Browsing named entities in Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). You can also browse the collection for 25th or search for 25th in all documents.

Your search returned 6 results in 3 document sections:

Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Stuart's cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign. (search)
Page 192: If Longstreet and Hill had stayed quiet a day longer Stuart would have crossed the Potomac in advance of Hooker's army early in the evening of the 25th, and the fate of the Confederate cause might have been different. There was no pressing necessity for the movement. General Lee did regard the movement of Lonrmy, crossed ten or twelve miles above on the pontoon at Edwards' Ferry, and marched on to Frederick. If Stuart had crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 25th, as suggested by General Lee, he would have been in position on General Ewell's right on the 26th of June, on which date the two columns of the Second Corps left Chambersburg, going towards the Susquehanna and General Lee arrived at that place. (See page 15). If he had crossed at Seneca on the 25th, as he expected to do before Hooker's army moved, he might still have had time to move over to Fredericktown, as indicated by General Lee; but when he had crossed the Potomac on the 27th, it
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Review of the Gettysburg campaign. (search)
y with Stuart, this delay was fatal, and threw his plans out of gear. Hooker's army, after concentrating about Leesburg, began the passage of the Potomac on pontoons at Edwards' Ferry, about twelve miles east of and below Harper's Ferry, on the 25th, and the movement was completed on the 26th. In the meantime Hill crossed the river at Shepherdstown on the 24th, and Longstreet at the same time at Williamsport. The two columns united at Hagerstown, and proceeded thence to the neighborhood of never would have delivered battle at Frederick; he would have retired precipitately to the neighborhood of Washington, and as one of General Lee's objects was the securing of supplies, such a move would have diverted him from that purpose. On the 25th, he wrote to Mr. Davis, from Williamsport, I have not sufficient troops to maintain my communications, and have to abandom them. I trust I can throw General Hooker's army across the Potomac, and draw troops from the South, embarrassing their plan
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), General J. E. B. Stuart in the Gettysburg campaign. (search)
and Hooker, learning the fact, had followed, the plans of the Confederate Commander, were, as I have stated, revealed to General Hooker, and the reason given for Stuart's march being made in rear of Federal army, no longer existed. Should not that officer then have reverted to the other route and crossed at Shepherdstown so as to be able to carry out his instructions as promptly as possible? Was not this course also the more important when he found that he could not cross the Potomac on the 25th, because the Federal columns were moving north? His cavalry had been assigned a definite part in the campaign then opened — that is, to guard Ewell's flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect supplies for the army. Everything should have been subordinated to the accomplishment of this end. Had it been, General Stuart would have resisted the temptation to break the Federal communications with Washington, and to capture and carry off the enemy's wagon train, and would ha