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John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army 234 4 Browse Search
John Bell Hood., Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies 83 1 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4. 63 1 Browse Search
Colonel William Preston Johnston, The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston : His Service in the Armies of the United States, the Republic of Texas, and the Confederate States. 40 0 Browse Search
The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 3: The Decisive Battles. (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller) 36 0 Browse Search
Frederick H. Dyer, Compendium of the War of the Rebellion: Regimental Histories 32 30 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 9. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 32 2 Browse Search
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Chapter XXII: Operations in Kentucky, Tennessee, North Mississippi, North Alabama, and Southwest Virginia. March 4-June 10, 1862., Part II: Correspondence, Orders, and Returns. (ed. Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott) 29 1 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 7. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 28 0 Browse Search
Horace Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860-65: its Causes, Incidents, and Results: Intended to exhibit especially its moral and political phases with the drift and progress of American opinion respecting human slavery from 1776 to the close of the War for the Union. Volume II. 27 1 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army. You can also browse the collection for Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) or search for Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) in all documents.

Your search returned 119 results in 10 document sections:

John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter IX (search)
ty instructions to oppose Hood at Pulaski at Columbia reason of the delay in Exchanging Messages. one on the march to the sea, to fight Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill, hurl him back from Franklin,sonville and back to Nashville, and thence to Columbia and near Pulaski, all by rail; that all of thace, or cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia, should he attempt to turn your right flank. to interpose between the enemy's cavalry and Columbia; while Stanley, with two divisions of the Fou railroad. The whole army was in position at Columbia, November 24, and began to intrench. Hood's ur troops and the enemy for the possession of Columbia. In fact, Ruger's troops at Columbia were quColumbia were quite capable of holding that place against Forrest and Hood's infantry was not within a day's march or Cox or Stanley until after both had reached Columbia. We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the evening of November 27, inviting an attack, and hoping that Thomas would arriv[1 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter X (search)
avalry had forced the crossing of Duck River above Columbia, and driven our cavalry back; and, about two o'clohave given the enemy the crossing of Duck River at Columbia and the turnpike road for his advance with his art reinforcements, but expressing the wish that the Duck River position be held until Smith arrived; and anotherer. I then decided to hold on to the crossing of Duck River until the night of the 29th, thus gaining twenty-s deceiving me by his thundering demonstrations at Columbia, and that I did not know he was marching to Springied: You can send some of the pontoons you used at Columbia to Franklin to lay a bridge there. War Records,possible for me to use the pontoons which I had at Columbia. Those pontoons were heavy wooden bateaux, and thanklin had become vastly more serious than that at Columbia or Spring Hill, and solely because of the neglect tenacity with which the crossing of Duck River at Columbia was held was well rewarded at Franklin. The que
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
even in detail, and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches misled me somewhatoga ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least moved up to Nashville or Franklimber 24, 1864. . . . Have the fords above Columbia as well guarded as you can, and I think you wd. November 24, 1864. If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north bank ofain, November 26, I reported the situation at Columbia, and my action, as follows; also suggesting tion was far enough in the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain if ordersontoons and cross his artillery and trains at Columbia. But that would not have been a serious matt's movements. I desire you to fall back from Columbia and take up your position at Franklin, leavinport the cavalry in opposing the crossing of Duck River at the numerous places above Columbia. But,roops which were stationed on the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out of th[40 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XII (search)
es. It was the accursed politicians who had led them into such a fratricidal strife who were the objects of our maledictions. But even that feeling has been softened by time, and by reflection upon the deeper and more remote causes of the war, and that the glorious fruits of final victory have amply repaid, and will continue to repay in all time, for all those immense sacrifices and sufferings. Hood undoubtedly made a mistake in his plan of operations after he crossed Duck River above Columbia on the night of November 28-9. His march on Spring Hill would have been the best if it had succeeded. But he failed to estimate accurately what he could accomplish in a short winter day over a very bad road. In a long day of summer, with that road in the usual summer condition, he might have reached Spring Hill early in the afternoon, with force enough to accomplish his purpose before night, if he had found a single division, or even two divisions, there. But he failed simply because he
