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racter of the slope, were unable to reach the summit. The enemy's loss on this part of the line was very heavy. I have heard several officers say that they have never seen the enemy's dead cover the ground so thickly, not even at the first Fredericksburgh fight, as they did on that portion of the field over which McLaws's troops fought. While the fight was raging on our right, Wilcox and Wright of Anderson's division, were pressing the enemy's centre. Wilcox pushed forward for nearly a milestand a day's march without being sent to the rear, have been either discharged or have died, thus leaving a smaller portion of those remaining liable to disease. Third, since that portion of the rebel army (Ewell's corps) moved from behind Fredericksburgh, on the fourth of June last, it has been favored with remarkably fine weather; has been stimulated with almost uninterrupted success in its movements; has been marching through a rich and fertile country, and, by levying on the inhabitants o
emocrat both agree on this question. They say they have heretofore felt none of the effects of the war worth speaking of, and from the number of new houses and barns, it seems they speak the truth. But I must close. A rebel letter. The following letter was picked up on the battle-field of Gettysburgh, by a member of one of the Philadelphia regiments: camp near Greenwood, Pa., June 28, 1863. My own Darling wife: I have written two letters to you since I left the trenches at Fredericksburgh. I received a letter from you, dated the fourteenth instant. You may be sure I devoured its contents with great eagerness, but oh! how I was pained to hear that you were so unwell! It makes me miserable to think of you as suffering bodily afflictions, with all the great troubles you now have to contend with, and I not there to help you. You can see by the date of this, that we are now in Pennsylvania. We crossed the line day before yesterday, and are resting to-day near a little
omplete, on Monday they were complete enough to carry him away; and yet on Monday his army was divided by the river, and in a state of trepidation for fear their hazardous movement should be discovered. We were growing stronger, by additions of troops, while we lay still, and the enemy was improving the same time in recovering from the disheartenment of his defeat, and the aggregation of supplies and ammunition from Winchester. In short, delay proved of far more advantage to the enemy than to us. Add to this the fact, of which I am personally cognizant, that the soldiers received the news of Lee's escape with feelings of bitter disappointment, and that they would rather have fought him two to one than to chase all over Virginia again after him, and the policy of a vigorous prosecution of the war at all times and under all circumstances is vindicated with greater emphasis than ever heretofore. A resume of the campaign since the army left Fredericksburgh, I will give in my next.
When the army of the Potomac reached Warrenton it was placed under command of General Burnside. He marched to Falmouth, hoping to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburgh, and to move at once upon Richmond. Delays, resulting from various causes, without fault of the General, permitted the insurgents to occupy the heights of FrFredericksburgh, and when, at length, in December, General Burnside crossed the Rappahannock, his assault upon Lee's well-fortified position failed. He skilfully recrossed the river without loss. General Hooker succeeded to the command, and it was not until the beginning of May that the condition of the roads permitted a renewal of crossed the Rappahannock and accepted a battle, which proved equally sanguinary to both parties, and unsuccessful to the army of the Potomac. The heights of Fredericksburgh were captured by General Sedgwick's corps, but the whole army was compelled to return to the north bank of the river. After this battle, Lee, in the latter p
nious defeat of the whole war — a defeat for which there is but little excuse or palliation. For the first time during our struggle for national independence, our defeat is chargeable to the troops themselves, and not to the blunders or incompetency of their leaders. It is difficult to realize how a defeat so complete could have occurred on ground so favorable, notwithstanding the great disparity in the forces of the two hostile armies. The ground was more in our favor than it was at Fredericksburgh, where General Longstreet is said to have estimated that Lee's army was equal to three hundred thousand men. And yet we gained the battle of Fredericksburgh, and lost that of Missionary Ridge. But let us take up the painful narrative at the beginning, and see how this great misfortune, if not this grievous disgrace, has befallen the confederate arms. Lookout Mountain was evacuated last night, it being no longer important to us after the loss of Lookout or Will's valley, and no lon
aces for defence, exhaust military ingenuity in fortifying positions by nature almost inaccessible, then hurl our men madly forward under a dozen disadvantages, should, if disastrous warnings can penetrate the mind of Gen. Halleck, be abandoned. I have good authority for stating that the attack upon Arkansas Post was made without authority of, or suggestion by, the authorities at Washington. Those worthies were apparently busily occupied seeing that the hospitals before Vicksburgh and Fredericksburgh were well filled. I mention but facts in saying that the feeling in this army against what they consider Halleck's blundering career, is universal and bitter. The soldiers are now busy destroying the works here, and burning the barracks. Every ditch has been dragged by adventurous ones in search of hidden property, and several hundred pistols and swords brought forth. Under floors, in hollow trees, everywhere that opportunity offered, the rebels concealed what they could. Their