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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 10 0 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 6 0 Browse Search
George Bancroft, History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 4, 15th edition. 6 0 Browse Search
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army. 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 17. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 2 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 30. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 2 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 14. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 2 0 Browse Search
James D. Porter, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, Tennessee (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 2 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: February 8, 1865., [Electronic resource] 2 0 Browse Search
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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Advertisement (search)
re but systems more or less complete of the tactics of battles, which could give but an imperfect idea of war, because they all contradicted each other in a deplorable manner. I fell back then, upon works of military history in order to seek, in the combinations of the great captains, a solution which those systems of the writers did not give me. Already had the narratives of Frederick the Great commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen (Lissa). I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple manoeuvre of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile army; and Lloyd soon came to fortify me in this conviction. I found again, afterwards, the same cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war (à tout l‘échiquier d'une guerre), this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should hav
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
be found to form two exterior lines; such was the mana90uvre of Frederick, which produced, at the end of the campaign of 1767, the splendid battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such were also almost all the operations of Napoleon, whose favorite manoeuvre consisted in uniting, by well calculated marches, imposing masses on the centre, tthe enemy. Ney was punished for this at Dennewitz; Marmont at Salamanca, and Frederick the Great at Kollin. Meanwhile, the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great at Leuthen, become so celebrated in the annals of the art, was a veritable movement of this kind, (see chapter VI, Treatise on Grand Operations;) but skillfully covered by ae line of battle. The famous march of Prince Eugene in sight of the French camp, for turning the lines of Turin, was much more extraordinary still than that of Leuthen, and was not less successful. In these different battles, I repeat, they were tactical and not strategical movements; the march of Prince Eugene, fiom Mantua u
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
nd men, which, by taking a divergent direction, would surely disperse the isolated hostile fractions in an exterior direction, prevent them henceforward from re-uniting, and would remove them thus farther and farther from the bridges. But if the passage were effected, on the contrary, upon one of the extremities of the strategic front of the euemy by changing direction briskly upon that front which would be attacked in its whole extent, as Frederick attacked the Austrian line tactically at Leuthen in all its length, the army would have its bridges behind it, and would cover them in all its forward movements. It was thus that Jourdan, having passed at Dusseldorf (1795) upon the extreme right of the Austrians, could advance in all security upon the Maine; if he was repulsed it was because the French having a double and exterior line of operations, left a hundred and twenty thousand men paralyzed from Mayence to Basle, whilst Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan upon the Lahn. But this circumst
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of an oblique order of battle: battle of Leuthen, December 5, 1757. (search)
s disaster after the victorious battle of Rosbach, hastened, with about 15,000 men, to Silesia, where he made a junction with the remaining portion of the army, commanded by the Duke of Bevern. His whole force amounted now to about 30,000 Battle of Leuthen. Dec. 5, 1757. men. Frederick addresses himself to his soldiers, telling them of the dangerous position of the Prussian monarchy, and excites them to the highest pitch. In the mean time the great Austrian army takes its position at Leuthen, near Breslau, awaiting the king to give battle. