Grant's Numerical strength Offset by Lee's Strategical advantage
crossing the Rapidan
not give my attention so much to Richmond as to Lee's army, and I want all commanders to feel that l go also.
He of course thought it likely that Lee would fall back upon Richmond in case of defeaterence to their military qualifications.
Since Lee had taken command he had not lost a single battelerity to the south side of the Rapidan, below Lee's position.
The infantry moved a little after s just the information I wanted.
It shows that Lee is drawing out from his position, and is pushin
General Longstreet, then commanding a corps in Lee's army, told me, several years after the war, tst Lee, he had a conversation on the subject at Lee's headquarters.
An officer present talked veryity presents itself for pitching into a part of Lee's army, do so without giving time for dispositis.
News had been received that Hill's corps of Lee's army was moving up rapidly on the Orange plan[16 more...]
llant General Wadsworth.
After Longstreet's removal from the field, Lee took command of his right in person, as we learned afterward, and oris movement, and just as I joined his troops, the enemy, directed by Lee in person, as we afterward discovered, made a desperate assault upond could not be followed up in such a country.
I can certainly drive Lee back into his works, but I shall not assault him there; he would havith ammunition.
It was felt that the day's strife had ended, unless Lee should risk another attack.
Just then the stillness was broken by h, this is a crisis that cannot be looked upon too seriously.
I know Lee's methods well by past experience; he will throw his whole army betw he seldom manifested: Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly goin and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.
The officer retired rather crestfallen, and without
Anderson had been ordered by Lee, on the evening of May 7, to start for Spottsylg as the result of a series of accidents.
When Lee found our wagon-trains were moving in an easter headquarters, he said: It looks somewhat as if Lee intends to throw his army between us and Frederove made, as in that case I would be in rear of Lee, and between him and Richmond.
That morning,e road running south from Piney Branch Church.
Lee had by this time comprehended Grant's intentionside facing north.
The demonstrations made by Lee, and the strengthening of his right, revived ind preparations were made in such case to attack Lee's left, turn it, and throw the Union army betweock had crossed the Po, and was now threatening Lee's left.
On the morning of the 10th Hancock fouenched, and no general attack was made upon it. Lee had realized the danger threatened, and had hurat flank.
Grant, perceiving this, decided that Lee must have weakened other portions of his line,
move forward for the purpose of reconnoitering Lee's extreme right, and keeping him from detaching gallantry displayed by him in this action.
Lee had learned by this time that he must be on theanxiety.
While maturing his plans for striking Lee, he was at the same time keeping a close lookout to see that Lee was not detaching any troops with the purpose of crushing Butler's or Sheridan's miles of the Virginia Central Railroad between Lee's army and Richmond, and had destroyed a large with the destruction of the railroad in rear of Lee, as it would increase the difficulty of moving
The main assault fell on Johnson's division of Lee's army.
Lee was led to believe that there was Lee was led to believe that there was an intention to attack his left, and he had sent most of Johnson's artillery to strengthen that flat works.
Reinforcements were rushed forward by Lee as soon as he saw the threatening condition of ter some new movements which had been ordered.
Lee made five assaults, in all, that day, in a seri[2 more...]
Grant expressed some anxiety as to the possibility of Lee's falling back toward Richmond without our knowing itmeaning of a movement of some of the organizations in Lee's center, and it was found that the enemy was merely rps was no longer there.
In the night of the 14th Lee began to move troops to his right.
Grant now directe Virginia Central and the Fredericksburg railroads in Lee's rear, had killed General J. E. B. Stuart, completelHe was their foremost cavalry leader, and one in whom Lee reposed great confidence.
We afterward heard that hef the 17th Hancock and Wright were ordered to assault Lee's left the next morning, directing their attack againaunton to stop supplies from being sent from there to Lee's army.
He immediately requested Halleck to have Sigenting briefly upon the bad news, General Grant said: Lee will undoubtedly reinforce his army largely by bringino longer in North Carolina, and I am prepared to see Lee's forces in our front materially strengthened.
his engagement, and it had been fairly won.
