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James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), The blockade and the cruisers. (search)
he extra session in August, an appropriation of a million and a half dollars for armored vessels, to be built upon plans approved by a board of officers. The board was composed of three of the ablest captains in the service, Smith, Paulding, and Davis. Out of a large number of plans proposed, three were selected by the board and ordered by the Department. Upon these plans were built the New Ironsides, the Galena, and the Monitor. Most of the measures, as outlined above, refer to the firstion. The steam-battery Fulton was seized at Pensacola, and $25,000 were appropriated to complete and equip her. The Merrimac was presently raised at Norfolk, and found to have no serious injury. Encouragement was given to private enterprise, by Davis's immediate adoption of the plan of issuing letters-of-marque. It was recognized that one of the most vulnerable points on the Union side lay in its commerce; and it was against commerce alone that the insurgent navy throughout the war was able
James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 4: (search)
ble to the blockade-runners. Port Royal then became the centre of occupation, and the headquarters of the fleet. The principal centre of blockade in the South Atlantic was Charleston. An attempt was made early in the war to close the entrance by placing obstructions in the channel. A number of vessels, most of them old whalers, were bought for the purpose by the Navy Department at a cost of $160,--000. They were loaded with stone and sunk in rows on the bar, under the direction of Captain Davis. The plan proved a failure, not through any want of skill in carrying it out, but from the operation of natural causes. The vessels soon buried themselves in the sand, or were gradually moved out of position by the action of the water, and blockade-runners passed in as freely as if no obstructions existed. The experiment was tried at other points with the same result, and the attempt was finally given up. The bar at Charleston extends several miles out to sea, and the main ship cha
James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 5: (search)
full speed down the Southwest Pass until she overtook the retreating blockaders. When she came up with them, the Richmond was making a general signal to cross the bar. Winslow ranged up alongside and earnestly represented the necessity of returning immediately up the river, but Pope, deeming the position of the squadron unsafe, overruled the suggestion and ordered the Water Witch to the assistance of the sailing vessels. This order was carried out. The Preble was piloted across the bar by Davis, the executive of the Water Witch, and the gunboat went herself to assist the Vincennes; but before Winslow could reach her, the sloop grounded. A moment later the Richmond also ran ashore. In this position the vessels of the squadron found themselves when Hollins came down the Pass with his flotilla. It was now about eight o'clock. The enemy's attack was not maintained with any great spirit, and though the cannonade lasted for a couple of hours, no advantage was gained by either side.
James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 7: (search)
he ocean warfare during the conflict falls naturally into a recital of the doings of Southern cruisers. The policy of systematic operations against the merchant fleet of the United States was adopted at the outset. As early as April 17, 1861, Davis published his famous proclamation, announcing his purpose of issuing lettersof-marque. At this time, the practice of privateering had been somewhat discredited by the general concurrence of European States in the Declaration of the Congress of Posed to amend the rules by the addition of a new article, exempting private property at sea from capture. No action was taken on the proposal, and the negotiations were suspended until President Lincoln's accession to office. About a week after Davis's proclamation was issued, the Department of State instructed the Minister of the United States at London to reopen negotiations, and offered to accede unconditionally to the Declaration. This proposal seemed to point too strongly to an effort t
James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 8: (search)
ls of his work himself, and as he had not at command a previously-trained body of staff-officers, he made judicious use of the material at his disposal by the creation of temporary boards. One board was organized, composed of Captains Dupont and Davis, Major Barnard of the Engineers, and Professor Bache, to report on the coast of the enemy, its points of access and its defences. Here the exceptional character of the war led to the selection of exceptional persons to give the information necesalso our own, no one could be better informed about its accessibility and defences than the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, and the engineer who had built the forts. Similarly another board, composed of Commodores Smith and Paulding, and Captain Davis again, was appointed to examine plans for ironclad vessels. The board modestly stated in its report that it approached the subject with diffidence, having no experience and but scanty knowledge in this branch of naval architecture. It was c