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, 3.208; blockade of declared by Ingraham and Beauregard to be raised, 3.191; naval operations under Dupont against the defenses of, 3.192-3.197; evacuation of by Hardee, 3.462; visit of the author to in 1866, 3.481. Charleston Harbor, fortifications in, 1.117; seizure of forts in by South Carolina troops, 1.137; stone fleet exportant services of at the battle of Spottsylvania Court-House, 3.308. Hanover, cavalry battle at, 3.58. Hanover Court-House, skirmish near, 2.406. Hardee, Gen. W. J., at the battle of Shiloh, 2.271. Harding, Col. A. C., his defense of Fort Donelson against Wheeler, 3.116. Harney, Gen. W. S., resumes command of the ason in, 1.120. Warren, Gen. G. K., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 3.30; at the battle of Bristow Station, 3.105; at Mine Run, 3.110. Wartrace, Tenn., Gen. Hardee at, 3.122. Washburne, Gen. C. C., surprised by Gens. Taylor and Green, 3.223. Washburne, Gov., Israel, loyal action of, 1.202. Washington City, how the
t, however, I was ordered in command of a detachment of Dragoons to serve as escort to Lieutenant Williamson of the Topographical Engineers, upon a surveying expedition in the direction of Salt Lake. My duties were soon brought to a close by the receipt of an appointment as Second Lieutenant in the Second Cavalry, a new regiment organized in accord with an Act of Congress, in 1855, and commanded by Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, with R. E. Lee as Lieutenant Colonel, George H. Thomas and W. J. Hardee as Majors. Lieutenant Philip Sheridan relieved me, and I returned to San Francisco en route to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, the rendezvous of the regiment. At the former place I met, for the first time, in his bank, W. T. Sherman, who possessed as at present the same piercing eye and nervous impulsive temperament. Little indeed did I anticipate at that period the great theatre of life upon which I was destined so soon to be thrown as an humble actor with him and others just mentioned,
that General Sherman was about to advance. This information induced quite a large number of absentees to return; as General Hardee and myself had noticed this increase a short time before the retreat began, the subject was mentioned between us whenhich latter point some diminution occurred in casualties, and in desertions on the night of our retreat on Cassville. Hardee's Corps was the largest in the Army, and numbered about two thousand (2000) more than my corps. As previously stated, een thousand one hundred (18,100) from that source. We now have forty-two thousand five hundred (42,500) in Hood's and Hardee's Corps at Dalton, exclusive of six hundred reserve artillery; and about nineteen thousand (19,000) in Polk's Corps, whicng over the northern slope of Rocky-faced Ridge. We find, as above stated, forty-two thousand five hundred (42,500) in Hardee's and Hood's Corps; nineteen thousand (I9,000) in Polk's Corps; eight thousand four hundred and ten (8410) in Wheeler's i
de of them. I regret this exceedingly, as my heart was fixed upon going to the front, and regaining Tennessee and Kentucky. I have also had a long talk with General Hardee. Whilst he finds many difficulties in the way of our advancing, he is at the same time ready and willing to do anything that is thought best for our general On reaching my tent soon after dark, I found an invitation to meet the Lieutenant Generals at General Polk's quarters. General Hood was with him, but not General Hardee. The two officers, General Hood taking the lead, expressed the opinion very positively that neither of their corps would be able to hold its position next daI am most truly yours, A. M. Polk. General Johnston, as evidence that without any proviso we advised him to retreat, quotes a statement to that effect of General Hardee and his chief of staff, neither of whom were present during our long discussion. If I did remark after the interview had closed, and Johnston had decided to
l Polk expressed himself entirely willing and ready to co-operate with General Hood to accomplish this object. After some moments of silence, General Johnston decided to withdraw the Armies to the south of the Etowah. Soon after this, Lieutenant General Hardee arrived. General Johnston informed him of this decision to cross the river, stating that Generals Polk and Hood had informed him that they could not hold their lines. Lieutenant General Hood then re-stated the reasons, and said that G any time, then or in the morning, rather than to await the attack of the enemy in his (Polk's) present position. Upon these points Lieutenant Generals Polk and Hood entirely agreed, urging the offensive rather than await the enemy. Lieutenant General Hardee made but few, if any, remarks that I heard. After a few moments General Johnston gave the orders for the armies to move to the south side of the Etowah. Lieutenant General Polk called to his A. A. General to issue orders to his Divisi