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIII (search)
ions, and the orders sent to Thomas by General Grant and the War Department during that time: (Unofficial.) Columbia, Tenn., December 27, 1864. lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. Armies, City Point, Va. General: My corps wnnessee. These reasons now no longer exist. By uniting my troops with Stanley's, we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia and Franklin until General Thomas could concentrate at Nashville, and also to give Hood his deathblow at Franklin. Sub I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. M. Schofield, Major-General. (Unofficial.) Columbia, Tenn., December 28, 1864. my dear General: Accept my hearty congratulations on the happy termination of your pleasure rk. But altogether your plan has been a brilliant success. Hood did n't follow you, . . . but he did me. I held him at Columbia several days, and hurt him considerably. Finally he got across the Duck River above, and made for Franklin via Spring H
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIV (search)
attle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerablColumbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade, which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in holding the line of Duck River. It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own strength in infantry and in cavalry—an opportunity such as had never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he thought his chance a very brilliant one is not remark
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XV (search)
back to a point where he could interpose between Hood and Columbia, and Ruger was stopped at Columbia. The great tenacityColumbia. The great tenacity with which I held on at Columbia and on the north bank of Duck River could not have been justified except by reference to tColumbia and on the north bank of Duck River could not have been justified except by reference to the despatches showing Thomas's wishes and his assurance of reinforcements at those points. If I had been free to do so, nothomas could not or would not reinforce me on the line of Duck River, and before Hood could endanger my retreat. Hence I wasGeneral Thomas then expected to concentrate his troops at Columbia or Pulaski, or both, in a very short time, take command ien he intended to concentrate all his available troops at Columbia and Pulaski, take command in person, and move against Hooers of November 8 to Stanley, to fight Hood at Pulaski or Columbia, as Hood might elect, until he (Thomas) could get there whe command of his army in Tennessee, from Pulaski through Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin to Nashville, and commended a
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVI (search)
y cripple Hood's army? Or what, if Hood had succeeded in his projected invasion of Kentucky—an event much less improbable than many that have actually occurred in war? If Hood had succeeded in overwhelming the smaller force that opposed him at Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as he came near doing, Nashville would have fallen an easy prey, for it was not defensible by the force Thomas then had there. Thomas's cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers, would have had nenot begin to arrive at Nashville until the day of the battle of Franklin (November 30), and they were a very important part of the force relied upon in Sherman's plan. The whole fate of the Tennessee campaign was decided by the delay of Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill and his defeat in the desperate battle of Franklin, and this by two of Sherman's six corps, without the aid of any of the reinforcements upon which he counted so largely, and about which he says so much. It is not too much to sa
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVII (search)
is march from Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South Carolina, crossing the Savannah River at or above Augusta, is an easier march than that from Savannah to Columbia. Or if Sherman had not cared about paying a visit to Columbia en route, he could have taken the much shorter Piedmont route to Charlotte, North Carolina, and thColumbia en route, he could have taken the much shorter Piedmont route to Charlotte, North Carolina, and thence northward by whichever route he pleased. Instead of retaining the dominant attitude of master, Sherman lost it the moment he started eastward with his main army, leaving an inferior force to cope with his enemy; and the march through Georgia and the capture of Savannah did not by any means restore that mastery to Sherman. It was not restored until Hood was actually defeated in Tennessee. I have referred to the possibilities of a direct march from Atlanta via Columbia or Charlotte, with a much larger army, at exactly the same time, for the purpose of showing that even Sherman's grand strategic plan to assist in the capture of Lee's army did not n
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Index (search)
C., Sherman's march to, 327, 338, 339 Columbia, Tenn., Federal movements at and near, operation195 et seq.; Thomas's purpose to fight him at Columbia, 195-197, 201; necessity of guarding his brid0; Stanley ordered to tight him at Pulaski or Columbia, 290; question of his movements in Georgia, 2int, 447 Huey's Mill, Tenn., Hood crosses Duck River near, 208, 210, 213, 214, 219; reconnoiterinn. Lovell H., on the defense of the bridge at Columbia, 203, 204 Ruger, Maj.-Gen. Thomas H., holdments, stands, and engagements see Brentwood; Columbia; Duck River; Franklin; Harpeth River; Nashvilas, Nov. 25, 1864, 197; need of his troops at Columbia, 197, 205; expected at Nashville, 225 ; propo273, 276-298; fails to send reinforcements to Columbia, 168; proposes to take personal command at CoColumbia, 168; urges holding the line of Duck River, 168, 171, 207; approves S.'s actions, 169; his op-Gen. George D., movement against Hood before Columbia, 168; battle of Franklin, 175, 176, 178, 180,[19 more...]