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and Brigadier-General D. C. Buell was assigned to its command, which he assumed November 15th. Army of the Cumberland, vol. i., p. 40. At the same time General H. W. Halleck superseded Fremont in command of the Department of the West. Sherman was removed from Kentucky, and sent to report to Halleck. His memoirs evince that heHalleck. His memoirs evince that he left Kentucky in disappointment and bitterness of spirit, and deeply distrusted by his Government — a distrust which it required all the great political influence of his family to remove. Buell, Sherman's successor, had sterling qualities-integrity, ability, and a high sense of the soldierly calling. He had a fine faculty forplace to cover Nashville with the aid of the volunteer force now being organized, which could in that way be brought in cooperation. It is understood that General Halleck, who will command at Columbus, and General Buell, who is in command on this line, will make a simultaneous attack. I doubt if Buell will make a serious at
s. General Johnston's considerate treatment of Crittenden. Thomas's movements. the movement of the Federal army, which had been frustrated in November, was renewed with better success early in January. General Johnston was now confronted by Halleck in the West, and by Buell in Kentucky. With the exception of the army sent under Curtis against Price in Southwestern Missouri, about 12,000 strong, the whole resources of the Northwest, from Pennsylvania to the Plains, were turned against General Johnston's lines in Kentucky. Halleck, with armies at Cairo and Paducah, under Grant and C. F. Smith, threatened equally Columbus, the key of the Mississippi River, and the water-lines of the Cumberland and Tennessee, with their defenses at Forts Donelson and Henry. Buell's right wing also menaced Donelson and Henry, while his centre was directed against Bowling Green, and his left was advancing against Zollicoffer at Mill Spring on the Upper Cumberland. If this last-named position could
t's share. Sherman's picturesque narrative. Halleck and Buell's views. Federal demonstrations. 220). He says that, in a council between Generals Halleck, Cullom, and himself- General Hallec Columbus, Kentucky. That is their line, said Halleck. Now, where is the proper place to break it?her Cullom or I said, Naturally, the centre. Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other near iGeneral Halleck's orders, I have always given Halleck the full credit for that movement, which was o shows, from the correspondence of Buell and Halleck, that, on the 3d of January, Buell proposed a These views were eminently judicious; but Halleck, overrating General Johnston's force and mean still reaching out. Grant, under orders from Halleck, sent McClernand, with 6,000 men, from Cairo there. On the same day Foote telegraphed Halleck that Fort Henry could be carried with four irrity to move. On January 29th Grant wrote Halleck fully, urging an immediate advance and attack[10 more...]
n at Fort Henry, stated by his biographer, Badeau, at 15,000 men, was receiving accessions from Halleck, while Buell was also reinforcing him. Forrest had reported the enemy concentrating 10,000 5,000. Let us now turn to the Federal army at Henry. Grant, elated by success, telegraphed Halleck: I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry. Badeau says, Thiether in conversation or dispatches, between the two commanders. This statement is erroneous. Halleck telegraphed Buell, January 31st: I have ordered an advance on Fort Henry and _Dover. It will betake and occupy Fort Henry and Dover, etc. Buell, however, had recommended the same movement to Halleck, as early as January 3d, and had already voluntarily started thirteen regiments to aid Grant in it. Halleck was also sending reinforcements, and he replied to Grant on the 8th: Some of the gunboats from Fort Holt will be sent up. Reinforcements will reach you daily. Hold on to Fort Henry
e of success? Buell had an army 75,000 strong. Grant could not be assailed in his fortifications on the north side of the Ohio; and, even if his intrenched position at Paducah had been attacked, he had his fleets and 25,000 men, with Buell and Halleck to draw upon for any required reinforcements up to 100,000 men within three or four days call. Nevertheless, it has been urged that these armies should have been concentrated. To concentrate them for any merely defensive purpose strikes th scale of miles, but by the time required to convey troops over the intervals between commands. Facilities of transportation more than distances, therefore, decide what these interior lines are. An unlimited power of water-communication enabled Halleck and Buell to cooperate fully, and practically to place what force they pleased where they pleased. Such was the concentration that actually took place. Forts Donelson and Henry were nearly twice as far from Bowling Green by land as from the Fe
