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ver the Tennessee were carried away this afternoon, and he is now dependent upon two small steamers for crossing the river, unless he has a third bridge, which cannot be seen from Lookout Mountain. In addition to this, the reinforcements sent out from Meade's army are reported to be at Bridgeport and intermediate points, water-bound and unable to move. Granger's corps is on the north side of the river, opposite Chattanooga, where it was sent, I presume, to guard against an attack upon the Moccasin batteries. At last we have authentic intelligence from Gen. Wheeler. He crossed the Tennessee near the mouth of the Hiwassee, passed around Rosecrans's army, destroyed the stores at McMinnville and at a number of depots on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, set fire to the tressel work at several points on the road, captured or destroyed between seven and eight hundred wagons, took a number of prisoners, and sustained considerable loss himself; was pursued by a heavy force, and f
th rocks and timber. There are but two ways by which we can send reinforcements to the scene of action--one by a tedious and circuitous route to the left; the other around the north end of Lookout, where they would be exposed to the fire of the Moccasin batteries. These batteries have been shelling Lookout and our lines in that direction all day. They destroyed the Half-way House (Mr. Craven's) last week, and have since driven our signal corps from Lookout Point. Their guns, though situated fr a jack o'lantern seen bogging about the river banks, we have not yet been able to ascertain. To-day Major E. P. Alexander moved four of his splendid 24-pounder rifle guns to Lookout Point and put them in position to return the fire of the Moccasin batteries. To-morrow we shall probably enjoy a novel if not a profitable spectacle — that of a grand but harmless artillery duel between hostile batteries, situated on opposite sides of a wide river, the one on a high hill and the other on a mo
ng, and he reports their wounded at from 800 to 1,000. He thinks it would be quite safe to put their entire casualties at 1,000. Our guns on Lookout shelled the road to-day along which the enemy's trains and artillery were moving towards Brown's ferry, and compelled their infantry forces to change their positions more than once. Unfortunately, not more than one third of the shells, which have just been received from Richmond, exploded. The guns engaged in the artillery duel with the Moccasin batteries yesterday were not Alexander's fine parrotts as reported; they were taken up to-day, and will render the enemy's position in Lookout valley unpleasant, if nothing more. It is but proper to add, in correction of an error in my last letter, that it was only the cavalry videttes, and not Law's pickets, who were surprised the night of the 26th, when the enemy effected a landing and threw a bridge across the river at Brown's ferry. There was but one brigade of infantry (Law's) on
tain, is Lookout creek, which is too near his works for us to attempt to bridge it, and in his rear and on his flanks are the river and Raccoon mountain. This is not all. If attacked in the valley he can be reinforced from Chattanooga by means of his pontoon bridges, and recross Moccasin bend more rapidly and safely than we could reinforce our column of attack; for our reinforcements would have to pass around the north end of Lookout mountain, where they would be exposed to the fire of the Moccasin batteries and the works in the vicinity of the ferry. So, also, if an attack were made upon Chattanooga, the enemy could receive reinforcements from the valley and ferry more expeditiously than we could send troops from our left to the centre, or from the centre to the left; and this because the enemy would move up on a right line whilst we moved upon the are of a circle. From Brown's ferry to the farthest point on the enemy's lines in front of Chattanooga the distance does not exceed