e towards Warrenton, to have quickly recalled Burnside from his march towards Fredericksburg.
The line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad is the real defensive line for Washington; and experience has proved that a hostile force might always, by a mere menace directed against that line, compel the Union army to seek its recovery.
General Lee either felt himself to be not in condition to attempt any offensive enterprise at this time, or he was prevented from doing so by instructions from Richmond; for he adopted the less brilliant alternative of planting himself directly in the path of the Union army.
It is not always by taking position in the direct path of an enemy that his advance is opposed; but sometimes points may be occupied on the flank with much advantage, so as to threaten his line of operations, if he ventures to pass.—Dufour: Strategy and Tactics, p. 41. So soon as Burnside's intention of moving towards Fredericksburg was fully disclosed, Jackson's corps was directed on
ced by the rapidly arriving Confederate corps.
It was soon manifest that the Cockade City, which the day before was the open prize of the first captor, would demand for its possession a battle or a siege.
As the event proved, Grant was compelled to sit down before it in formal beleaguerment, and it was not till after the lapse of near a twelvemonth that, in the last act of the eventful drama of the war, Petersburg fell.
The army before Petersburg.
In its strategic relations to Richmond, Petersburg may be defined as a fortress thrust forward on the flank of the Confederate capital.
The great lines of supply for an army covering Richmond—the Lynchburg Railroad, James River Canal, and Danville Railroad—run into that city from a westerly and southwesterly direction.
But Petersburg, securely held, easily holds off at arm's-length any force threatening the communications of the Confederate capital.
It is distant twentytwo miles south from Richmond, with which city it is conn
tation of the army to the 99; the army before Yorktown (for siege of—see Yorktown), 99; pursuit of Johnston to Williamsburg (for further—see Williamsburg), 112; White House reached.
118; Seven days retreat —see Seven days; the close of the, 164; reflections on its strategy, 164; joy of the South and grief of the North, 165; losses of, 165.
Peninsula, the, as a secondary base, 23.
Petersburg, the siege of, 497; importance as point d'appui for the army, 500; its strategic relations to Richmond, 107; two possible modes of capture, 552; observations on the siege, 550; manoeuvres by the left, 551; Grant's change of base to south of the James, 497; Cole's Ferry—the ponton delay, 499; the fortifications of on Smith's arrival, 501; Grant's army all on south side of the James, 500; Gillmore's and Kautz's abortive attempt to capture, 500; partial success of Smith's forces, 503; noncapture-circumstances of Hancock's march, 504; Hancock ordered to assist Smith before, 504; Grant's expecta