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General Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant, Chapter 18 (search)
g about his neck while he was writing, make a terrible mess of his papers, and turn everything in his tent into a toy: but they were never once reproved for any innocent sport; they were governed solely by an appeal to their affections. They were always respectful, and never failed to render strict obedience to their father when he told them seriously what he wanted them to do. Mrs. Grant, formerly Miss Julia Dent, was four years younger than the general. She had been educated in Professor Moreau's finishing-school in St. Louis, one of the best institutions of instruction in its day, and was a woman of much general intelligence, and exceedingly well informed upon all public matters. She was noted for her amiability, her cheerful disposition, and her extreme cordiality of manner. She was soon upon terms of intimacy with all the members of the staff, and was quick to win the respect and esteem of every one at headquarters. She visited any officers or soldiers who were sick, wen
an hour, or until it was too dark to tell friend from foe. The rebels were completely routed. Thirteen were killed, several more wounded, and many taken prisoners. Among the rebels killed were Captain McCulloch and son, somewhat noted in that section. The Union loss was one killed, Joseph Garrison, one man named Adams mortally wounded, and another, named Gallupe, slightly wounded. Colonel Moore took possession of Lancaster to-night.--St. Louis Republican, November 30. At night Capt. Moreau's Cavalry, accompanied by Gen. McCook's body guard, went to the traitor Buckner's farm, situated on Green River, a few miles above Munfordsville, Kentucky, and took possession of the stock, a large amount of grain, wheat, corn, &c.--N. Y. Times, November 30. William H. Carroll, Brig.-Gen. of Confederate forces at Camp Lookout, East Tennessee, annulled the proclamation of martial law made by his predecessor.--(Doc. 188.) United States gunboats Flag, Augusta, Pocahontas, and Senec
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
even in our day, notwithstanding the immense progress which civilized nations have made in all the sciences, statistical, political, geographical and topographical. I will cite two examples of them of which I was a witness; in 1796, the army of Moreau, penetrating into the Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, defiles and forests, which the ancient Hercinius called to memory with frightful circumstances; we were surprised after having climbed the cliffs of that vast plateau, which of the great states of Europe has not been happy in his sayings and his predictions; he sees obstacles everywhere; he presents, among others, as impregnable, the frontiers of Austria upon the Inn, between the Tyrol and Passau, where we have seen Moreau and Napoleon manoeuvre, and triumph with armies of a hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805 and 1809. The greater part of those reasonings are open to the same criticism; he has seen things too materially. But if these sciences are not
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
son three lines of manoeuvre-operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two masses ofcovers Latour, for stealing a few marches upon Moreau, and for throwing all his forces upon the righng a strategical direction opposite to that of Moreau; Suwaroff profits skillfully from the central ese pretended mathematical rules. Did not General Moreau find himself at the gates of Vienna in 180o inevitable defeat. This is what happened to Moreau and Jourdan before the Arch-Duke Charles,in 17 Arch-Duke triumphed in 1796, over Jourdan and Moreau, by a single march, which was the application ans of arresting for a whole month the army of Moreau upon the Danube. It is known how many advanta opportuneness of this precaution. In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray upon the true directies of the Tyrol and push its march to Linz, as Moreau did in 1800. Thus far we have considered moa in 1799, as well as those of Napoleon and of Moreau in 1800. The first is a model of operations o[6 more...]
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
o natural genius for war, nor the instructive coup d'oeil which experience in combats will give to a general brave and of a tried sang-froid. The simultaneous employment of the greatest possible number of forces, of all the arms combined, except a small reserve of each of them, which it is proper always to have on hand, The grand reserves should naturally also be engaged when it is necessary, but it is well always to keep two or three battalions and five or six squadrons in hand. General Moreau decided the battle of Engen with four companies of the 58th regiment, and it is known what the 9th Light and the cavalry of Kellerman did at Marengo. will be then, at the decisive moment of the battle, the problem which every skilfull general will apply himself to resolve, and which should make his rule of conduct. Now this decisive moment is very generally that when the first line of one of the parties should be broken, and when the efforts of the two adversaries should tend, either to
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
h embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an, to cut it off from Austria, and to drive it back upon the Maine. Moreau, who had already a tete de pont at Basle, preferred to pass more cotent of the same front of operations, as occurred to Jourdan and to Moreau in 1796. If we gain by it on one side the advantage of having in nrevent the enemy from overwhelming them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had followed this maxim, and had united at Donanwert instead of movwell directed, but could not count among distant retreats. That of Moreau, in 1796, exalted by party spirit, was honorable, without being extic direction of his retreat that Germany owed its safety? Finally, Moreau, who had marched upon an immense development by isolated divisions,ds of the enemy, as the Arch-Duke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a manoeuvre almost always
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
ht, and that of Augereau detached to the left, were disposable for acting upon the flanks. But from the passage of the Danube at Donauwert, all was disordered; Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the main body was dislocated, part to the right, a part to the left, so that this fine order of battle became useless. It will ever be difficult to give an organization at all stable; meanwhile events are not always as complicated as those of 1805, and the campaign of Moreau in 1800, proves that the primitive organization can, to a certain point, be maintained, at least for the bulk of the army. To this end it seems that the organization of the army into four fractions, viz: two wings, a centre, and a reserve, is the only rational one; the composition of those fractions may vary according to the strength of the army, but in order to be able to maintain it, it will be indispensable to have a certain number of divisions out of line, to furnish the necessary detac
he French frontier; Kray, with another army, threatened the Rhine. Moreau, near Basel, was to act against Kray; and the reserve army, disposen the Swiss frontier, was to act in Italy. Napoleon's plan was for Moreau to pass through Switzerland, cross the Rhine an Schaffhausen, to cuon, St. Gothard, and Spluegen, and arrived in the rear of Melas. Moreau did not entirely conform to Napoleon's plan; he crossed the Rhine nthe Archduke Charles, in Germany, defeated the armies of Jordan and Moreau by retreating on concentric lines from the Rhine to the Bohemian fr0 men. The Archduke Charles commanded in person the army opposed to Moreau; arrived near the Lech, he left General Latour, with 30,000 men, anft a corps to continue the pursuit, while he himself turned against Moreau, and marched to cut him from his line of retreat. The news that the archduke had left the army opposed to him reached Moreau only after Jordan's defeat; he then commenced to retreat, but was overtaken by the
1796; or, in consequence of strategical movements of the enemy, to keep free our lines of communication — the retreat of Moreau in 1796 was such. We may also retreat to gain a favorable position for a battle, as did Napoleon before the battle of Auhe pursuing enemy. If we retreat in consequence of a strategical movement and are pursued by an inferior enemy, as was Moreau in 1796, we should act like him — that is, to disengage our rear by trying to engage and defeat the pursuer. General Latour, with only 30,000 men, was imprudent enough to accept the battle offered to him by Moreau with 50,000 men. Latour was defeated at Biberach, on the 2d of October, 1796; after his victory, Moreau continued his retreat unmolested. Descents and Moreau continued his retreat unmolested. Descents and expeditions. here, again, we must consider the strategical and the tactical arrangement. Descents are undertaken for the conquest of a country or an island; or they have only a restricted object, such as the destruction of arsenals, depots, ships
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
s. If two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same opposing force, they are said to follow double or multiple lines. The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, were double lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, although moving in seven distinct corps d'armee, form the operations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they met with a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles, from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing generals, and forcing them to retreat. If theategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the enemy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same way the Archduke Charles took an interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan, in 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single point. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on the
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