Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2. You can also browse the collection for Hood or search for Hood in all documents.

Your search returned 346 results in 10 document sections:

tional forces retreat of Early, whirling through Winchester pursuit by Sheridan battle of Fisher's Hill Second defeat of Early further retreat of rebels effect of success at the North Grant's orders to Sheridan Early abandons the Valley censures of Lee disappointment in Richmond. Atlanta had fallen, the Weldon road was carried, and Early's exit from the Valley had been barred, but the end was not yet. A long and tedious prospect still stretched out before the national commander. Hood's army was not destroyed, the rebels were in force in Sheridan's front, and Lee had not abandoned Richmond. Grant looked the situation full in the face, and lost no time in adapting his plans to the actual emergencies. On the 8th of September, Sherman had entered Atlanta in person, and on the 10th, he was instructed: As soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pre
orgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on t1st of October, Sherman reported the advance of Hood, and added: If he tries to get on my road this ay Sherman moves, he will undoubtedly encounter Hood's army, and in crossing to the sea-coast, will Sherman said to him: There is no doubt some of Hood's infantry is across the Chattahoochee, but I d, about sixty miles south-west of Rome; and as Hood had now abandoned the Macon and West Point road His hope was to interpose this corps between Hood and the detachment of five thousand rebels now gia howl. . . . On the 10th, he learned that Hood had crossed the Coosa river, between Rome and tof road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose wit, dated the same hour with Grant's—eleven A. M. Hood moved his army from Palmetto station, across bydiffered was whether it was not better to fight Hood before the march was made. Sherman declared th[41 more...]
es audacious in design or incessant in attack, at others he was cautious, and deliberate, and restrained; and none knew better than he when to remain immovable under negative or apparently unfavorable circumstances. At present he believed the proper course in front of Petersburg to be—to steadily extend the investment towards the Southside road, while annoying and exhausting the enemy by menaces and attacks at various points, preventing the possibility of Lee's detaching in support of either Hood or Early, and himself waiting patiently till the moment should come to strike a blow like those he had dealt earlier in the war. To many this task would have been more unacceptable because, while the chief was lying comparatively inactive in front of Richmond, the subordinates were fighting important battles and winning brilliant victories elsewhere. Sherman had captured Atlanta, and Sheridan had overrun the Valley, while Thomas was entrusted with a command where the mightiest issues wer
itions to entrap the enemy at Snake Creek Gap. Hood, however, was too quick, for him, and escaped . Sherman, however, was very much in hope that Hood would actually invade Tennessee. On the 16th, General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. I really do not see that you cth for Sherman, to intercept reinforcements for Hood, and to concentrate whatever force it was possit so that Sherman might attack him in rear; but Hood eluded the national columns. Sherman, meanwhCroxton and Granger. On the 25th of October, Hood appeared before Decatur in force, for, contrary, and when he reported to Grant the approach of Hood, he also announced: If Rosecrans's troops can rime it was impossible to determine which course Hood would take—advance on Nashville, or turn towardouri to East Tennessee. The very boldness of Hood's movement was calculated to affect the spirit rs: he showed them how Thomas being set to hold Hood, and Sheridan retained to watch Early, while Me[70 more...]
Yours of 4 P. M. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army is in front of Columbia, and so gfer incalculable injury upon your railroads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefonvinced by this reasoning, for he believed that Hood's obstacles and disadvantages were equal to tho force, both in infantry and cavalry; but after Hood was defeated with a loss of six thousand men atpapers. Immense supplies in kind, intended for Hood and Lee, had been piled along the roads, all ofr: It has been seriously apprehended that while Hood, with a part of his forces, held you in check nEtowa2097,541 In his entire command70,272 Hood's effective present, as already shown, was 23,0ebels encamped at Spring Hill, and on the 18th, Hood continued his retreat across the Duck river, tough my progress may appear slow, I feel assured Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee, and eventureceived. I am now, and shall continue to push Hood as rapidly as the state of the weather and road[157 more...]
