Browsing named entities in Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865. You can also browse the collection for July 15th or search for July 15th in all documents.

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ert it as an incontrovertible truth, fully proved by later events, that the President of the Confederacy, by neglecting to compel his Quarter master-General to procure the transportation which could have been easily procured, more than a month before the battle of Manassas; by refusing, as early as the 13th of June, to assent to General Beauregard's urgent request that authority should be given to concentrate our forces at the proper moment, at Manassas Junction; by again refusing, on the 15th of July, to allow him to execute his bold, offensive plans against the enemy, the certain result of which would have been the taking of Washington; that the President of the Confederacy, by thus persisting in these three lamentable errors, lost the South her independence. We write this in no spirit of detraction. But, after a lapse of more than twenty-two years, President Davis must expect to stand before the public merely on the merits of his acts and omissions. Personal friendships, which wou
General Johnston, who received it? It is clear that, under the order as given, General Johnston could have moved, or not, as he thought best in the circumstances; and that the making or not making of the junction was left entirely to his own decision. That such is the only correct conclusion to be arrived at after reading that order, is shown by the following passage in the endorsement of Mr. Davis: The words if practicable had reference to letters of General Johnston of 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as compared with his own. Hence the uncertainty, hence the want of authoritativeness, so perceptible in the governmental despatch alluded to. That the War Department construed it as entirely contingent, and as depending upon General Johnston's judgment, is further shown by the telegram already mentioned in Chapter VIII. of this book, but whic