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s a reverse to the picture, however. The North, suddenly checked in its vainglorious boast of subjugating the South in ninety days, sobered itself down to a steadier prosecution of its deadly purpose. Scott and McDowell went into eclipse, and McClellan was called to the work of organization and command. Nevertheless, operations were closed on that line for nearly a year, and the activity of preparation was transferred to the West. In the South an undue and ignorant exultation blinded the ma severance accomplished as a political fact, the State-rights men maintained their allegiance to the Old dominion by stubborn warfare until the close of the contest; and its eastern border was at all times a debatable ground. On this field General McClellan gained his first distinction, which raised him, as the successor of Scott, for a time to the chief command of the United States Army. The movements in this quarter from the Ohio River Valley as a base, though well contested in many a blood
ation of peace within her borders. It also passed laws for arming. Garrett Davis visited Washington, and engaged Mr. Lincoln to respect this neutrality. He not only avouched the fact of Lincoln's promise, but his own belief that it would be faithfully kept. Davis was highly respected in Kentucky as an honorable man, and his declaration carried great weight; but Mr. Lincoln subsequently denied and repudiated the arrangement. The same issue arose between General Buckner and General McClellan, in regard to the terms of an oral agreement made between them June 8th, resulting, it is to be presumed, from such misunderstanding as all oral communications are liable to. General Buckner took active measures to carry out his part of the convention. On the 10th of June he advised Governor Magoffin of its stipulations, and, on the 11th, engaged Governor Harris, of Tennessee, to consent to the same terms, and give assurances on the part of the South that the neutrality of Kentucky s
quipments, transportation, organization, and discipline, was still greater. The United States troops opposed to him were over 36,000 strong, while his own available force was less than 20,000 men. General Fremont reports that he had, September 14, 1861, at and near Cairo, 12,831 men, and at Paducah, 7,791 men; together, 20,622 men, under General U. S. Grant. report on the conduct of the War, part III., p. 41. in this estimate he only puts the forces in his Department at 55,000 men. General McClellan, in his report of the army of the Potomac, p. 48, estimates Fremont's forces, from the best information at the War Department, at 80,000 men, or about 45 per cent. More. This rate of increase would give General Grant 30,000 men. General Robert Anderson commanded the Central Department. The fortune of War, which gave General Johnston his former room-mate at West point as his second in command, confronted him thus with his early friend Anderson as his antagonist. Anderson was able to
His marked individuality gradually asserted itself, but when he became permanent President it was too late. Hence we find the preparations for defense in 1861 by no means equal to the ability or opportunities of the South. But, apart from these general considerations, it was natural for the Administration to regard the defense of Tennessee as of secondary importance. The political reasons for holding the capital, the early pressure upon that point, and the great host marshaling under McClellan at Washington, induced the Government to hazard every other interest for the protection of Richmond. The Gulf States would scarcely consider any other danger than that to their sea-coast, and this influence was so powerful at Richmond that troops were left in them to defend lines of no general importance. In a parliamentary and confederated government it is almost impossible to ignore local interests for the sake of the general welfare, even when all is at stake. If the President had l
Robinson, or McCook at Nolin. Had he done so in October, 1861, he could have walked into Louisville, and the vital part of the population would have hailed him as a deliverer. Why he did not, was to me a mystery then and is now; for I know that he saw the move, and that his wagons loaded up at one time for a start toward Frankfort, passing between our two camps. Conscious of our weakness, I was unnecessarily unhappy, and doubtless exhibited it too much to those near me. (Page 200.) McClellan had 100,000 men, Fremont 60,000, whereas to me had only been allotted about 18,000. I argued that, for the purpose of defense, we should have 60,000 men at once, and, for offense, would need 200,000 before we were done. . . . (Page 203.) I complained that the new levies of Ohio and Indiana were diverted East and West, and we got scarcely anything; that our forces at Nolin and Dick Robinson were powerless for invasion, and only tempting to a general, such as we believed Sidney Johnston
