Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. You can also browse the collection for P. H. Sheridan or search for P. H. Sheridan in all documents.

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antages of Warren's advance. In the same way Sheridan as yet appeared to have accomplished nothinglose no opportunity. On the 29th, he ordered Sheridan: If it is ascertained certainly that Breckenrreat to the west bank of the Opequan; but had Sheridan been aware of Anderson's intention, he wouldMartinsburg . . I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and I expected an early move.—Earlyrned to the ranks, so that the actual loss to Sheridan's command did not exceed 3,000. Early, in never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders. Early fell bh of Strasburg; and at daylight on the 20th, Sheridan moved rapidly up the Valley in pursuit. Fishs Narrow Passage, a gorge in the Blue Ridge. Sheridan pursued them during the night, only halting a and inquired of Halleck: Has the news of General Sheridan's battle been sent to General Sherman? I the fall of Richmond. On the 24th, however, Sheridan reported: I am now eighty miles from Martinsb[79 more...]
Grant on the James in support of Sherman and Sheridan orders to Butler and Meade Grant has small pondence of Grant with President in regard to Sheridan Sheridan's operations facilitated by movemenSheridan's operations facilitated by movement on James Meade moves out to left Warren captures work on Peeble's farm Ninth corps. At first f Richmond anxiety of Lee. In the midst of Sheridan's brilliant successes in the Valley, the geneherman, and partly to favor the operations of Sheridan in the Valley. On the 1st of October, Sherthan heretofore. Wilson had been sent from Sheridan's army a few days before, to take command of s, in support of the movements of Sherman and Sheridan, and announced his intentions to both commandof the week; and the next day he sent word to Sheridan: No troops have passed through Richmond to ree same time he forwarded the latest news from Sheridan, and wrote an elaborate letter to the governmr communications. and consequently hearing of Sheridan. . . I am satisfied no troops have gone from [2 more...]
ut Chapin's Farm should be held or levelled. Sheridan, for want of supplies, if there should be no ortify, holding Waynesboroa and Rockfish Gap.—Sheridan to Halleck, Oct. 1. This information afterwaried, I am afraid they would all run off. . . Sheridan has laid waste nearly all of Rockingham and meanwhile, though deferring to the opinion of Sheridan, so far as to direct the return of the Sixth for guarding against and resisting. To this Sheridan replied from Front Royal: The cavalry is all l line of battle also overlapped the right of Sheridan's, and for a time threatened disaster; but a national advance was checked for a while; but Sheridan soon pushed on, and the rebel left again gaveade the North, and the various detachments of Sheridan's army marched whithersoever they wished, for general would have met with better fortune. Sheridan had shown himself abundant in resource, instar to be disaster into glorious victory stamps Sheridan what I have always thought him, one of the ab[66 more...]
ages from Meade, and Butler, and Sherman, and Sheridan, and Thomas, and Canby, and Stanton, and Halland; often one was with Sherman, another with Sheridan, and a third with Canby; and during actual moates. He enjoyed the triumphs of Sherman and Sheridan, and of all national commanders, as keenly asRosecrans, as well as of Meade and Butler and Sheridan, so that all should contribute to the safety e dashing genius or the personal magnetism of Sheridan, but possessed not a few traits in common withortest notice. At the same time he directed Sheridan: If you are satisfied this is so, send the Sid them how Thomas being set to hold Hood, and Sheridan retained to watch Early, while Meade and Butlportant of which now came from Georgia, since Sheridan had laid waste the Valley. When the listened that the country could not think higher of Sheridan and Thomas and Schofield than he did, nor thawhat he said about Thomas, and Schofield, and Sheridan, and most of all Sherman, others left his pre[1 more...]
