Browsing named entities in John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies. You can also browse the collection for W. T. Sherman or search for W. T. Sherman in all documents.

Your search returned 246 results in 17 document sections:

1 2
close by the receipt of an appointment as Second Lieutenant in the Second Cavalry, a new regiment organized in accord with an Act of Congress, in 1855, and commanded by Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, with R. E. Lee as Lieutenant Colonel, George H. Thomas and W. J. Hardee as Majors. Lieutenant Philip Sheridan relieved me, and I returned to San Francisco en route to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, the rendezvous of the regiment. At the former place I met, for the first time, in his bank, W. T. Sherman, who possessed as at present the same piercing eye and nervous impulsive temperament. Little indeed did I anticipate at that period the great theatre of life upon which I was destined so soon to be thrown as an humble actor with him and others just mentioned, and who have since become so distinguished and prominent as American soldiers. In the early Autumn of 1855 I sailed from San Francisco for New York, via Panama, and reported for duty at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. Soon therea
ement, on the 1st of May, and previous to General Sherman's advance, only two thousand three hundre It was telegraphed over the country that General Sherman was about to advance. This information ieral Johnston the grand opportunity to attack Sherman with his main Army, by passing over the northg but a short distance to march; and that General Sherman did not take up his position in front of e wall between him and his adversary, had General Sherman advanced by the latter route, where the ctowards Cleveland. I have always thought General Sherman did not wish to accept a pitched battle, y stated, and practically demonstrated by General Sherman's use of them, after these mountain defiln on the night of the 12th by the report that Sherman had moved with his Army down the valley beyonval of Polk's Army, when a grand assault upon Sherman's left flank and rear could have been made nethe firing. I have too high a regard for General Sherman's sagacity, as a soldier, to believe that
General Johnston, soon after our arrival at Cassville, to turn back and attack Sherman at Adairsville, as we had information of a portion of his Army having been senith the spirit of our urgent recommendation only the day previous to turn upon Sherman, and give him general battle at Adairsville, and but poorly harmonizes with thPolk and myself, urged Johnston only the day previous to march back and attack Sherman at Adairsville; that his own chief of artillery reported the position Polk andst earnestly urged Johnston, only the day previous, to move forward and attack Sherman, does it not seem strange that we should be insisting on retreat the followingf Cassville, this intention could only have been based upon the vain hope that Sherman would march across the valley, and through the town to attack his entrenchment a heavy enfilading fire of artillery, may I not ask — especially as a part of Sherman's Army, I think Schofield's Corps, was then reported to be moving across the E
25th, 1874. Dr. W. M. Polk, 288 Fifth Avenue, New York. Dear Sir:--In reply to your note of the 2oth inst., asking me to give you my recollection of the circumstances in regard to the retreat of the Confederate Armies from Cassville, Georgia, to the south side of the Etowah river, I will state the facts as connected with myself, as follows: At the time when the Confederate Armies of Tennessee and Mississippi, under the command of General J. E. Johnston, and the Federal Army under General Sherman, were manoeuvring in the neighborhood of Cassville, I had nearly completed my journey from Demopolis, Alabama, to that town to join Lieutenant General Polk, commanding the Army of Mississippi, who was with General Johnston in that vicinity. I had crossed the country in company with a part of that command. I arrived at Cassville railway station about half-past 3 or four o'clock in the afternoon of the i9th of May, 1864, and met Colonel Gale, of our staff, who informed me that the Lieut
iving their close and accurate fire with the fortitude always exhibited by General Sherman's troops in the actions of this campaign. * * * The contest of the main boenant General Polk's and my urgent recommendation that he turn upon and attack Sherman at Adairsville, just before he placed his Army upon the untenable ridge in rearmy had remained on the defensive about thirty days at Kennesaw Mountain, when Sherman resorted to a ruse he had learned from experience would prove effective: he sef Georgia. After our passage of this river on the night of the 9th of July, Sherman moved rapidly to the eastward and across the Chattahoochee, some distance abov for Atlanta; at the same time I directed his attention to the approach of General Sherman, and alleged that the enemy, unless checked, would in a few days capture try, to pocket the correspondence, remain in command, and fight for Atlanta, as Sherman was at the very gates of the city. To this my second appeal he made about the