ny point along its banks, either to attack Nashville in rear, or cut off the communications of Columbus by the river with Memphis, and by the railroad with the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Should the enemy determine on the former plan of operation, your army, threatened in front and on right flank by Buell's large army, will be in a very critical condition, and may be forced to take refuge on the south side of the Tennessee River, in Alabama and Georgia, or Eastern Tennessee. But should Halleck adopt the second plan referred to, the position at Columbus will then become no longer tenable for an army inferior in strength to that of the enemy, and it must fall back to some central point where it can guard the two main railroads to Memphis, i. e., from Louisville and from Charleston; Jackson, Tennessee, would probably be the best position for such an object, with strong detachments at Humboldt and Corinth, and with the necessary advance-guards. The Memphis & Charleston Railroad, so
red to command. It is evident, however, from Halleck's correspondence, that his own cautious and hnd Island No.10. On the 18th of February General Halleck sent Major-General John Pope, whom he hadected. In orders issued March 1st, to Grant, Halleck says: The main object of this expeditioendation. Buell seems to have advised General Halleck with very considerable accuracy and promp, there was some diversity of opinion between Halleck and Buell as to details; but the main idea ofe Tennessee River. The original design of Halleck, as communicated to his subordinates, was a dby the War Department under the orders of General Halleck, and he designated Savannah, on the east oundation in truth, and I shall show that General Halleck and General Grant themselves could not haably from the division of the command between Halleck and Buell, and the time taken up in concertin troops in garrison or reserve of Grant's and Halleck's commands: Buell's troops73,472 Grant's4[14 more...]
ill march for Chattanooga to-morrow, to defend. This army will move on the 26th, by Decatur, for the valley of the Mississippi. Is in good condition and increasing in numbers. When his arrangements at Murfreesboro were complete, he wrote to Mr. Benjamin, February 27th, that he was about to move to the defense of the Mississippi Valley, crossing the (Tennessee) River near Decatur, in order to enable him to cooperate or unite with General Beauregard. Next day he moved. This was before Halleck's orders for the movement up the Tennessee, and ten days before it began, and General Johnston was already three days on his march before Columbus was evacuated. On the 26th of February General Beauregard asked for a brigade to assist in the defense of New Madrid, in the following terms: Appearance of an early attack on New Madrid, in force. Position of absolute necessity to us. Cannot you send a brigade at once, by rail, to assist defense as fast as possible? In his report o
f Grant (page 600) occurs the following correspondence. The first communication is a telegram from General Grant to General Halleck, his commanding officer: Savannah, April 5, 1862. The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at difftook place between our out-guards and the enemy's yesterday and the day before. U. S. Grant, Major-General. Major-General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Missouri. In a subsequent dispatch to Halleck, on the same day, he says that he had received notHalleck, on the same day, he says that he had received notes, stating that our outposts had been attacked by the enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately went up, but found all quiet. . . . They had with them three pieces of artillery, and cavalry and infantry. How much, cannot of course beus, but will be prepared should such a thing take place. General Sherman's dispatch to Grant, sent with the above to Halleck, is as follows: Pittsburg Landing, April 5, 1862. sir: All is quiet along my lines now. We are in the act of exchang
s found in the entire change of Federal tactics from that day. The bayonet was exchanged for the spade; and the grand march was turned into a siege of the South. Halleck took chief command on the 9th, and Grant, though left nominally second in command, was, as his biographer, Badeau, admits, under a cloud, unconsulted, unemployed,nd absent numbered more than one-half the army. No sudden epidemic had smitten the camp; the sickness was the effect of causes evident from the hour of retreat. Halleck had taken position at Farmington, and was advancing spade in hand; and Beauregard intrenched to resist him. Digging in the trenches among those marshes, with consnaction, produced obstinate types of diarrhea and typhoid fever. The attempt to bore artesian wells failed. No sound men were left. Beauregard twice offered Halleck battle. But he preferred regular approaches, in the mean time seizing the railroad east of Corinth, and cutting off communication with the seaboard. There was n
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