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The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 3: The Decisive Battles. (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller), chapter 11 (search)
It was the garrison at this same Johnsonville that, a month earlier, had been frightened into panic and flight when the bold Confederate raider, Forrest, appeared on the west bank of the river and began a noisy cannonade. New troops had been sent to the post. They appear well coated and equipped. The day after the photograph was taken (November 23d) the encampment in the picture was broken. The forces were widely scattered, and the situation was indeed critical. The afternoon of November 29th records a series of lost opportunities to the Confederates. From noon until seven o'clock in the evening the little force of Stanley was completely isolated from the main army. Hood had sufficient troops literally to crush him, to cut off the retreat of Schofield, and thereby to defeat that wing of the Federal army. During the afternoon and evening there were various attempts made on the Union lines, which were stoutly resisted. The vigor of the repulse, the lack of concentration in
The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 3: The Decisive Battles. (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller), Nashville — the end in Tennessee (search)
It was the garrison at this same Johnsonville that, a month earlier, had been frightened into panic and flight when the bold Confederate raider, Forrest, appeared on the west bank of the river and began a noisy cannonade. New troops had been sent to the post. They appear well coated and equipped. The day after the photograph was taken (November 23d) the encampment in the picture was broken. The forces were widely scattered, and the situation was indeed critical. The afternoon of November 29th records a series of lost opportunities to the Confederates. From noon until seven o'clock in the evening the little force of Stanley was completely isolated from the main army. Hood had sufficient troops literally to crush him, to cut off the retreat of Schofield, and thereby to defeat that wing of the Federal army. During the afternoon and evening there were various attempts made on the Union lines, which were stoutly resisted. The vigor of the repulse, the lack of concentration in
Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative, Chapter 14: fall of 1862 (search)
g the country was hilly and wooded. The river was narrow, and there were several fords. These features would have made a crossing easy to accomplish by a surprise. Below the town the river widened, and the country opened. Yet Burnside adopted that flank for his movement, and began his preparations to cross at Skinker's Neck, 12 miles below Fredericksburg, where the river was over 1000 feet wide. Lee discovered his preparations, and as Jackson's corps had arrived from the Valley about Nov. 29, it was moved to the right, and observed the river as far as Port Royal, 18 miles below. Jackson had not left Winchester until Nov. 22, five days after Sumner's arrival at Falmouth. His troops had marched 150 miles in 10 days, but Lee and Jackson had both presumed largely on Burnside's want of enterprise in allowing, for even a few days, 150 miles to separate the two corps. Lee had given no express orders to Jackson, but as late as Nov. 19, had written him to remain in the Valley as long
Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative, Chapter 19: battle of Chickamauga (search)
d'sBenning156Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 Hood'sRobertson918633Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 Hood'sLaw1569892Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 Hood'sAnderson35760Nov. 17 and 18 Hood'sAnderson3312925187Nov. 29 Total Hood's Division8338744514 DIVISIONBRIGADEKILLEDWOUNDEDMISSINGTOTALDATE McLaws'sWofford4812181250Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 McLaws'sBryan2712164212Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 McLaws'sHumphreys1818Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 McLaws'sHumphreys218756164Nov. 29 McLaws'sKershaw191163138Nov. 17 and 18 Total McLaws's Division115463204782 Aggregate1988502481296 Loss in the assault on Fort Sanders, Nov. 29: killed, 129; wounded, 458; missing, 226; total, 813, included in the above. Return of casualties, BurnsidNov. 29: killed, 129; wounded, 458; missing, 226; total, 813, included in the above. Return of casualties, Burnside's command, Nov. 14 to Dec. 4, 1863 DIVISIONBRIGADEKILLEDWOUNDEDMISSINGTOTAL 9th Corps 1st Div. Morrison519630 Christ15252464 Humphreys1810246166 Artillery22 Total3814876262 9th Corps 2d Div. Sigfried5273264 Schall47314 Artillery11 Total9353579 Total 9th Corps47183111341 23d Corps 2d Div.Chapin13619 23d Corps 3d Div
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter X (search)
