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, with his division, and two brigades, under Gen. Hood, were ordered to proceed to Gordonsville. Aenemy from his position on the mountain. Brig.-Gen. Hood, with his own and Gen. Whiting's brigade,ngstreet took position on the light of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deplochanged his front, so as to meet the advance of Hood and Evans. However, about two o'clock in the alace on Jackson's left, Gen. Longstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance, but before the order could be obeyed, Hood was himself attacked, and his command at once became warmly engaged. Reinforced be command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attason's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades under Wilcox moved foivisions of Gens. McLaws, Walker, Anderson, and Hood; and a division under Gen. D. H. till, which ust raged with great fury and alternate success. Hood's two brigades were moved to the support of Jac[1 more...]
-organized, and divided into three equal and distinct corps. To Gen. Longstreet was assigned the command of the first corps, consisting of the divisions of McLaw, Hood, and Pickett; to Gen. Ewell, who had succeeded to the command of Jackson's old corps, were assigned the divisions of Early, Rodes, and Johnson; and to Gen. A. P. Hing with Heth's, then Pender's and Anderson's divisions. On the right of Anderson's division was Longstreet's left, McLaw's division being next to Anderson's, and Hood on the extreme right of our line, which was opposite the eminence upon which the enemy's left rested. There was long a persistent popular opinion in the South t to support Longstreet, and Pender and Heth to act as a reserve, to be employed as circumstances might require. Longstreet, having placed himself at the head of Hood's and McLaw's divisions, attacked with great fury. The first part of the enemy's line he struck was Sickles' corps, which he hurled back with terrible loss on the
of numbers. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's command. he proposes an offensive movement. is balked by Bragg at Richmond. statement of Johnston's forces on 1st May. Johnston's policy of retreat. he proposes to fight at Cassville; but is overruled by Hood and Hardee. he crosses the Etowah. engagement at New hope Church. battle of Kenesaw Mountain. Sherman's ghastly experiment. he resorts to maneuvering. Johnston retires to Atlanta the situation around Atlanta. defeat of Sturgis' column in N and retreat to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine and Lost Mountains. Battle of Kenesaw Mountain. These natural battlements covered the railroad back to the Chattahoochie river. On the 19th June the disposition of Johnston's forces was: Hood's corps with its right on the Marietta and Canton road, Loring's on the Kenesaw Mountain, and Hardee's, with its left extending across the Lost Mountain, and the Marietta road. Subsequently Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions of Hardee's corps we
mply fulfilled. The canvass of 1864 concluded in the election of Abraham Lin coin by the vote of every Northern State, except Delaware, Kentucky, and New Jersey. But in the analysis of the popular vote there was yet some encouragement. It stood twenty-two hundred thousand for Mr. Lincoln, eighteen hundred thousand for Gen. McClellan. Although too small for victory, the conservative vote was much larger than had been expected by reflecting men, after the fall of Atlanta, the reverses of Hood, and the success of Sherman. Under all the adverse circumstances under which the vote was given, it was creditable to the party which made the contest, and encouraging for the cause of constitutional liberty. It was given just after decisive reverses had befallen the Confederate cause, in the moments of victory and exultation, at a time the most propitious that could have been chosen by the war party, and the most unpropitious conceivable for the peace party. Tile election had occurred jus
betrays to the enemy the new military design. Hood's new movement to Tennessee. Sherman follows t battle of Nashville. Gen. Grant's fears that Hood would invade Kentucky. probable effect of suchemy's plan of battle. the second day's fight. Hood's assurance of victory. a Confederate brigade e communication on the subject made by me to Gen. Hood, and the fact that my family was in the townta. While Sherman meditated such a movement, Hood made the very mistake that would secure and facssing Tennessee soil. On the 24th September, Hood commenced the new movement to pass to Sherman'sonnoissance towards Newman, and discovered that Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee River on the 29thsaster that was now to ensue in his campaign Gen. Hood attributed to the fact that some of his Genet four miles south of Franklin, but as soon as Hood's forces began to deploy for the attack, and to a plan of battle, which was to make a feint on Hood's right flank, while he massed his main force t[59 more...]
