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Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 2. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.) 191 19 Browse Search
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 4. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.) 126 8 Browse Search
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.) 98 12 Browse Search
Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative 85 1 Browse Search
William A. Crafts, Life of Ulysses S. Grant: His Boyhood, Campaigns, and Services, Military and Civil. 67 13 Browse Search
Oliver Otis Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, major general , United States army : volume 1 63 5 Browse Search
John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana 51 13 Browse Search
An English Combatant, Lieutenant of Artillery of the Field Staff., Battlefields of the South from Bull Run to Fredericksburgh; with sketches of Confederate commanders, and gossip of the camps. 42 12 Browse Search
Owen Wister, Ulysses S. Grant 40 2 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 36 0 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). You can also browse the collection for Halleck or search for Halleck in all documents.

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Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg. (search)
o the text. As it was impossible to insert them in their proper place, they are given here. The first is a note to the passage which treats of Longstreet's arguments with Lee against making the attack on the morning of the 2d: Now that the war is over, and we have the privilege of reviewing the conduct of both armies, we can see more clearly what would have been the effect of this proposed movement around the Federal left on the afternoon of the 1st. General Meade telegraphed to General Halleck in cipher just before my battle on the 2d: If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster. If, therefore, we had drawn everything up on the night of the 1st and made a concentrated move on the morning of the 2d by
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Numerical strength of the armies at Gettysburg. (search)
e reasoning as that originally pursued, I would say that General Lee had at Gettysburg, including all the cavalry, 67,000 men — that is to say, 53,500 infantry, 9,000 cavalry, and 4,500 artillery. Of course this number was not available to him at any one time, as I have previously explained, but I prefer to adopt the greatest number as shown by the official reports; and in like manner I would persist in estimating the strength of the Federal army by the statement of General Hooker to General Halleck, made on the 27th day of June, to the effect that his whole force of enlisted men present for duty would not exceed 105,000. As General Hooker thus gave only his enlisted men present for duty, perhaps the figures originally given by me as the strength of General Lee's army — that is say, 67,452 on the 31st May, 1873, and 62,000 at Gettysburg — should be employed in the comparison, as they represent also his enlisted men present for duty. For if we add to the 105,000 enlisted men o<
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Colonel Taylor's reply to the Count of Paris. (search)
ooker, on the 27th day of June, 1863-four days previous to the battle-stated that his whole force of enlisted men present for duty would not exceed 105,000. He does not use the term effective strength, but enlisted men present for duty. Evidently these figures were taken from the column headed enlisted men present for duty. Now, why will all the writers on the other side persist in ignoring this evidence of the General of the Army of the Potomac? This dispatch from General Hooker to General Halleck was sent under peculiar circumstances. The former desired to impress upon the latter the necessity for reinforcing him, and that there might be no misunderstanding, he informs his superior that his whole force of enlisted men present for duty will not exceed 105,000. This evidence, written down at the time by the General of the Army, with the reports of his subordinates before him, is worth ten times that sustained only by the hind-sights of the officers whose evidence, given from mem
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), General Longstreet's Second paper on Gettysburg. (search)
done this we should either have been attacked — the very thing we had been hoping and mourning for-or we should have dislodged Meade from his position without striking a blow. If we had been attacked we should have certainly repulsed it. Had Meade deserted his position without striking a blow in its defence, the moral effect in our favor would have been tremendous. To show that one of these results would certainly have followed, I quote a dispatch sent in cipher from General Meade to General Halleck, just before my battle on the 2d. The dispatch reads: If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster. If, however, no decisive result had followed immediately upon the flank movement that should have been made on the night of the
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Reply to General Longstreet's Second paper. (search)
r food to stay the cravings of hunger. The consequence would have been total and inevitable destruction, unless we began the retreat before the crisis arrived. Such considerations as these, doubtless, presented themselves to General Lee, but they seem never to have penetrated General Longstreet's brain. He thinks Meade would certainly have attacked us at once, if we had awaited his attack, or, by abandoning his position, given us the moral effect of a victory, because, in a telegram to Halleck he said: If not attacked and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster. Longstreet's deduction from this is most illogical. All the inferences from his telegram are that Meade would not have attacked us in our then position, unless he coul