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Epictetus, Works (ed. George Long) 22 0 Browse Search
Sallust, Conspiracy of Catiline (ed. John Selby Watson, Rev. John Selby Watson, M.A.) 16 0 Browse Search
C. Suetonius Tranquillus, The Lives of the Caesars (ed. Alexander Thomson) 4 0 Browse Search
E. T. Merrill, Commentary on Catullus (ed. E. T. Merrill) 2 0 Browse Search
Q. Horatius Flaccus (Horace), The Works of Horace (ed. C. Smart, Theodore Alois Buckley) 2 0 Browse Search
Cornelius Tacitus, A Dialogue on Oratory (ed. Alfred John Church, William Jackson Brodribb) 2 0 Browse Search
Pliny the Elder, The Natural History (ed. John Bostock, M.D., F.R.S., H.T. Riley, Esq., B.A.) 2 0 Browse Search
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Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
ethought both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say: I move not without thy knowledgeThe line is from the prayer of Ulysses to Athena: Hear me child of Zeus, thou who standest by me always in all dangers, nor do I even move without thy knowledge. Socrates said that the gods know everything, what is said and done and thought (Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 19). Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i. 1, 2; and Dr. Price's Dissertation on Providence, sect. i. Epictetus enumerates the various opinions about the gods in antient times. The reader may consult the notes in Schweighaeuser's edition. The opinions about God among modern nations, who are called civilized, and are so more or less, do not seem to be so varied as in antient times: but the con- trasts in modern opinions are striking. These modern opinions vary between denial of a God, though the number of those who
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
ution of things and a dispersion; or it is unity and order and providence (Antoninus, vi. 10): also vii. 9, all things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly any thing unconnected with any other thing. See also Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, ii. 7; and De Oratore, iii. 5. do, the person replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things have a natural agreement and unionThe word is sumpaqei=n. Cicero (De Divin. ii. 69) translates sum pa/qeian by continuatio conjuncCicero (De Divin. ii. 69) translates sum pa/qeian by continuatio conjunctioque naturae. with heavenly things? I do. And how else so regularly as if by God's command, when He bids the plants to flower, do they flower? when He bids them to send forth shoots, do they shoot? when He bids them to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit? when He bids the fruit to ripen, does it ripen? when again He bids them to cast down the fruits, how else do they cast them down? and when to shed the leaves, do they shed the leaves? and when He bids them to fold themselves up and
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
n idle show,e)mperpereu/sh|. Epictetus (iii. 2. 14) uses the adjective pe/rperos to signify a vain man. Antoninus (v. 5) uses the verb perpe/reuesqai: and Paul (Corinthians i. c. 13, 4), where our version is, 'charity (love) vaunteth not itself.' Cicero (ad Attic. i. 14, 4) uses e)neperpereusa/mhn, to express a rhetorical display. and say, See how I make dialogues? Do not so, my man; but rather say; See how I am not disappointed of that which I desire: See how I do not fall into that which I wouow this, how never to be disappointed in your desire and how never to fall into that which you would avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and syllogisms: do you labour at thinking about death,The whole life of philosophers,' says Cicero (Tusc. i. 30), following Plato, 'is a reflection upon death.' chains, the rack, exile;Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, torture, exile and sudden executions, can be ranked among the common accidents of life, may be surpris
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
part of a certain whole, it is for the sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at another time be in want, and in some cases die prematurely. Why then are you troubled? Do you not know, that as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you are no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For what is a man?Compare Antoninus, ii. 16, iii. 11, vi. 44, xii. 36; and Seneca, de Otio Sap. c. 31; and Cicero, De Fin. iii. 19. A part of a state, of that first which consists of Gods and of men; then of that which is called a)po/lutoi. Compare Antoninus, x. 24, viii. 34. next to it, which is a small image of the universal state. What then must I be brought to trial; must another have a fever, another sail on the sea, another die, and another be condemned? Yes, for it is impossible in such a body, in such a universe of things, among so many living together, that such things should not happen, some
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