Federal Generals. Buell. Kentucky refugees. John C. Breckinridge. the Kentucky Provisional Government. minor operations. the cavalry. Morgan and Duke. fight at Woodsonville. N. B. Forrest. Texas Rangers. fight at Sacramento. letters to the Secretary of War. anecdotes. It has been seen that the early part of November was a season of hostile activity with the enemy. It was also marked by important changes in the assignment of their generals. On November 1st Major-General George B. McClellan was assigned to the chief command of the army, in place of Lieutenant-General Scott, retired. On November 9th the Department of the Cumberland was discontinued by the United States War Department, and the Department of the Ohio constituted, embracing the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky (east of the Cumberland River), and Tennessee; and Brigadier-General D. C. Buell was assigned to its command, which he assumed November 15th. Army of the Cumberland, vol. i., p. 4
tack upon the centre should be made by two gunboat expeditions, with, I should say, 20,000 men on the two rivers. Boynton also quotes a letter from Halleck to McClellan, January 20, 1862, which says: The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not the proofficers, finding by due pressure the weak point of a strong line to be on their own immediate front, were not slow to seize the advantage. Early in January, McClellan, the general-in-chief, directed Halleck, commanding the Western Department, to make a demonstration in Western Kentucky which should prevent reinforcements beingered greatly from cold, and from the effects of a violent storm of rain and snow. They subsisted chiefly on plunder. Badeau's Life of Grant, vol. i., p. 25; McClellan's report, Rebellion record, vol. IV., p. 49. General Polk believed that the retreat of these columns was due to a movement toward their rear by 1,000 cavalry an
showing that he had greatly improved his means of information, and that the retreating army could not so effectually mask its movements as in Kentucky. In forming a plan of campaign, there was some diversity of opinion between Halleck and Buell as to details; but the main idea of dividing the Confederacy, by cutting the Memphis & Charleston Railroad near the Great Bend of the Tennessee, was essentially the same. There has been controversy as to the origin of this plan of campaign. McClellan and Buell were in conference about it; and Halleck adopted it as soon as he saw his way clear to the possession of the Tennessee River. The original design of Halleck, as communicated to his subordinates, was a dash at the Confederate lines of communication. It had become apparent to them, however, and to his adversary, that he purposed to split the South, and that from Shiloh to Corinth was where he expected to drive his wedge. Buell says that he and Halleck, as independent comma
n of an angry and disappointed populace. McClellan next appeared in the arena, and the whole co Northern journalists began to grow weary of McClellan's inactivity. They had fully exhausted all dequate to the heaven-born qualities of George B. McClellan. His eyes, hair, mouth, teeth, voice, e giant infant would yield! The father was Dr. McClellan, and the son-General McClellan! our youngGeneral McClellan! our young commander on the Potomac. The country will see a prophetic charm in this incident. Truly, he was integrity! This beautiful incident of General McClellan's youth was not written subsequent to thllowing is the exceedingly modest address of McClellan after his disastrous defeat in the Seven Dayeard distinguished Southern leaders speak of McClellan in the highest terms of compliment. His sucd great veracity have said in Richmond, that McClellan offered his services to the South when the wgnal victory over the combined forces of Generals McClellan and Pope. On the twenty-eighth and twen
he grand rendezvous, and the troops that first arrived were camped there: some few were sent twenty-five miles to the front (Fairfax Court-house and station) to watch the enemy, while General Johnston proceeded down the Shenandoah Valley with all he could gather, to watch and oppose General Patterson, who was massing his troops on the Maryland bank of the Potomac, and threatening Harper's Ferry. General Pegram was in Western Virginia, watching the Federals in that direction, who, under General McClellan, were threatening to advance circuitously and take us in the rear. Such, in brief, might be said to be the state of things in the middle of April, 1861. I now proceed to a simple narration of facts, of which, for the most part, I was an eye-witness, throughout most of the engagements of the war. And in the first place let me observe, that prior to the proclamation of April, 1861, in which President Lincoln warned us to disperse to our homes in thirty days, there were many who fon
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