the 13th of December, he reopened it with Foster and the fleet. In these thirty-one days he had utterly destroyed two hundred miles of railroad, breaking up every connection between the rebel forces east and west of Georgia. No report from General Hood since the 20th ult.—Beauregard to Richmond, December 13. He had consumed the corn and fodder, as well as the cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry, in a region sixty miles wide, carried away more than ten thousand horses and mules, and liberated countless numbers of slaves. Many of the stores and provisions were essential to the armies of Hood and Lee. The damage done to the state of Georgia he estimated at one hundred millions of dollars, of which twenty millions inured to the national advantage; the remainder was simple waste and destruction. Sixty-five thousand men and thirty-five thousand animals had obtained abundant food for forty days, and the troops reached the coast, needing no provisions but bread. They started with five thou
same sad story. Hardee and Early and Bragg and Hood were unanimous. The injuries done to crops andmas, if he is assured of the departure south of Hood from Corinth, to send Schofield here with his cfrom Thomas it will be advisable to see whether Hood's army halts at Corinth. I do not think he wilas gone west to gather up what he can save from Hood's army, to bring against Sherman. If this be tsibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me he worhood of Columbia. The scattered fragments of Hood's army were also hurrying rapidly across Georgiwo, rebel armies; for not only the fragments of Hood's command, and the garrison of Savannah, and al our cavalry should not have taken advantage of Hood's and Forrest's forces being on furlough. Theyousand, exclusive of Cheatham and Stewart [from Hood's army], not likely to reach in time. If Lee a command, with a reinforcement from the army of Hood, was in front of Schofield, and before the nat[10 more...]
is bitter and personal enemy; and the chagrin of the general who was relieved by Hood was avenged by the anguish of the fallen chief, deserted and disobeyed by the sucommand. In September, Sherman captured Atlanta, but he still had the army of Hood to contend with; and although he had won a victory, as yet reaped none of its results. On the contrary, by the advance of Hood he was speedily placed in a more precarious position than before Atlanta fell. But his brilliant strategical genius,r sent to the Valley dealt him blow after blow. These two northward advances of Hood and Early gave an appearance of boldness to the rebel strategy, and were calculated to impose on unwary or impatient opponents. Hood and Early both conceived audacious plans, but failed utterly in their accomplishment. They were typical of the nent and then marched northward, driving Johnston; Thomas destroyed or scattered Hood; Sheridan had beaten and battered Early's army, literally, into pieces. Only th
ops of this year are being collected at Demopolis, Selma, Montgomery, and other points for the use of the rebel army. By moving on that line they will be converted to our use or be destroyed; by moving on Augusta they will be left for the use of Hood's forces. I do not write this for the purpose of influencing your adoption of a particular plan of campaign, or of changing your decision, if you have adopted any plan, but simply to urge on you an early decision, if you have not already made omber of officers and men for battle, November 20, 1864, was59,584 The total number of officers and men for battle, November 30, 1864, was71,452 The total number of officers and men for battle, December 10, 1864, was70,272 The strength of General Hood's army, as per returns on file in the Archive office, on the 6th of November and 10th of December, 1864: November 6th. Effective total present 30,600 Total present40,740 Aggregate present 45,719 Total present and absent88,793 Aggregate
ckade, efficiency of, III., 224, Blue Mountain, Hood at, III., 56 Bowen, General, defeat of at PoSherman's army at, 533; cut off from Sherman by Hood, III., 153. Chattanooga, battle of orders ofrby Smith to cross the Mississippi, 175; visits Hood's army, 193; unpopularity of, 354; presents Lee-254. Duck river, course of, III., 178, 205; Hood's retreat across, 259. Early, General Jubal 7; crosses the Chattahoochee, 538 superseded by Hood, 539; recalled from retirement, III., 356; supe3-525: III., 70, 127 prevented from reinforcing Hood or Early, 532; relations with Early's campaign,ober, 1864 III., 79, at Fort Fisher, 312; under Hood, November 1864, 188; battle of Franklin, 212, b169-173. Taylor, General Richard, supersedes Hood, III.; 270; calls for more troops, 287; surrendtuation in, November, 1864, III., 154-161, 174; Hood's campaign in, 153-280; geography and strategic45; at battle of Nashville, 249-260; pursuit of Hood 261; congratulated by Grant, Lincoln, and Stant[6 more...]