the morning of the 27th to transfer Cleburne's Division of Hardee's Corps to our right, where it was formed on the prolongathim at the time, in lieu of forwarding it through Lieutenant General Hardee to whose corps he was attached. Again, in refe line, and to assail that flank at dawn next day. Polk and Hardee were instructed to join in the battle successively, obliqu us greatly the advantage if a general battle ensued; that Hardee and Polk could be in readiness to come to my assistance, irs were dispatched for the two remaining corps commanders, Hardee and Polk, who shortly joined us. They were instructed to he so to be, unless the order was countermanded. Lieutenant Generals Hardee and Stewart then joined me in a telegram to the I did not hear. At the close of it, however, you and General Hardee and I went into the Adjutant General's office, and togollows: Richmond, July 18th, I864. to Generals Hood, Hardee and Stewart. Your telegram of this date received. A c
, and the more thorough the demoralization. As I have already mentioned, Lee handled his troops upon a directly opposite basis. They were always taught to work out the best means to get at the enemy, in order to cripple or destroy him, in lieu of ever seeking the best means to get away from him. Therefore the Lee and. Jackson school is the opposite of the Joe Johnston school, and one will always elevate and inspirit, whilst the other will depress and paralyze. The statement of Lieutenant Generals Hardee and Stewart, to the effect that the Confederate Army, after crossing the Chattahoochee, had as much spirit and confidence as it possessed at Dalton, is erroneous. Whilst I have a proper regard for the opinions of these officers who spoke, I believe, in all sincerity, I cannot but consider that their impressions were formed from their own standpoint, without having actual knowledge of the high state of perfection obtained by the troops in the Virginia Army, under the training and m
e. When I again have the leisure to continue my reply to the many unwarranted statements contained in General Johnston's book, I may find it necessary to bring forth also this important truth. I am yours truly, J. B. Hood. When I recall the different events with which the military career of General Johnston is connected, it is difficult to believe that he ever had any other fixed plan than that of retreat. Possibly the following paragraph in reference to a light engagement of General Hardee, on the I5th of March, I865, near Averysboroa, North Carolina, may indicate the nature of his expectations, after a surrender of Richmond, Atlanta, etc., etc., and a final retreat to the seashore, the last point of resistance: That report, if correct, proves that the soldiers of General Sherman's Army had been demoralized by their course of life on the Southern plantations. Those soldiers, when fighting between Dalton and Atlanta, could not have been driven back repeatedly by a fourth o
, Stewart's Corps was in position on the left, Hardee's in the centre, and Cheatham's on the right. Orders were given to Generals Hardee and Stewart to observe closely and report promptly the progreposed as follows: Stewart's Corps on the left, Hardee's in the centre, and Cheatham's on the right eam a division front to the right. To do this, Hardee and Stewart were each ordered to extend a half The plan was for the divisions (commencing on Hardee's right) to move forward, successively, en ech instructions of the General Commanding to General Hardee and myself. I was to hold a division in r been withdrawn from the lines on the right of Hardee's Corps. His corps and mine were to close to half-a-mile. At 1 o'clock I found the left of Hardee's Corps just beginning to shift to the right. of the Army. General Hood's old corps and General Hardee's were both on my right. The troops were rting Stewart's gallant assault, the troops of Hardee — as their losses on that day indicate — did n[7 more...]<
Major General Wheeler was ordered to move on Hardee's right with all the cavalry at his disposal, take up the movement from his right as soon as Hardee succeeded in forcing back, or throwing into cothe movement became general, i. e., as soon as Hardee and Cheatham succeeded in driving the Federalsr his right. Though the movement assigned General Hardee, on this occasion, was a very simple one, to act as soon as the battle was initiated by Hardee who was supposed to be at that moment in rear flank of the enemy. I at once perceived that Hardee had not only failed to turn McPherson's left, gallant attack on the 20th was neutralized by Hardee's inertness on the right; and the failure in t, on the 20th, of the best troops of the Army, Hardee's Corps. Shortly after the beginning of the ss unfortunate observation to Cleburne that General Hardee gave a similar warning to other officers. likewise in attributing the lack of spirit in Hardee's troops to fatigue from the march of the nigh[20 more...]