ekin was in blaze of fire-works, crackers and military enthusiasm.
Our American Chinese stick closely to the Oriental pattern.--Nothing can exceed their exultation at having captured two little forts on a sand bank in North Carolina, manned by five or six hundred men, with a naval force of one hundred guns and a land force of ,500 men. Picayune Butler becomes forthwith one of the greatest Generals of the age, and old Wool announces his exploits in tones that would become a victory such as Austerlitz or Jena.
Success is a novelty to them, even on the most limited scale.
Can such a people hope to hold Arlington Heights and Washington, and Maryland, when our Generals choose to advance ? They cannot.
Their General is well aware that they cannot stead the Such of the sold He is busy preparing the means to keep them at long law. He dare set depend on their manhood.
He knows that they will never dress bayonets with our men, and hence his enormous accumulation of artillery, which, after
to be cured in collation of it. He did not scorn success obtained in the most irregular manner.
He made break neck marches through the show, and fought battles when the thermometer was below zero Washington had winter quarters, such as they were, because Howe and Clinian had New York and Philadelphia, and he was obliged to watch them and keep them in check.
Had he possessed the means of attacking them.
he would have paid no respect to winter quarters as he showed at Trenton and Ponleton During the wars of the French Revolution operations never stopped for the winter innumerable great battles were fought in the dead of winter; as, for instance, Arcole, Rivoli, Hohenlinden, Austerlitz, Eylan, Cormuns, the Beresina, La Rothiere, Brienne, Orthes, Tonlouse, &c. The retreat of Sir John Moore took place in the depth of winter and Mantusa surrendered in February.--In fact the leaders of that day paid no respect to seasons and no respect, as far as we can see, has been paid to them since.
dun aged ninety-four.
Theresa Jourdan, born at Basacen, in 1768, was married in 1783, to Jean Patru, who afterwards became sergeant in the Sixty ninth brigade.
She accompanied her husband in the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, under Gen. Bonaparte.
She next went to Egypt, was present at the landing of the army before Alexandria, then at the battle of the Pyramids, and at Kleber's victory near the ruins of Heliopolis.
After her return from the East, she was present at the battles of Austerlitz, Jena, Dylan, Friedland, and in the campaigns on the Elbe, the Vistula, and the Niemen.
She then followed the army into Spain and Portugal, whence she returned, and, going to Germany again, witnessed the battles of Easling and Wagran.
In 1812 she followed the grand army to Russia, and was present at the battle of Moscow, where her husband fell in storming a redoubt.
She came back to France with the remnant of the army, and took part in the campaign of 1813; was at Baulzen and Leipai
then, it is so easy to gain victories on paper?
Pope was the right man, and he put him in the right place.
No man so thoroughly understands the art of gaining victories on-paper; not even McClellan, or Stanton himself.
Of this he has already given a striking proof.
A band of his horsemen came to Beaver Dam Depot — where there was no force — and burnt it. They "skeddied" as soon as they heard that Smart was after them.
Pope announced a great victory, in terms sufficiently swelling for Austerlitz or Jena.
The Boabdil of the old army, he proclaims that he has seen nothing of his enemies but their backs.
We wonder if the gentleman who cowhided him for offering an indignity to a lady was standing with his back to him when he inflicted chastisement?
The Duke of Brunswick, when he invaded France issued a proclamation in which he threatened to hang or shoot every Frenchman who took up arms in defence of his country.
He has received the execration of the world in return from that
Republic successfully withstood the assault of combined Europe.
How? By virtue of her numbers.
She had, at one time, nearly a motion of men under arms.
Under the Empire, the military force was always enormous.
In 1805, when the campaign of Austerlitz took place, it was computed at 651,000 men. In the campaign of Jens (1806) it was somewhat larger.
In the campaign of Friedland (1807) the military strength of the Empire approached 800,000 men, and in the campaign of Wagram (1809) it quite caI, one century before, failed quite as badly as Napoleon did in 1812, and his army was little more than one- tenth part as large as that of the latter.
Decisive battles are usually fought by a very small proportion of the entire force.
At Austerlitz the French numbered 80,000 men, while the strength of the Empire was 651,000.