ted him. the charge of habitual intoxication. review of the Valley campaign. its effects decisive upon Richmond. remark of a Confederate general. some views of the management and disposition of the Confederate cavalry forces in Virginia To Hood's unbroken series of disasters there was a companion-piece in another part of the Confederacy: a small theatre of the war, but an important and a conspicuous one, associated with many heroic memories of the Confederacy. This other chapter of misfortune was Early's campaign in the Valley of Virginia. In this campaign a Confederate General never won a victory; lost all of his artillery, and brought an army to practical annihilation. But, although like Hood's misadventure in these particulars, the campaign in the Valley is to be judged by another standard; while marked by some undoubted misconduct, it had much to excuse its impotent conclusion, and it was, in some respects, what its commander designated it-a forlorn hope. We have alr
e were continually brought to it, and subjected to certain infection. Neither do we find evidences of amendment on the part of our enemies, notwithstanding the boasts of the sanitary commission. At Nashville, prisoners recently captured from General Hood's army, even when sick and wounded, have been cruelly deprived of all nourishment suited to their condition; and other prisoners from he same army have been carried into the infected Camps Douglas and Chase. Many of the soldiers of General General Hood's army were frost-bitten by being kept day and night in an exposed condition before they were put into Camp Douglas. Their sufferings are truthfully depicted in the evidence. At Alton and Camp Morton the same Inhuman practice of putting our prisoners into camps infected by small-pox, prevailed. It was equivalent to murdering many of them by the torture of a contagious disease. The insufficient rations at Camp Morton forced our men to appease their hunger by pounding up and boiling bone
ith the remainder of his command, to ensure the capture of Lee's army or to smother it with numbers. But this plan of operations was changed. On the 18th of December, writes Gen. Grant, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by Gen. Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operatierman's pathway. But the old, wretched excuse of want of concentration of the Confederate forces was to apply here. Gen. Hardee was not the man to grasp the business of a large army, and he had never had his forces well in hand. The remnants of Hood's army, the corps of Cheatham and Stewart, had been brought to Augusta, to find that Sherman had given the cold shoulder to it, and moved down the railroad. On the lower part of the road, Hardee could not be persuaded that Charleston was not the
ll with Johnston's surrender; and we shall now see how the system of Confederate defence fell in the Southwest; and how, in a little time thereafter, the department of the Trans-Mississippi was prostrated, completing the downfall of the Southern Confederacy. Operations in the Southwest-capture of Mobile-Wilson's expedition. As part of the general design of the Federal arms in 1865, a movement was prepared early in that year against the city of Mobile and the interiour of Alabama. When Hood's ill-fated army was beaten and driven across the Tennessee River, the troops which Gen. Canby had sent to aid Thomas were returned, and, being heavily reinforced, prepared to undertake, with assured success, the capture of the city of Mobile — an enterprise which had not yet been ventured upon, unless very remotely, by any Federal army. The works of Mobile were very strong, and the supplies of food were abundant for a siege. The heavy ordnance was excellent and well disposed. But the ga
Cambridge History of American Literature: volume 2 (ed. Trent, William Peterfield, 1862-1939., Erskine, John, 1879-1951., Sherman, Stuart Pratt, 1881-1926., Van Doren, Carl, 1885-1950.), Chapter 23: writers of familiar verse (search)
Book III, Chap. IX. (1850-95), and Henry Cuyler Bunner See also Book III, Chap. VI. (1855-96), though the last two belong to a period somewhat later than that chiefly considered in this chapter. Of these Saxe is the earliest and the least important. He is not only the earliest, he is also the most old-fashioned in his method and the least individual in his outlook. His verse is modelled upon Praed's, to whose dazzling brilliance he could not attain; and he borrowed also the pattern of Hood in his more broadly comic lyrics. He was clever and facile; but he was a little too easy-going to achieve the delicate fineness which we have a right to demand in familiar verse. He does not understand that the thinner the theme the more care must be exercised to redeem its exeguity by certainty of touch and by infinite solicitude in execution. The immanent difficulty of familiar verse is due to the fact that poetry of this type at its best ought to be humorous without broadening into mere
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