mouth of Cape Fear river orders to Butler and Weitzel orders to Sheridan movement of Meade against Hicksford situation at Nashville Thomhich should have followed a victory; and either Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan would undoubtedly have moved upon the enemy, disordered by defeat rative with Thomas's advance; and Sherman and Meade and Butler and Sheridan were all included in the scheme, in which the army in Tennessee bous forces in every field. On the 28th of November, he had said to Sheridan: My impression now is that you can spare the Sixth corps with impu the Shenandoah Valley. On the 4th of December, he telegraphed to Sheridan: Do you think it possible now to send cavalry through to the Virginging troops from the Shenandoah, and suggesting new operations to Sheridan; while planning a movement for the army of the Potomac, which mighurn to Meade. Upon the receipt of this news, Grant telegraphed to Sheridan: The inhabitants of Richmond are supplied exclusively over the roa
d Mann. There could be no surer evidence that the cause was desperate. But the capture of Fort Fisher not only closed the last important inlet of supplies to the enemy from abroad, at a juncture when Grant was cutting off those supplies in every direction at home, and thus formed an important adjunct to his general plan of exhausting as well as destroying the Confederacy; it had also a strategically consequence, not apparent at the time to outsiders, but which with him was paramount to all other considerations. The circle was now gradually closing around the prey. Sherman had reached Savannah, Thomas was masster of Tennessee, and Sheridan of the Valley of Virginia, while Grant still held the principal rebel force at Richmond. At this crisis the possession of Cape Fear river opened another base for operations into the interior. It enabled the general-in-chief to look forward to supporting Sherman's future movements, and presented an opportunity to complete the isolation of Lee.
ves in North Carolina capture of Wilmington Sheridan ordered to move West of Richmond anxiety of Lee's statement of rebel condition news from Sheridan Grant's prescience of Lee's movements Gradupatches from Sherman-further delay of Thomas Sheridan arrives at White House Sheridan's raid last defeat of Early skilful strategy of Sheridan enormous loss inflicted on enemy approaching consumessee in the direction of South Carolina, and Sheridan was now instructed to penetrate to the west ographed to Lincoln, explaining his strategy. Sheridan's movement, he said, is in the direction of tan was ordered to come in from Tennessee, and Sheridan had started from the Valley, all aiming to cod as far up on the Lynchburg road as he can. Sheridan started this morning from Winchester, Virginiield was effected at Goldsboro; on the 24th, Sheridan set out from White House to rejoin the army odid this always. He did so now. Meade and Sheridan and Ord were invited to meet Sherman, and on [6 more...]
of Humphreys and Warren Pickett sent against Sheridan battle of Dinwiddie advance of Pickett repebels on Chamberlain's creek Pickett pierces Sheridan's centre Sheridan attacks in return SheridaSheridan forced back to Dinwiddie Sheridan holds Dinwiddie generalship of Sheridan situation, March 31stSheridan situation, March 31st Sheridan not dismayed Grant determines to reinforce Sheridan Warren ordered to Sheridan's supporSheridan's support Urgency of Grant and Meade inexcusable delay of Warren chagrin of Grant Disarrangement of Sheridan's plan advance of Sheridan without Warren Sheri-Dan's new plan of battle battle of Five Forkand results of battle-grant's endorsement of Sheridan characteristics of Warren and Sheridan. O Hatcher's run. On the 28th, Grant instructed Sheridan: The Fifth corps will move by the Vaughan roa the order was disagreeable to his listener. Sheridan, however, said nothing, and Grant immediatelyfused to answer to his will. With Sherman or Sheridan he moved like a skilful rider on a high-bred[22 more...]
ate effect, formidable at first to an adversary; but, when opposed by soldiers like Sherman and Sheridan and Grant, their strength was wasted, their struggles vain, their endurance failed. Next camthe continent and then marched northward, driving Johnston; Thomas destroyed or scattered Hood; Sheridan had beaten and battered Early's army, literally, into pieces. Only the command in front of Ric for Stoneman and Thomas and Wilson were in his rear, while Sherman was in front, and Meade and Sheridan were approaching from the North. The troops that escaped from Mobile were between Canby and th Stanton, the two great men in civil life whom the epoch produced, on one hand, and Sherman and Sheridan, with their eminent executive military genius, on the other. He participated in the authority th the people; his strategy was not inferior to that of Sherman, and he proved himself equal to Sheridan in that power of audacious and skillful combination in the presence of the enemy which, above a
Appendix to Chapter XXV. Sheridan's strength in the campaign in the Valley of Virginia, 1864. General Sheridan to Adjutant-General of the army. HeadquartGeneral Sheridan to Adjutant-General of the army. Headquarters, Middle military division, September 13, 1864. General: I have the honor to forward as complete a field return as is possible at the present time. The most somplete all reports required, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, P. H. Sheridan, Major-General. Brigadier-General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, United Stat44,6114,815 —————— 2,20843,28445,487 This return is the only one made by Sheridan to the Adjutant-General prior to the battle of Winchester; and, as it was accore of sufficient size to reduce the force in the field to the numbers given in Sheridan's report to Grant, which were taken at the time from the official returns of ernish copies of them. At Grant's Headquarters it was always understood that Sheridan's effective force in the Valley campaign was about thirty thousand men.
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