At Jena, 126,000 French only were engaged.
At Friedland 80,000 French decided the fate of the war. although there were in Poland nearly 300,000 French soldiers, whi
t he who overthrows a great military reputation renders an essential service to mankind.
In this sense Dr. Vinton is the greatest benefactor of whom humanity can boast.
He has overthrown every military reputation that ever existed, in a single lecture.
He shows that when Hannibal piled the field of Cannæ with the bodies of 80,000 Romans he was ignominiously defeated.
He shows that Pompey, and not Cæsar, was victorious at Pharsalia.
He shows that the Russians and Austrians conquered at Austerlitz, and that Wellington was beaten at Waterloo.
We are afraid, however, that mankind is too stupid to understand the Doctor.
They can never be made, we very much apprehend, to believe that flight means victory, or that pursuit means defeat.
In spite of his unanswerable logic, they will obstinately persist in believing that the Roman Republic was nearly overthrown at Cannæ, and that the French Empire was prostrated at Waterloo.
As the Yankees wish to possess our country, and as they certai
ttack shall be hazarded, the end will be the same.
The general hope here is that the trial will be made to confident are all in the valor of our army and the consummate skill of its great leader.
It seems to be doubted whether Gen. Lee permitted the enemy to come over, or whether he could have prevented it had he tried.
It seems to us that he bad every reason to wish them to come over.
He had selected his field of battle, and had thoroughly studied it, as Napoleon had done the field of Austerlitz when he fell back thirty miles to draw his enemy to it, and as Wellington is said to have done at Waterloo.--He had an army full of confidences in themselves and in him. The disparity of force was not so great as to render victory at all improbable when the composition of the two armies and the animating spirit of each are taken into consideration.
If they were determined to pass, he could hardly have prevented them, since they had possession of the heights on the Stafford side, and had c
without any pressing cause, he undertook to make a flank march with an army of more than one hundred thousand men, in presence of a powerful enemy already in position, and prepared to attack him the instant he commenced the movement, he violated a fundamental principle which has never been infringed without disaster.
Frederick the Great attempted this manœuvre at Kolin, and it nearly cost him his crown Wurmser tried it at Castiglione, and he was driven out of Italy.
Kutesoff tried it at Austerlitz, and it resulted in one of the most signal defeats known to history.
Marmont tried it at Salamance, and his army by trying it McDowell tried it at Manassas, and it came near giving us possession of Washington.
To suppose that McClellan would attempt it, when he was watched by a man whom he is known to revers as the first General of the age, at the head of in army which had proved itself more than a match for his own, and which he believed to be superior in numbers — without any sort of
e Herald. It goes on to say, "We have an army larger than could be raised by any Power in Europe, with the single exception, perhaps, of Russia." It ought to have added that no army in Europe ever has been so often or so completely flogged; but for such an addition it substitutes the following: "This army is splendidly disciplined and equipped, and is armed with the best and most effective weapons.
It has seen service during several campaigns, and fought and won battles, compared to which Austerlitz, Waterloo, Solferino, and Sebastopol were mere child's play!" Prodigious!!! Where these mighty battles were fought, and where they were won, is a mystery.--Certainly not on this continent, nor since the beginning of this war. Within that time, and upon that arena, it has usually been the fortune of that army to be flogged whenever it came in contact with the Confederates.
We are, however, not surprised at the enthusiasm of the Herald when we reflect that in the same article it calls the
net.
The indecisive character of the battles which we have heretofore fought greatly assists the enemy in carrying out his schemes.
We have been almost always victorious, yet we have never in a single instance derived any benefit from our victories, and in all of them we have lost a vast number of men. We have not the least doubt that in his three battles, in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia, General Bragg lost as many men as the victorious party lost in the three battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, each of which struck down an Empire.
Yet General Bragg, although victorious in all his battles, not only gained nothing, but lost ground.
It is difficult to understand of what use such victories can be to us, when the results have been such.
A defeat could hardly have produced a catastrophe more unfavorable to us. The enemy is vastly more numerous than we. He knows that in every battle we fight we lose large numbers of men, although we may be victorious, and that we find it d
