselves,
while you, Athenians, have lost that virtue. You cannot, I suppose, have a proud
and chivalrous spirit, if your conduct is mean and paltry, any more than your
spirit can be mean and humble, if your conduct is honorable and glorious; for
whatever a man's pursuits are, such must be his spirit.
[
26]
But reflect on what
might be named as the outstanding achievements of your ancestors and of
yourselves, if haply the comparison may yet enable you to become your own
masters. For five and forty years
7 they commanded the willing obedience
of the Greeks; more than ten thousand talents did they accumulate in our
Acropolis; many honorable trophies for victories on sea and on land did they
erect, in which even yet we take a pride. Yet remember that they erected them,
not that we might wonder as we gaze at them, but that we might also imitate the
virtues of the dedicators.
[
27]
Thus did our
ancestors; but as for us, who have gained, as you all see, a clear field,
consider whether we can match them. Have we not wasted more than fifteen hundred
talents on the needy communities of
Greece?
8 Have we not squandered our private estates,
our public funds, and the contributions of our allies? Have not the allies
gained in war been lost in the peace?
[
28]
But, it
may be said, in these respects alone things were better then than now, but in
other respects worse. Far from it; but let us examine any instance you please.
The buildings which they left behind them to adorn our city—temples,
harbors, and their accessories—were so great and so fair that we who
come after must despair of ever surpassing them; the Propylaea yonder, the
docks, the porticoes and the rest, with which they beautified the city that they
have bequeathed to us.
[
29]
But the private houses
of those who rose to power were so modest and so in accordance with the style of
our constitution that the homes of their famous men, of Themistocles and Cimon
and Aristides, as any of you can see that knows them, are not a whit more
splendid than those of their neighbors.
[
30]
But
today, men of
Athens, while our
public works are confined to the provision of roads and fountains, whitewash and
balderdash (and I blame, not those who introduced these
improvements—far from it!—but you, if you imagine that these
are all that is required of you), private individuals, who control any
of the State-funds, have some of them reared private houses, not merely finer
than the majority, but more stately than our public edifices, and others have
purchased and cultivated estates more vast than they ever dreamed of before.
[
31]
The cause of all this change is that then
the people controlled and dispensed everything, and the rest were well content
to accept at their hand honor and authority and reward; but now, on the
contrary, the politicians hold the purse-strings and manage everything, while
the people are in the position of lackeys and hangers-on, and you are content to
accept whatever your masters dole out to you.
[
32]
Such, in consequence, is the state of our
public affairs that if anyone read out your resolutions and then went on to
describe your performances, not a soul would believe that the same men were
responsible for the one and for the other. Take for instance the decrees that
you passed against the accursed Megarians,
9 when they appropriated the sacred demesne, that you should
march out and prevent it and forbid it; in favour of the Phliasians, when they
were exiled the other day, that you should help them and not give them up to
their murderers, and should call for volunteers from the
Peloponnese.
[
33]
That, Athenians, was all very noble and right and worthy of our city; but the
resultant action was simply of no account. So your hostility is expressed in
your decrees, but action is beyond your control. Your decrees accord with the
traditions of
Athens, but your
powers bear no relation to your decrees.
[
34]
I,
however, would advise you—do not be angry with me—either to
humble yourselves and be content to mind your own affairs, or else to get ready
a more powerful force. If I felt sure that you were Siphnians or Cythnians
10 or people of that sort, I should
counsel you to be less proud, but since you are Athenians, I urge you to get
your force ready. For it would be a disgrace, men of
Athens, a disgrace to desert that post of
honor which your ancestors bequeathed to you.
[
35]
But besides it is no longer in your power, even if you wished it, to hold
aloof from Greek affairs. For you have many exploits to your credit from the
earliest times, and it would be disgraceful to abandon the friends you have,
while it is impossible to trust your enemies and allow them to grow powerful. In
short, you stand in the same position as your statesmen stand to
you—they cannot retire when they would; for you are definitely
involved in the politics of
Greece.
[
36]
This,
Athenians, is the sum of all that I have said. Your orators never make you
either bad men or good, but you make them whichever you choose; for it is not
you that aim at what they wish for, but they who aim at whatever they think you
desire. You therefore must start with a noble ambition and all will be well, for
then no orator will give you base counsel, or else he will gain nothing by it,
having no one to take him at his word.