ks, D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions crossed.
A. P. Hill's battle soon became firm, but he waited a little for Jackson before giving it full force.
Jackson came up, marched by the fight without giving attention, and went into camp at Hundley's Corner, half a mile in rear of the enemy's position of contention.
A. P. Hill put his force in severe battle and was repulsed.
As D. H. Hill approached, he was called into the fray by the commanding general, then by the President.
He sent R-aggressive.
Early in the morning, D. H. Hill was ordered to march to the left to turn the position, and was on the Federal right before their lines were well out of their trenches.
He came up with Jackson and led the march of that column from Hundley's Corner.
A. P. Hill marched by the direct route to Gaines's Mill, and Longstreet, in reserve, moved by the route nearer the river and Dr. Gaines's house.
D. H. Hill marched by Bethesda Church to Old Cold Harbor.
He understood the plan of
It even opened up grander possibilities than came within his most hopeful anticipations at the period of projection.
The Union commander left his Fifth Corps engaged at Beaver Dam Creek while Jackson's column marched by it as far as Hundley's Corner and went into camp.
The object and instructions of Jackson's advanced echelon were to have him file in against any force that he might pass and attack it in flank and rear.
If, instead of going into camp at Hundley's Corner on the aftHundley's Corner on the afternoon of the 26th of June, he had filed to his right behind the Fifth Corps, he would have had it surrounded by fifty thousand men beyond the reach of succor.
He was troubled by conflicting orders.
The general order for the campaign and verbal instructions were intended to supersede all others, but General Lee's letter of the 11th was not recalled, so he marched with the two orders in his pocket, which made not a little trouble.
Before Jackson's army was called from the Valley, it was