cers would lead them as gallantly, as before; it put a few hundred of the enemy hors de combat and maintained the right of way by the river to the South.
But it was the occasion for another shout of triumph-perfectly incommensurate with its importance — to go up from the people; and it taught them still more to despise and underrate the power of the government they had so far successfully and brilliantly defied.
Elsewhere than on the Potomac line, the case had been a little different.
Magruder, on the Peninsula, had gained no success of note.
A few unimportant skirmishes had taken place and the Confederate lines had been contracted — more from choice than necessity.
But the combatants were near enough-and respected each other enough --for constant watchfulness to be considered necessary; and, though the personnel of the army was, perhaps, not as good as that of the Potomac, in the main its condition was better.
At Norfolk nothing had been done but to strengthen the defenses
which crosses the Chickahominy at Long Bridge; the division of G. W. Smith and Magruder's forces — commanded by him before Johnston's army arrived at the Yorktown liniles from the city, with one brigade in observation at Bottom's Bridge; whilst Magruder's troops extended from Old Tavern, on theNine-mile road, to New Bridge, thence division was ordered to the ground vacated by mine on the Williamsburg road.
Magruder's troops were not moved; but, at my request, I was relieved from longer commancommanding General Magruder, and he was ordered to report, in future, direct to General Johnston.
At the same time D. R. Jones's division, two brigades, of Magruder's proMagruder's proper command, posted on our extreme left, remained temporarily under my control, for service in the proposed attack.
Brigadier-General Whiting was regularly assigned,rushed, or routed, before 8 A. M. At that season daybreak was at about 4 A. M. Magruder's command and A. P. Hill's division were not moved.
In order to form a prop
