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not remain long undecided. In 1796, the Archduke Charles, in Germany, defeated the armies of Jordan and Moreau by retreating on concentric lines from the Rhine to the Bohemian frontier. To JordanJordan was opposed Wartensleben, with about 30,000 men. The Archduke Charles commanded in person the army opposed to Moreau; arrived near the Lech, he left General Latour, with 30,000 men, and, with the remnder of his army, he joined Wartensleben, after some forced marches at Amberg, where he defeated Jordan; he pursued and defeated him a second time at Wurzburg, and a third time on the Lahn; he then le retreat. The news that the archduke had left the army opposed to him reached Moreau only after Jordan's defeat; he then commenced to retreat, but was overtaken by the duke, and defeated at EmmendingSchlingen, and forced again to cross the Rhine — an operation which had already been executed by Jordan. In the years 1758 to 1762, Frederick the Great was attacked by a Russian, Austrian, and Germ
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of a battle of the offensive defense: battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805. (search)
mn of Alvinzi was defeated in its turn by Napoleon's entire force; and the fourth column, which had arrived in his rear, was arrested for some time by a few battalions, and, after the defeat of the main body, obliged to surrender. At Stockach, Jordan, commanding the French army, imitated Alvinzi at Rivoli, and attacked the Archduke Charles in a similar way; Jordan was entirely defeated. In the attack of intrenched camps, or of field-works in general, we cannot proceed as we do against an aJordan was entirely defeated. In the attack of intrenched camps, or of field-works in general, we cannot proceed as we do against an army in open field; the enemy is more protected from our fire by the epaulement; and our advance, or rather our closing with him, is rendered difficult by the ditch; besides, in the advance, we are too much exposed to his fire, without being able to return it. On the other hand, the defender of an intrenched camp or redoubt cannot deploy great forces, and cannot himself pass to the offensive at the right moment. These different circumstances should tell us how to conduct the attack. A converg
e direction of our retreat will depend on many circumstances. If we are co-operating with another army, we should retreat in this direction, to make a junction with it and obtain a central position between the enemy's armies. We may also retreat directly into the heart of our country; or we may retreat parallel to the frontiers. In the first example we have already spoken of this last. The reasons for our retreat may be different, likewise. We may retreat after a lost battle, as did Jordan, for instance, in 1796, and Napoleon in 1813, when driven back from the Bohemian frontiers across the Rhine; or before a very superior enemy, as the Russians did in 1812 before Napoleon; or in consequence of a preconcerted strategical plan, as in the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796; or, in consequence of strategical movements of the enemy, to keep free our lines of communication — the retreat of Moreau in 1796 was such. We may also retreat to gain a favorable position for a battle,