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John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army 1,058 0 Browse Search
The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 3: The Decisive Battles. (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller) 437 13 Browse Search
General James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox 314 4 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4. 275 7 Browse Search
Joseph T. Derry , A. M. , Author of School History of the United States; Story of the Confederate War, etc., Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 6, Georgia (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 212 2 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2. 207 5 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3. 172 4 Browse Search
Col. O. M. Roberts, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 12.1, Alabama (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 168 2 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 156 2 Browse Search
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.) 126 2 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army. You can also browse the collection for John B. Hood or search for John B. Hood in all documents.

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John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter I (search)
e West Point training importance of learning how to obey a trip to New York on a wager the West Point Bible class dismissed from the Academy without trial intercession of Stephen A. Douglas restoration to Cadet duty James B. McPherson John B. Hood Robert E. Lee. I was born in the town of Gerry, Chautauqua County, New York, September 29, 1831. My father was the Rev. James Schofield, who was then pastor of the Baptist Church in Sinclairville, and who was from 1843 to 1881 a home missaccumulating with alarming rapidity, I applied for and obtained a transfer to Company C, where I would be under Lieutenant Cogswell and Cadet Captain Vincent, my beloved classmate, who had cordially invited me to share his room in barracks. John B. Hood was a jolly good fellow, a little discouraged at first by unexpected hard work; but he fought his way manfully to the end. He was not quite so talented as some of his great associates in the Confederate army, but he was a tremendous fighter w
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter VII (search)
f Rocky-face. Or if McPherson had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain that, however large his force might have been, he could have put troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of cutting off Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it could not be done at all. So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was Thomas's plan to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise of success, and therefore
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter VIII (search)
reted a conversation with James B. McPherson over the question of relative rank encouraging John B. Hood to become a soldier visit to the Camp of Frank P. Blair, Jr. anecdote of Sherman and Hookerf believing there were three entire corps in front of us, I doubted whether there was even all of Hood's corps. General Hooker's habit of swinging off from the rest of General Thomas's army, and ge one winter before going to West Point, and hence had acquired the knack of explaining things. Hood was not well up in mathematics. The first part of the course especially he found very hard—so muiculty. When we were fighting each other so desperately, fifteen years later, I wondered whether Hood remembered the encouragement I had given him to become a soldier, and came very near thinking onc generals were unwilling to attempt it. Had Sherman divided his army in such a way, and struck at Hood's rear, he might have found a chance to destroy that army as well as the railroads in Georgia.
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter IX (search)
Atlanta Johnston's untried plan of resistance Hood's faulty move holding the Pivot of the positioor carloads of fixed ammunition, and hence that Hood was abandoning that place. I reported my obser firm hold of the railroad at Rough and Ready. Hood having failed to attack our exposed flank durin This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy Hood's army, if that was the objective of the campaie that in the following November, 1864, opposed Hood's advance from the Tennessee River and repulsedan had been stopped by the reported approach of Hood. I ordered all back to Cleveland, and we barelly decided not to accept that challenge to meet Hood upon a field chosen by the latter, but to contin Georgia, and to direct the operations against Hood. Thomas had in his department at that time otempting to carry out his instructions to fight Hood at Pulaski if he should advance upon that placement upon it more fully later. The season of Hood's invasion of Tennessee was extremely unfavorab[33 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter X (search)
ncentrated his troops; for if I failed in that, Hood would not only force me back upon Nashville bef he intrenched a good position in which to meet Hood's column when it should arrive, which it did laut dark. Much bitter controversy arose between Hood and some of his subordinates because of their f bridges and through deep mud is very slow. If Hood had turned down the north bank of Duck River, ale in fact I was watching him all day. Besides, Hood went to bed that night, while I was in the saddds until he was relieved by my orders! Some of Hood's troops relieved him next morning! We have toight, or whether it might be necessary to fight Hood at Spring Hill the next day. In either case themanity have given their lives in that cause! Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely critici probable, and the rapidity and impetuosity of Hood's advance and assault add to that probability. the opinion that Thomas ought to have turned on Hood after his repulse at Franklin; and General Jaco[30 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