turnpike at Spring Hill. While I have no wish to take any part in that discussion, I must say that I think the mistake was Hood's. I think he attempted a little longer march, over a very bad road, than could be made in so short a time. The 29th of November is a very short day, and the march of troops across pontoon bridges and through deep mud is very slow. If Hood had turned down the north bank of Duck River, across the fields, which were no worse than his road, he could have got into a fighse at Franklin made final success easy and certain. A retreat at any time before nine o'clock A. M. on the 29th would have led to substantially the same result as if begun at 2 A. M. If the plan adopted and ordered early in the morning of November 29 had been carried out, by which the line of Duck River would have been abandoned in the middle of that day, the head of the column from Spring Hill would have arrived at Franklin about midnight, expecting to cross the Harpeth without delay; but
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
e answer being received by me next morning, November 29. It is thus seen that up to the morning :30 P. M. and his answer was received by me November 29 (no hour mentioned in the records). The DepThe appendix to my report mentions the date November 29, but does not give the hour. My official r, artillery, and trains. In the morning, November 29, I sent a brigade of infantry toward Huey'st my reply to General Thomas of 8:30 A. M., November 29, and my orders to Ruger of 8 and 8:45 A. M.m the north bank of Duck River. Early on November 29, I sent the following brief despatch in rep15 A. M. to Wilson. Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the first report from the brigade sent towf the order actually given to the troops on November 29 explains how that mistake occurred. In bri division at that place in the afternoon of November 29 cannot be overestimated or too highly praisad already learned at 2 A. M. the same day (November 29). The only question in my mind that General[5 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XII (search)
information that cavalry could possibly give. If it is true that the operations of our cavalry were to some extent influenced by apprehension of a cavalry raid on Nashville or other vital point in our rear, that was only what General Thomas had been apprehending all the time, and to meet which he had assembled eight thousand troops in Nashville, perhaps not informing the commander of his own cavalry of that fact quite as early as he might have done. See Thomas's despatch of 8 P. M., November 29, to Colonel H. C. Wharton, Wilson's staff officer: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1146. In fact, the redoubtable Forrest had become famous, and his troopers were esteemed a very large factor in the problem then undergoing solution—greater in some respects, as I have pointed out, than the events justified. In my report of the battle of Franklin I gave all the information in my possession of the gallant action of our cavalry in driving that of the enemy back across the Harpeth at t
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIII (search)
y assault and his rear reached by Thomas's cavalry before noon, and nothing less than a miracle could have prevented the capture of Hood's army. It is worthy of note as instructive comparisons that on November 30 Hood advanced from Spring Hill to Franklin and made his famous assault in just about the same length of time that it took our troops to advance from the first to the second position at Nashville and make the assault of December 16; and that the Fourth and Twenty-third corps on November 29 and 30 fought two battles—Spring Hill and Franklin—and marched forty miles, from Duck River to Nashville, in thirty-six hours. Time is an element in military problems the value of which cannot be too highly estimated, yet how seldom has it been duly appreciated! The remnant of Hood's army having made its escape across the Tennessee River, the pursuit terminated, and General Thomas issued his remarkable General Orders, No. 169, announcing that the rear-guard of the flying and dispirited
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIV (search)
December 16 that battle due to the spontaneous action of subordinate commanders statements in the reports of the Corps commanders explanation of the absence of orders the Phraseology of General Thomas's report. the official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate, made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood'
Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing), Columbus, Christopher 1435-1536 (search)
coast, the wind being southwest, but he did not weigh, because he was unacquainted with the coast beyond, and did not know what danger there might be for the vessels. The sailors of the two vessels went on shore to wash their clothes, and some of them walked inland for a short distance. They found indications of a large population. but the houses were all empty, every one having fled. They returned by the banks of another river, larger than that which they knew of, at the port. Thursday, Nov. 29. The rain and thick weather continuing, the Admiral did not get under way. Some of the Christians went to another village to the northwest, but found no one, and nothing in the houses. On the road they met an old man who could not run away, and caught him. They told him they did not wish to do him any harm, gave him a few presents, and let him go. The Admiral would have liked to have had speech with him, for he was exceedingly satisfied with the delights of that land, and wished t
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