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Epictetus, Works (ed. George Long) 20 0 Browse Search
C. Suetonius Tranquillus, The Lives of the Caesars (ed. Alexander Thomson) 4 0 Browse Search
Q. Horatius Flaccus (Horace), The Works of Horace (ed. C. Smart, Theodore Alois Buckley) 4 0 Browse Search
P. Ovidius Naso, Art of Love, Remedy of Love, Art of Beauty, Court of Love, History of Love, Amours (ed. various) 2 0 Browse Search
T. Maccius Plautus, Trinummus: The Three Pieces of Money (ed. Henry Thomas Riley) 2 0 Browse Search
Sallust, Conspiracy of Catiline (ed. John Selby Watson, Rev. John Selby Watson, M.A.) 2 0 Browse Search
C. Suetonius Tranquillus, The Lives of the Caesars (ed. Alexander Thomson) 2 0 Browse Search
C. Suetonius Tranquillus, The Lives of the Caesars (ed. Alexander Thomson) 2 0 Browse Search
C. Suetonius Tranquillus, The Lives of the Caesars (ed. Alexander Thomson) 2 0 Browse Search
Sallust, The Jugurthine War (ed. John Selby Watson, Rev. John Selby Watson, M.A.) 2 0 Browse Search
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Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
Of progress or improvement. HE who is making progress, having learned from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that happinessto\ eu)/roun or h( eu)/roia is translated happiness. The notion is that of flowing easily, as Seneca (Epp. 120) explains it: beata vita, secundo defluens cursu. and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and defers it,u(perte/qeitai. The Latin translation is: in futurum tempus rejicit. Wolf says: Significat id, quod in Enchiridio dictum est: philosophies tironem non nimium tribuere sibi, sed quasi addubitantem expectare dum confirmetur judicium. but he employs his aversion only on things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that sometimes he will fall in with s
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
er, is false; and it is not a conclusion derived from the premises to which we assented. A ridiculous example is given by Seneca, Ep. 48: Mus syllaba est: mus autem caseum rodit: syllaba ergo caseum rodit. Seneca laughs at this absurdity, and says peSeneca laughs at this absurdity, and says perhaps the following syllogism (collectio) may be a better example of acuteness: Mus syllaba est: syllaba autem caseum non rodit: mus ergo caseum non rodit. One is as good as the other. We know that neither conclusion is true, and we see where the error is. Ménage says that though the Stoics particularly cultivated logic, some of them despised it, and he mentions Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Antoninus. Upton, however, observes that Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus did not despise logic (he says nothing about Seneca), but employed it for their own purposes. It has been observed that if a man is asked whether, if every A is B, every B is also A, he might answer that it is. But if you put the conversion in this material form: Every goose is an a
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
. But in the matter of our miserable ruling faculty, yawning and sleeping, we carelessly admit every appearance, for the harm is not noticed. When then you would know how careless you are with respect to good and evil, and how active with respect to things which are indifferentWe reckon death among the things which are indifferent (in- differentia), which the Greeks name a)dia/fora. But I name 'indif- ferent' the things which are neither good nor bad, as disease, pain, poverty, exile, death.—Seneca, Ep. 82. (neither good nor evil), observe how you feel with respect to being deprived of the sight of the eyes, and how with respect to being deceived, and you will discover that you are far from feeling as you ought to do in relation to good and evil. But this is a matter which requires much preparation, and much labour and study. Well then do you expect to acquire the greatest of arts with small labour? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is very brief. If you would know, read Zeno
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 1 (search)
t Rome in December, a season of jollity and license (Livy, xxii. 1). Compare the passage in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 15, in which Nero is chosen by lot to be king: and Seneca, De Constant. Sapient. c. 12, Illi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et praetextam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur. a king is chosen by lot, for it has beenchweighaeuser's note. that is the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond this. This was the reason why DemetriusDemetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca (De Benef. vii. 1) says: He was in my opinion a great man, even if he is com- pared with the greatest. One of his sayings was; You gain more by possessing a few precepts of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning many if you have them not at hand. Seneca often mentions Demetrius. The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (Life by Diogenes Laertius) and to Socrates by Xeuophon (Apologia, 27). said to Nero, You threaten me with death, but nature threat
Epictetus, Discourses (ed. George Long), book 3 (search)
what reward they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer: 'For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye de- manded a recompense for seeing or the feet for walking.' M. Anto- ninus. ix. 42. Compare Seneca, de Vita Beata, c. 9.?—Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? At Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy? For these purposes being introduced by the gods into this city (the world), and it being now your duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their weeping move you and