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Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Conclusion (search)
n with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to a request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. Finally [A. F.] Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government. From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States. I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican Republic. That was the scheme of one man [Napoleon III], an imitator without genius or merit. He had succeeded in stealing the government of his cou
General James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, Chapter28: Gettysburg-Third day. (search)
came down over them. It is simply out of the question for a lesser force to march over broad, open fields and carry a fortified front occupied by a greater force of seasoned troops. Referring to the proposed move around the Union left to cut the line of communication, a parallel in the Franco-German war is appropriate. When the manoeuvres of the campaign had pushed Marshal MacMahon's army back to the road between Paris and Metz, the latter fortified and occupied by the army under Marshal Bazaine, MacMahon hesitated between Paris and Metz, and was manoeuvred out of position to a point north of the line. Von Moltke seized the opportunity and took position on the line, which gave him shorter routes east and west. So that MacMahon, to reach either point, must pass the German forces under Von Moltke. He made a brave effort to reach Metz, and Von Moltke, to maintain his advantage, was called to skilful manoeuvre and several gallant affairs, but succeeded in holding his advantage t
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XVI (search)
the east of Metz; while the centre and left were composed of the several corps of the Second Army, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, a part of whose troops had just been engaged in the sanguinary battle of Mars-la-Tour, by which Bazaine was cut off from the Verdun road, and forced back toward Metz. At first the German plan was simply to threaten with their right, while the corps of the Second Army advanced toward the north, to prevent the French, of whose intentions there wnian corps, and some of the lately broken right wing organizations, that had been rallied on the heights of Gravelotte. The lost ground being thus regained, and the French having been beaten on their right, it was not long before word came that Bazaine's army was falling back to Metz, leaving the entire battle-field in possession of the Germans. During the excitement of the day I had not much felt the want of either food or water, but now that all was over I was nearly exhausted, having ha
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XVII (search)
m spoke English, however, except Bismarck, who sat next the King and acted as interpreter when his Majesty conversed with me. Little was said of the events taking place around us, but the King made many inquiries concerning the war of the rebellion, particularly with reference to Grant's campaign at Vicksburg; suggested, perhaps, by the fact that there, and in the recent movements of the German army, had been applied many similar principles of military science. The French army under Marshal Bazaine having retired into the fortifications of Metz, that stronghold was speedily invested by Prince Frederick Charles. Meantime the Third Army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia-which, after haying fought and won the battle of Worth, had been observing the army of Marshal MacMahon during and after the battle of Gravelotte--was moving toward Paris by way of Nancy, in conjunction with an army called the Fourth, which had been organized from the troops previously engaged around Metz, and on t
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XIX (search)
IX Riding over the battle-field destruction of Bazeilles mistakes of the French Marshal Bazaine on to Paris a week in Meaux Rheims on the picket line under fire a surrender at Verilized, accepted battle with the Crown Prince, pitting 50,000 men against 175,000; the next was Bazaine's fixing upon Metz as his base, and stupidly putting himself in position to be driven back to iBelgian frontier. Indeed, it is exasperating and sickening to think of all this; to think that Bazaine carried into Metz — a place that should have been held, if at all, with not over 25,000 men — a, I cannot conceive that this excuse was sincere; on the contrary, I think that the movement of Bazaine must have been inspired by Napoleon with a view to the maintenance of his dynasty rather than fcularly because word had been received the same morning that a correspondence had begun between Bazaine and Prince Frederick Charles, looking to the capitulation of Metz, for the surrender of that pl
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XX (search)
ly no other termination. As I have previously stated, the first of these blunders was the acceptance of battle by MacMahon at Worth; the second in attaching too much importance to the fortified position of Metz, resulting in three battles-Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte-all of which were lost; and the third, the absurd movement of MacMahon along the Belgian frontier to relieve Metz, the responsibility for which, I am glad to say, does not belong to him. With the hemming in of Bazaine at Metz and the capture of MacMahon's army at Sedan the crisis of the war was passed, and the Germans practically the victors. The taking of Paris was but a sentiment-the money levy could have been made and the Rhine provinces held without molesting that city, and only the political influences consequent upon the changes in the French Government caused peace to be deferred. I did not have much opportunity to observe the German cavalry, either on the march or in battle. The only time I
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3., Lee's right wing at Gettysburg. (search)
made sufficient sacrifice, and that was all we had left to do on that day. During the Franco-Prussian war I kept a map of the field of operations with colored pegs, that were moved from day to day to indicate the movements of the two armies. Bazaine had been driven to shelter at Metz, McMahon had been driven back to the route leading from Paris to Metz and seemed in doubt whether he would go to Paris or to Bazaine's relief. He suffered himself to be forced north of the route between these Bazaine's relief. He suffered himself to be forced north of the route between these points. On the morning that the wires brought us that information, two or three of the French Creoles of New Orleans visited my office to ask my views of the movements then proceeding. I replied, McMahon's army will be prisoners of war in ten days. They were very indignant and stated that I was a Republican and in sympathy with the Prussians. My reply was that I had only given them my solution of a military problem. The Prussians were on the shorter route to Paris or to Metz, so that if Mc
John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies, Chapter 8: (search)
upon an army. He served with distinction until the close of the war, and displayed superior ability as a corps commander whilst in the Army of Tennessee. A forcible example of the difference in the mode of handling troops — as illustrated by General Lee, and those generals who constantly resort to the use of fortifications — is afforded in the recent war between France and Prussia, and also in that between Turkey and Russia. One hundred and fifty thousand of Louis Napoleon's Army, under Bazaine, shut themselves up in the stronghold of Metz; allowed a much larger number of Germans to surround them; to construct works almost as formidable as their own, and quietly await their surrender for want of provisions. The Turks committed a similar blunder at Plevna, in allowing a fine army to be entrapped and the remainder of their forces to become demoralized by the natural effect of this gross error, in lieu of holding their troops well in hand, taking some general line upon which to re
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 3. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Sketch of the late General S. Cooper. (search)
other side, Prussia had a population of some twenty-four millions, or, including the North German Confederation (of which she is a part) of some thirty millions. Her standing army numbered less than 400,000. To what was due, then, the astounding results of that conquest, for the world was prepared for a gigantic and not unequal combat? Why, in the short space of six months, do we witness a Sedan, with a capitulation by McMahon of 90,000 men? a Metz, with a surrender of nearly 200,000 by Bazaine? a Strasburg, giving up 17,000 soldiers? and speedily the fall of Paris, with a war indemnity to be paid the victors of five milliards of francs? Why such a series of victories for Germany, such inglorious defeats for France? Why such a rapid fall of the curtain upon such a striking tableau vivant? We trace it to the weakness and inefficiency of the military organization of France, and to the wisdom of the system which gave the preponderating power of the reserves to Germany — the marv
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XX (search)
n believes that Maximilian can remain long in Mexico after the French troops are withdrawn; but it is very important for him, in order to give some appearance of truth to his assumed grounds of action, that Maximilian be allowed to stay there some time without French aid. And for this reason he wants some assurance of neutrality from the government of the United States. Prince Napoleon and others with whom I have conversed express the decided opinion that Maximilian will come away with Marshal Bazaine, in spite of all the Emperor may say to induce him to try to stand alone. This, I apprehend, will be the difficulty, and may cause much delay, unless the United States kindly lend a helping hand. Would it not be wise for us to abstain for a few months from all interference, direct or indirect, and thus give Napoleon and Maximilian time to carry out their farce? Mexico would thus be rid of the French flag in the least possible time. If the French troops come also, Juarez can easily d
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