llowed, or made themselves familiar by study with his campaigns.
The reader turns naturally for explanations of the surprise and attending disgrace at Shiloh; the ill-judged and fatal assault at Chickasaw Bayou; the protest against the move by which Vicksburg was captured; his failure to carry the point assigned him at the battle of Chattanooga; the escape of Johnston from Dalton and Resaca; the terrible mistake of the assault on Kenesaw; the plunging of his army, marching by the flank, into Hood's line of battle under the supposition that Atlanta was evacuated; the escape of the rebel army from Savannah; the careless and inexcusable periling and narrow escape of his own army at Bentonville; and lastly, the political surrender to Johnston at Raleigh: these are points upon which every reader desires light.
But instead of gaining it, he finds that for most, the chief aim of the author seems to be to make the darkness more impenetrable.
The succeeding chapters will treat, in their or
acuation of Atlanta, as Crittenden had watched for Rosecrans at Chattanooga.
The movement drew Hood out of Atlanta, and Slocum marched in, as Crittenden had passed into Chattanooga when Rosecrans' Rosecrans' had been south of Chattanooga.
Suppose some story-teller of the war had then written: Hood had completely driven Sherman's army into Atlanta!
If it be answered that Sherman marched back ty now be different.
You certainly should hold Kingston, and as far below as may seem prudent.
Hood will probably send a part of his army to the south-west.
Whether to Bragg or by Abingdon is uncerd Chattanooga and attack Rosecrans wherever found.
A part of Longstreet's Virginia troops under Hood arrived at Dalton on the 18th, and participated in the first day's fight at Chickamauga, but Lon arranged from right to left as follows: Stewart's, Johnson's, Hinman's, and Preston's divisions, Hood's division (of which only three brigades were up), was in rear of Jackson, Kenshaw's and Humphrie
ned three days before—that is, on the 18th—that Hood had relieved Johnston, and what was expected ofeld, who was his classmate at West Point, about Hood—as to his general character, etc., and learned he step discussing the chances of battle and of Hood's general character.
McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan.
We agreed that we ought to be unimes for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of grehe needed it. * * * *
After explaining how Hood had first withdrawn from his outer line on the hat the attacking force could only be a part of Hood's army, and that, if any assistance were rendernston had been relieved of the command, and General Hood substituted.
A new policy seemed resolved ey have attacked and been repulsed since dark.
Hood fights his graybacks desperately. J. C. Van ard East Point.
The question also arises, if Hood, in his sally, was practising one of his favori[2 more...
al impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devilthousand infantry, and the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break my road.
I would infinitehave an ample force with which to encounter General Hood any where in the open field, besides garrisman.
Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him befd still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have b
I dispatched you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north, ouhe railroad, and especially before he destroyed Hood's army.
A campaign to the sea to cut the Confelluded to began.
Finally, by underestimating Hood's forces, and largely overestimating those pro: You propose to march without first destroying Hood.
As Thomas can now take care of him, I say go.turned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to comp[45 more...]
hville he had quartermasters' employes to man the forts; and to meet Hood's twelve thousand well-equipped and enthusiastic cavalry he had sevewere arriving to replace veteran troops, whose terms had expired.
Hood's army, fully concentrated, confronted Thomas.
The concentration ofonly begun.
A. J. Smith's veterans were still in Missouri.
To meet Hood he had less than half Hood's force.
To fall back slowly while he gaHood's force.
To fall back slowly while he gathered his army from the immense territory over which the fragments which were finally to compose it were scattered, was, of course, his only Schofield gathered the troops in hand, reached Franklin and defeated Hood, will not be forgotten.
The very day he fought there, Smith's veterive victory.
And Sherman, with the bulk of the organized army which Hood had so often checked upon the Atlanta campaign, had marched down to d not even reach it.
On the 14th Thomas had successfully attacked Hood, and on the 15th had utterly defeated and routed him, and the War De
J. Smith's troops) a force large enough to whip Hood in a fair fight was correct.
There was no risk which he saw in leaving Thomas to grapple Hood at every disadvantage less apparent, the Memoirs' dispatch, giving an account of the attack on Hood on the 15th, which was successful, but not compght was correct.
I approve of Thomas' allowing Hood to come north far enough to enable him to concence, in which he promised me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence, urging mehis own men, though I would have preferred that Hood should have been checked about Columbia.
Abandon all minor points if you expect to defeat Hood.
And the very last dispatch, before startith your views if you think it expedient to hold Hood back as long as possible.
When you get all youogether, and in fighting condition, we can whip Hood easily, and I believe make the campaign a decisturned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to comp[27 more...]
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville.
If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville,ing has met with many delays which have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition.
I as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is.
Time strengt in further extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that I could not concentrate my troops, and gethe enemy from crossing.
There is no doubt but Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the r dispatch of 12 M., this day, is received.
General Hood's army is being pursued as rapidly and as vmmunition.
I am doing all in my power to crush Hood's army, and, if it be possible, will destroy ity is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may cmas, then in the field directing the pursuit of Hood, replied:
headquarters Department of thl Thomas so nobly fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully given in his ow[35 more...]
s across them all. In front was Hardee with a force which might be formidable in contending the passage of the larger rivers.
On the right were the garrisons of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington.
There was reason to expect that a portion of Hood's army would arrive on the left and strike from the direction of Augusta.
Lastly, Wade Hampton, then popular in South Carolina, had been sent down from Lee's army to rally an opposing force.
And, as the result proved, before serious battle was df than any other of his mistakes of which he treats.
But the official record supplies some important omissions.
Concerning the start from Savannah northward, General Sherman writes:
I knew full well at the time that the broken fragments of Hood's army (which had escaped from Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across Georgia, by Augusta, to make junction in my front, estimating them at the maximum, twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's, and Hampton's forces at fifteen thous
General Sherman's own military history, however, will show that it was not until he attained the rank of brigadier-general that his antipathy to staff duty began.
But from that time forward it has been marked.
Even the large body of staff officers in his own army, who, on the Atlanta campaign, had been continuously on duty and most of the time under fire from May till September, did not escape being made to feel this prejudice.
While the army was moving from Atlanta on Hood, who had passed to its rear, Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, inspector-general on the staff, was appointed by the Governor of Ohio to the command of one of the new regiments from that State.
Whereupon General Sherman issued the following order:
[special field orders no. 98.] headquarters Military division of the Mississippi, in the field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864.
1st. Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, acting Inspector-General on the staff of this military division, havin
of the move as far as Atlanta.
The records show further, that on the 10th of September Grant suggested a move from Atlanta on Augusta or Savannah, instead of Mobile, since the control of the latter had passed into the hands of the Union forces.
Concerning Savannah, the records reveal an escape of Hardee with ten thousand, from Sherman's sixty thousand, without disclosing even a plausible excuse.
Here the Memoirs show Sherman looking back to Nashville, from whence alone, through defeat of Hood, could come a success that should vindicate his March to the Sea, and finding fault with Thomas, who, though crippled in all ways by Sherman, was through superhuman efforts there, saving him from the jeers of the Nation.
In treating of Savannah, he also attacks Mr. Stanton for carelessness in connection with the captured cotton, and transactions relating thereto, while the records show not only that he had absolutely no foundation for his charges, but that in most respects the exact opposi