Lee had evidently intended to make Ewell's movementning of May 20: My chief anxiety now is to draw Lee out of his works and fight him in the open fielment of Early yesterday gives me some hope that Lee may at times take the offensive, and thus give h was the last offensive movement in force that Lee ventured to make during the entire campaign.
ned to try by every means in his power to tempt Lee to fight outside of his intrenched lines.
He hme good opportunity were offered.
He knew that Lee, from the distance over which he would have to is about twenty-five miles north of Richmond.
Lee, notwithstanding his superior means of obtaininy.
Even after Grant had crossed the Mattapony, Lee spoke of the Union forces as being east of thatving toward the North Anna.
In these movements Lee was entirely outgeneraled.
On the morning opears to have been about midday of the 22d when Lee obtained information, through his cavalry, of o[6 more...]
t of the Fredericksburg Railroad, and to strike Lee wherever he could be found.
To understand the er, he was told by the people living there that Lee had rested for a few hours at the same house thut suddenly on May 8, passed round the right of Lee's army, keeping out of reach of his infantry, carles's Mills.
That day it became evident that Lee was going to make a permanent stand between the the situation at this time: It now looks as if Lee's position were such that it would not be prudch General Grant had predicted would be sent to Lee's army had reached him. Between 12,000 and 15,0ssent, and she continued: I'm powerful glad General Lee has been lickin‘ you-all from the Rapidan cr solution a very formidable military problem.
Lee's position, from the strength and location of hs the North Anna and proceed to Little River on Lee's extreme left, and make a vigorous demonstrat Lee's left.
This was done so effectually that Lee telegraphed to Richmond the next morning: From [7 more...]
would probably have occurred if they had been thrown against Lee's formidable intrenchments, and had had to fight a battle winstructions.
In each of his three attempts to move close to Lee's troops and cross difficult rivers in his very face, Grant ield of operations.
It seemed a little singular to him that Lee, after falling back behind the North Anna River, had allowedde Grant say at this time, and also write to the government: Lee's army is really whipped. . . . A battle with them outside o and had gone into camp on the south side.
In the mean time Lee had moved his entire army rapidly from the North Anna, and trited fighting.
The movement disclosed the fact that all of Lee's troops were in position on the north side of the Chickahom case move the whole army to the right, and throw it between Lee and Richmond.
But this opportunity did not arise.
On Ma corps to make a night march and move to Sheridan's relief.
Lee, discovering this, ordered Anderson's corps to Cold Harbor.
s comments on Cold Harbor
Lee had maneuvered and fought over this ground two general-in-chief.
In the afternoon of the 2d, Lee became aware that we were sending troops agains manoeuvred skilfully with a view to compelling Lee to stretch out his line and make it as thin andg action were made nearly as late as midnight.
Lee's position was such that no turning movement wahe morning, and make a vigorous effort to break Lee's right, and if it were demonstrated that the aary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchb I have held since leaving the North Anna, that Lee will not come out and take the offensive againsthe fact that Grant had succeeded in compelling Lee to stretch out his line almost to the breaking-hat if our attacking columns had penetrated it, Lee would have been found without reserves, and( thons which were far from Grant's choosing.
When Lee stopped fighting the cause of secession was los[4 more...]
discussing this matter at headquarters: We can defend Washington best by keeping Lee so occupied that he cannot detach enough troops to capture it. If the safety of ar of this army, but it don't appear to have any.
I don't know why it was, but Lee seemed to have some personal grudge against me, remarked the guest.
I think, sa involve a march of about fifty miles in order to reach Butler's position, while Lee, holding interior lines, could arrive there by a march of less than half that dieparations are made by him to render his position secure against any attack from Lee's forces while the Army of the Potomac is making its movement.
You will then sestream to allow for a sufficient distance between it and the present position of Lee's army to prevent the chances of our being attacked successfully while in the acumber as the losses.
It was estimated from the best sources of information that Lee had also received reinforcements equal to his losses, so that the armies were no