thout firing a musket; and there have awaited Sherman's advance, when he should have made his attachis policy, he would have been able to engage Sherman with over seventy thousand (70,000) effectivehe Army. It is a significant fact that General Sherman dedicates only thirty-eight pages to an ainually of fighting at Dalton; when, however, Sherman appeared at Tunnel Hill, in front of Rockyfac the enemy, and have held Atlanta against General Sherman's Army of over one hundred thousand (100,h Tree creek, which embraced the front of General Sherman's entire Army; and when, as you will remef the enemy and have held Atlanta against General Sherman's Army of over one hundred thousand (I00, creek embraced about the entire front of General Sherman's Army. I, therefore, found it necessaryenlightened me in regard to the means to hold Sherman's one hundred and six thousand (106,000) at bfeasible, and certainly more promising. If Sherman had not a sufficient force to form a cordon o
llowing extract from an official telegram, even General Sherman was in doubt as to whether or not Johnston woulht, but it may be so. Let us develop the truth. W. T. Sherman, Major General Commanding. My predecessor hve thousand (5000) cavalry in Tennessee, to destroy Sherman's communications with Nashville,--at least, in so far as to hinder Sherman from receiving sufficient supplies for the maintenance of his Army. General Wheeler's with only five thousand (5000) menespecially, when Sherman had a large force of cavalry attached to his own Ar circumstances, could have so effectually destroyed Sherman's communications as to compel him to retreat. The hnston when he arranged the terms of surrender with Sherman. Generals Hampton and Wheeler being away at the tianied him with an escort to the last interview with Sherman, and on our return to camp he told me that he had hreport, if correct, proves that the soldiers of General Sherman's Army had been demoralized by their course of
rmed no intention, till the appearance of General Sherman's Memoirs, to enter fully into the detailin this critical position. Not till I read Sherman's Memoirs, was I aware of McPherson's so closed my predecessor on his retreat to Macon. Sherman says (vol. II, pages 71, 72): On the 18tI am apprised for the first time, and through Sherman's Memoirs, of the presence of the enemy's lef day, and endeavor to show in what manner General Sherman exposed, on his approach to Atlanta, the ncapable of rendering timely assistance. General Sherman's violation of the established maxim thatonfederate Army--and thus, if possible, crush Sherman's right wing, as we drove it into the narrow my. Instead of charging down upon the foe as Sherman represents Stewart's men to have done, many ock according to explicit instructions. General Sherman writes as follows, in regard to this engagement: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, pages 72. 73. On the 19th the three Armies were conver
lly inadequate for the purpose designed; that Sherman's line, which extended from the vicinity of Dhe enemy time to further entrench, and afford Sherman a chance to rectify, in a measure, his strangner of moving, and illustrated effectually to Sherman the danger of stretching out his line in suchependent of the main body of the Army. General Sherman acknowledges the correctness of my positis, in reference to the battle of Shiloh : Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 229. We did notward to use freely his artillery, saying: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 53. I explainedd. This I think, and indeed am sure, was General Sherman's opinion before and after Hood's tacticst was printed, and sent it immediately to General Sherman by one of my couriers. He wrote me back e part of the troops. Neither Johnston's nor Sherman's Armies ever experienced the weariness and h, and, in all probability have so profited by Sherman's blunders as to have altered signally the is[13 more...]
. These operations had been ordered by General Sherman upon a grand scale; picked men and horseshe Federals crossed the Chattahoochee. General Sherman, in reference to his plan of operations a, as the subjoined extract will indicate: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 98. I now becamven out of Tennessee by superior forces. General Sherman, in relation to this movement, says: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 130. The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee,with about one-half of our cavalry force, General Sherman took advantage of the absence of these trion by throwing cavalry to our rear, says: Sherman's Memoirs, vol. II, page 104. He (Kilpatjoy Station. I have often thought it strange Sherman should have occupied him-self with attacking of the 3d, our troops filed into position in Sherman's front, which was then near Jonesboroa. By d moved off in the direction of Atlanta. General Sherman published orders stating that his Army wo[17 more...]
1 2