rrival of A. J. Smith; and this is true even if Hood's cavalry force was no larger than that which nn as possible, and even in detail, and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches en returned by November 21, about the time when Hood's advance from Florence had become certainly kntime, and prevented their use in the capture of Hood's defeated and retreating troops. The failure ntrate at Columbia or remain at Lynnville. If Hood's entire army should advance, you must use your well intrenched. The line is too long; yet if Hood wishes to fight me on it to-morrow, I am willinis arrival we can withdraw gradually and invite Hood across Duck River, and fall upon him with our wen withdraw from your present position. Should Hood then cross river, we can surely ruin him. You mshed him away in the evening and came through. Hood attacked in the front and flank, but did not hueceived your despatch asking whether I can hold Hood here three days. I do not believe I can. I can [73 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XII (search)
of the cavalry Corps and the Fourth army Corps Hood's mistake after crossing Duck River an incident of the Atlanta campaign bearing on Hood's character an embarrassing method of Transmitting Messagl enmity toward my old friend and classmate General Hood, or his comrades. It was the accursed polie he tried to do what was not possible. When Hood crossed the river he was not more than five milordered to Spring Hill. I was willing to fight Hood in that position, and expected to do so. But I e in open battle. But I believed I could fight Hood, even where I was, from noon until dark, and thexpectation of General Thomas that I would hold Hood in check until he could concentrate his reinfornt. As illustrating my accurate knowledge of Hood's character before we ever met in battle, the fo our right gave indication of the heavy attack Hood's troops made upon Thomas's advancing columns tstream in the rear of the army), nor yet by General Hood until he saw the apparent opportunity to de[8 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIII (search)
ter XIII Grant orders Thomas to attack Hood or relinquish the command Thomas's Corps comma the fighting of December 15 expectation that Hood would retreat delay in renewing the attack on ters, informed us that he was ordered to attack Hood at once or surrender his command (not saying tod surprised at my suggestion that we would find Hood in line of battle ready to receive us in the mohat of General A. J. Smith. The fact is that Hood's left wing had been much weakened to strengtheg the Harpeth and destroying the bridges. If Hood had retreated in the night of December 15, as Tthat of more than half of the Union troops that Hood's left could easily have been crushed by an infrded strong enough after it became evident that Hood designed to invade Tennessee; and, second, in oould concentrate at Nashville, and also to give Hood his deathblow at Franklin. Subsequent operatin't any left. I barely succeeded in delaying Hood until Thomas could get A. J. Smith and Steedman[30 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIV (search)
orps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was ning the line of Duck River. It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations agains and force him to a decisive battle; whereas if Hood could defeat and seriously cripple, if not destvade Kentucky, as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country of his own friends were also fully informed in due time of all of Hood's movements, but overestimated his strength bect be compared. This formidable army was now in Hood's immediate front at Nashville, while the impors strongly guarded. It had become too late for Hood even to attempt a raid into Kentucky. Thomas wm. As stated in his report, Thomas estimated Hood's strength as being at least equal to his own, as at least equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact strength is a matter oft, he must, it would seem, have felt so sure of Hood's retreat in the night that he did not think it[17 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XV (search)
ack to a point where he could interpose between Hood and Columbia, and Ruger was stopped at Columbiaoncentrate his reinforcements, and not to fight Hood at Pulaski, as he (Thomas) had at first ordered troops in the vicinity, watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance into Tennessee as much nley and subsequent orders to me about fighting Hood at Pulaski, absolutely contradictory to that std wishes in respect to defensive action against Hood's advance into Tennessee, which I had so properlle, matured after the event, or at least after Hood's advance into Tennessee had actually begun, an respect to his plans or wishes in the event of Hood's advance from the Tennessee before Thomas was anley, to fight Hood at Pulaski or Columbia, as Hood might elect, until he (Thomas) could get there ds seem to show, still further, that even after Hood's plans of aggression had developed so long in lmost hourly, urging him to move out and attack Hood, and finally became so impatient that I contemp[10 more...]
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