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John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter IX (search)
r 30, to march to the nearest point on the railroad, and report by telegraph to General Thomas for orders. At first General Thomas ordered me to move by rail to Tullahoma, and then march across to Pulaski, as Stanley was doing. But just then Forrest with his cavalry appeared at Johnsonville, on the Tennessee River west of Nashville, and destroyed a great quantity of property, General Thomas not having sufficient force available to oppose him; hence on November 3 Thomas ordered me to come atvalry brigades. That action was magnified at the time, and afterward, into evidence of a race between our troops and the enemy for the possession of Columbia. In fact, Ruger's troops at Columbia were quite capable of holding that place against Forrest and Hood's infantry was not within a day's march of either Cox or Stanley until after both had reached Columbia. We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the evening of November 27, inviting an attack, and hoping that Thomas
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter X (search)
r Hood's infantry could not reach that place over a wretched country road much before night, and Stanley, with one division and our cavalry, could easily beat off Forrest. Hence I retained Ruger's division and one of Stanley's, and disposed all the troops to resist any attempt Hood might make, by marching directly from his bridgesDuck River, to dislodge me from that position. That was his best chance of success, but he did not try it. Stanley arrived at Spring Hill in time to beat off Forrest and protect our trains. Then he intrenched a good position in which to meet Hood's column when it should arrive, which it did late in the afternoon. They had a don't think any of Whitaker's men cared to give the Confederates a similar view of them. After stopping to see Stanley a few minutes, and learning that some of Forrest's troopers had been seen at Thompson's Station, three miles farther north, about dusk, I went with Ruger's division to drive them off and clear the way to Frankli
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
,000 to 45,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry, including Forrest's command. I find from General Sherman's despatch to Thomas, dated October 19ue even if Hood's cavalry force was no larger than that which now appears from Forrest's report—5000; for Forrest might easily have got a day or two the start of hisForrest might easily have got a day or two the start of his pursuer at any time, as had often been done on both sides during the war. It is true that Sherman's instructions to Thomas appear to have contemplated the possibno material loss so far. I shall try and get Wilson on my flank this morning. Forrest was all around us yesterday, but we brushed him away in the evening and came tvening. Wilson is here, and has his cavalry on my flank. I do not know where Forrest is. He may have gone east, but, no doubt, will strike our flank and rear again General Wilson this evening. I think he can do very little. I have no doubt Forrest will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief. It appears to m
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XV (search)
ecember 15. But of course there were no copies of orders or despatches which I had not received; and the desertion of my telegraph-operator and the operations of Forrest's cavalry in my rear had made it probable that there must have been some such despatches sent but not received. There were no annotations or other suggestions aseral days, and that your success will fully equal your expectations. He had ordered me to march, as Stanley had done, from Tullahoma to Pulaski; but the action of Forrest at Johnsonville about that time caused General Thomas to change his orders and hurry me by rail to Nashville, and thence to Johnsonville, with the advance of my tely probable that General Thomas had given very little thought at that time to the subject of defensive action, except as against what that troublesome cavalryman Forrest might do. It seems far more probable from the record that General Thomas's plans and wishes in respect to defensive action against Hood's advance into Tennessee,
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVI (search)
not defensible by the force Thomas then had there. Thomas's cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers, would have had nearly a clear field of Kentucky while Hood marched to the Onessee was 45,000, besides cavalry, which was understood to be 10,000, or even 12,000 including Forrest's separate command. But even this was less than half of Sherman's two armies. Sherman made g through Georgia instead of sending a subordinate; and the partial execution of that threat by Forrest's cavalry, referred to in Sherman's despatch of November 1 to Grant, gave a strong reason for She neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and, the water being low, is able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee; and General The line of the Tennessee firmly, as follows: Despatch of last night received. The fact that Forrest is down about Johnsonville, while Hood, with his infantry, is still about Florence and Tuscumbi
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVII (search)
winter, besides destroying Georgia en route. Of course it is much easier to see what might have been done than to see in advance what can or ought to be done. But it can hardly be believed that Sherman did not think of everything that was possible, as well as many things that were not. At least, so simple a proposition as the following could not have escaped his mind. Sherman was, as he so confidently said, absolute master of the situation? before he started for Savannah. Hood and Forrest had utterly failed so to damage his communications that they could not be put in order again in a few days. He was able, if he chose, to remain in perfect security at Atlanta all winter, with two or three corps, while he sent back to Thomas ample force to dispose of Hood. Then, if the result of the operations of a larger force in Tennessee had been as decisive as they actually were with the smaller one Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta all of the troops he had sent to Ten
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Index (search)
ilitary movements at, 152 Eastport, Miss., Forrest at, 319 Education, universal, 519, 520; thoans, 530, 531 Foreboding of death, 141 Forrest, Lieut.-Gen. Nathan B., raids Johnsonville, 14; lack of bridge over, 221, 222; repulse of Forrest at, 228; Hood's retreat across, 248-250; S.'s166, 288-290; the Twenty-third Corps at, 165; Forrest's raid at, 165, 288, 320; military movements nn., possible movement by Beauregard to, 311; Forrest at, 319 Paris, Comte de, on S.'s services 1-173, 210, 211, 214, 215, 219; moves against Forrest at Thompson's Station, 173, 216; moves to Col mastery in Georgia, 338; failure of Hood and Forrest to damage his communications, 338; aims to det, 171, 172, 210, 211, 214-217,228, 230, 279; Forrest driven from, 172; S. moves to, 172, 173, 216; 289, 295, 300, 301, 304, 305, 316–:322, 325; Forrest's raid on, 165; Thomas's army in winter quartfor defeat, 254 Thompson's Station, Tenn., Forrest at, 173; S. at, 174; military movements at, 2[4 more...]