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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
ence, at least for one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money procured soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and honor equally gave soldiers, and that at need war supported war. Doubtless France found in the richness of its soil and in the exaltation of its chiefs, sources of transient power which could not be admitted as the general base of a system; but the results of its efforts were not less striking. Each year the numerous echos of the cabinet of London, and M. D'Yvernois especially, announced that France was about to succumb for the want of money, whilst that Napoleon was keeping up two millions of savings in the Tuileries, at the same time cancelling regularly the expenses of the State and the pay of his armies. There was a deficit at his fall, but there was none in 1811; it was the result of his disasters, and of the extraordinary efforts which he was required to make. A power which should abound in gold could badly defend itself;
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
e grave faults, rather than useful operations. We shall limit ourselves to citing two examples of them: the expedition of the Duke of York to Dunkirk, in 1793, suggested to the English, by ancient maritime and commercial views, gave to the operations of the Allies a divergent direction which caused their failure, and this objective point was good neither in strategy nor in tactics. The expedition of the same prince to Holland, in 1799, equally dictated by the same views of the cabinet of London, strengthened by the mental reservations of Austria upon Belgium, was not less fatal, in causing the march of the Arch-Duke Charles from Zurich upon Manheim, an operation quite contrary to the manifest interests of the Allies at the epoch in which it was resolved upon. These truths prove that the choice of political objective points ought to be subordinate to those of strategy, at least, so far as great military questions may be decided by arms. For the rest, this subject is so vast an