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Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4., The opposing forces at Fort Fisher, N. C.: January 13-15, 1865. (search)
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. H. Colquitt: 6th Ga., Col. T. J. Lofton; 19th Ga.,----; 23d Ga.,----; 27th Ga.,----; 28th Ga.,----Hagood's Brigade: 11th S. C.,----; 21st S. C.,----; 25th S. C.,----; 27th S. C.,----; 7th S. C. Battalion,----. Kirkland's Brigade: 17th N. C.,----; 42d N. C.,----; 50th N. C.,----; 66th N. C.,---- cavalry: 2d S. C., Col. T. J. Lipscomb. According to General Bragg's official report the garrison of Fort Fisher (including reenforcements from the adjacent forts) numbered 1800, and the movable force under General Hoke, including reserves and cavalry, was about 6000. In regard to the losses, the same authority says: After the enemy entered the fort our loss is represented to have been about 500 killed and wounded. The garrison consisted of about 110 commissioned officers and 2400 or 2500 men. The strength thus stated probably included the 21st and 25th South Carolina sent from Hagood's Brigade. General Terry reported the capture of 112 officers and 1971 men. Colo
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
, in elementary treatise, and remain yet to be developed. Lloyd, who has made on them an essay in the fifth part of his Memoirs, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe has not been happy in his sayings and his predictions; he sees obstacles everywhere; he presents, among others, as impregnable, the frontiers of Austria upon the Inn, between the Tyrol and Passau, where we have seen Moreau and Napoleon manoeuvre, and triumph with armies of a hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805 and 1809. The greater part of those reasonings are open to the same criticism; he has seen things too materially. But if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the European staffs must be rich with valuable documents for teaching them, at least in the special schools of this corps. In waiting for some studious officer to profit from those documents, published or unpublished, for giving the public a good military and strategical geography, it may, thanks to the im
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
he other face, as had place in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The nearly right angle, formed by thefile of Bard, covered by a little fort, had in 1800. The second kind of decisive points is that rmy destined to second him. On the contrary, in 1800, Kray, finding himself in the same position at m back upon the Maine. In the same campaign of 1800, the first objective point of Bonaparte, was to results of the lines of operations of 1796, of 1800 and 1809. 14. The general configuration of tments coming from the Rhine. The campaign of 1800, more characteristic still, signalised a new er such a refuge may have a great importance. In 1800, the intrenched camp of Ulm gave Kray the meansove the opportuneness of this precaution. In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray upon the true complicated. The campaign of 1799 and that of 1800, are equally rich in interesting lessons on thi In reading the history of the Fort of Bard in 1800, or the taking of Leutasch, and Scharnitz in 18[12 more...]
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
f the point where it ought to be made, is connected with the grand operations which embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an example for causing to be appreciated this assertion. Napoleon, more skillful in strategy than his lieutenst be owned that it is worthy of remark. In our day, General Dedon has celebrated the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl, and that of the Danube at Hochstaedt in 1800: his work should be consulted as classic for details; now, precision in details is everything for these kinds of operations. Finally, three other passages of thnt this frontier as the more advantageous for being defended by lateral movements. This assertion has received, as we have said, cruel denials in the campaigns of 1800, 1805 and 1809, but as the lateral defense has not been precisely well attempted there, the question is still susceptible of controversy. All depends in my opin
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
and the new system, at the same time preserving the advantage of the division organization. He formed inithe campaign of 1800, corps of two or three divisions, which he placed under lieutenant generals for forming the wings, the centre or the reserorganization at all stable; meanwhile events are not always as complicated as those of 1805, and the campaign of Moreau in 1800, proves that the primitive organization can, to a certain point, be maintained, at least for the bulk of the army. To thiuence that of the grand fractions. If an army does not exceed a hundred thousand men, the formation in divisions, as in 1800, would be better perhaps than that by corps. After having sought the best mode for giving a somewhat stable organizatio12. The proportions of the artillery have considerably varied in the late wars. Napoleon went to the conquest of Italy in 1800, with forty or fifty pieces, and succeeded completely; whilst in 1812 he invaded Russia with twelve hundred pieces, and di
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Strategy. (search)
's communications, we close his line of retreat; to return to his base, he is obliged to force his way with the bayonet; if he fails in this attempt and is defeated, he will be forced to surrender. Examples of such operations are the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806. In 1805, Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and extension of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this,place our armies between those of the enemy, and transport our main body alternately from one army to the other. The enemy's armies, being isolated, cannot unite, and must fall under the blows of our superior force. The plan of the campaign of 1800, as devised by Napoleon, is the finest example that can be offered for a similar operation. Melas, with a large army in Italy, had arrived at a short distance from the French frontier; Kray, with another army, threatened the Rhine. Moreau, nea
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only be favorable to a movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this direction may be best calculated to lead to important results. (Fig. 4.) In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left of the line of the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by the St. Bernard and Milan on the eecessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base. Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by Turin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first secured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
nt victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, Marengo in 1800, Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in 1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this concente efforts of the Archduke Charles. St. Jean d'acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days of open trench. Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a month. Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days. 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days. Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two months; and in 1809 it was again besieged for two months. Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days. Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly four of themVienna in 1529, and again in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792; nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos in 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names of places that
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 4: Logistics.—Subsistence.—Forage.—Marches.—Convoys.—Castrametation (search)
ght the battle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of January, then marched all night upon Rivoli, fought in the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua on the 15th, and defeated the army of Provera on the morning of the 16th,--thus, in less than four days, having marched near fifty leagues, fought three battles, and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners! Well might he write to the Directory that his soldiers had surpassed the much vaunted rapidity of Caesar's legions. In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of Loudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and climbing mountains and. glaciers. In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at Boulogne, in the early part of September, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts on the Rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. During the same campaign the French infantry, pursuing the Archduke Ferdinand in his retreat from Ulm, marched thirty miles a day in dreadful
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 7: sea-coast defences..—Brief description of our maritime fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have taken place between ships and forts, including the attack on San Juan d'ulloa, and on St. Jean d'acre (search)
compare this cost of timber for building, with that of the same item for repairs, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and 1820, The list would have been still farther enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect: Name of Ship.No. of Guns.When built.Repaired fromCost. Vengeance,74--1800 to 1807£84,720 Ildefonso,74--1807 to 180885,195 Scipio,74--1807 to 180960,785 Tremendous,74--1807 to 1810135,397 Elephant,74--1808 to 181167,0within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between 1800 and 1820, was £ 18,727,551; in repairs and ordinary wear and tear, £ 17,449,780; making an annual average of $4,560,158 fo voted for the sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships, from 1800 to 1815. Year.For the wear and tear of Ships.Ext. Expenses for building, repairing, &c.For entire seaservice. 1800£4,
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