about lines (geometrical figures) or sounds? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already taught as it were by nature some things on this matter (to/pon), and proceeding from these we have added to them self—conceit (oi)/hsin).See Cicero's use of 'opinatio' (Tusc. iv. 11). For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it to particulars? You do. Do I not then adapt it properly? In that lies the whole question; And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without it?Doing nothing without the rule. This is a Greek proverb, used also by Persius, Sat. v. 119; compare Cicero, de Fin. iii. 17; and Antoninus, ii 16. For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their madness those who use mere 'seeming' as a measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain things (principles) kno
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
did Socrates act? He used to compel his adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he wanted no other witness.This is what is said in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 472, 474. Therefore he could say, 'I care not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disputing with me.' For he used to make the conclusions drawn from natural notionsThe word is e)/nnoiai, which Cicero explains to be the name as prolh/yeis. Acad. Pr. ii. 10. so plain that every man saw the contradiction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus): Does the enviousSocrates' notion of envy is stated by Xenophon (Mem. iii. 9, 8), to be this: 'it is the pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and that such are the only envious persons.' Bishop Butler gives a better definition; at least a more complete description of the thing. 'Emulation is merely the desire and hop
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 2 (search)
t which he does; but so long as you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man persists in his practice; for having the appearance of doing right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates also trusting to this power used to say, I am used to call no other witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him with whom I am discussing, and I ask him to give his opinion and call him as a witness, and though he is only one, he is sufficient in the place of all. For Socrates knew by what the rational soul is moved, just like a pair of scales, and then it must incline, whether it chooses or not.There is some deficiency in the text. Cicero (Acad. Prior. i. 12), but enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi; sic snimum perspicuis cedere,' appears to supply the deficiency. Show the rational governing faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from it; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him who is not persuaded.M. Antoninus, v. 28; x. 4.
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 3 (search)
But however since in a manner I have been condemned to wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant by 'rationally'? Conformably to natureCicero, de Fin. ii. 11: Horace, Epp. i. 10, 12. This was the great principle of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted in following nature, that it is a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true. and completely. What then do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the animal part? No. Is it the condition of mortality? No. Is it the power of using appe
E. T. Merrill, Commentary on Catullus (ed. E. T. Merrill), Poem 55 (search)
The general character of the gesture is clear, despite the difficulty of emendation. See Crit. App. te ferre: i.e. to endure with patience your conduct. Herculi labos est: with the figure cf. Prop. 3.23.7 ubi pertuleris, quos dicit fama, labores Herculis. The genitive in -i from Greek proper names in -es is not infrequent in the earlier period and in Cicero. ubi sis futurus: where you are to be (found), that I may come thither at an appointed time and meet you. crede luci: in contrast with v. 2 tenebrae. The sportive manner of the girl (vv. 11-12) has awakened the poet's suspicions, and he is anxious to learn the truth from his friend's own lips. lacteolae: apparently not occurring again till Aus. Epi
Q. Horatius Flaccus (Horace), The Works of Horace (ed. C. Smart, Theodore Alois Buckley), book 1, He describes his sufferings from the loquacity of an impertinent fellow. (search)
fish, paucorum hominum, and does not love a great deal of company." and of a very wise way of thinking. No man ever made use of opportunity with more cleverness. You should have a powerful assistant, Adiutor was a person who assisted a player either with his voice or action, but in what manner is to us inconceivable, as we have nothing like it in our stage. Ferre secundas may be somewhat better explained by a passage in Cicero: "He will not exert his utmost eloquence, but consult your honor and reputation, by lowering his own abilities and raising yours. Thus we see among the Grecian actors, that he who plays the second or third part, conceals his own power, that the principal player may appear to the best advantage." Our impertinent therefore promises Horace, that far from any design of supplanting him in the favor of Maecenas, he will be contented to play the second
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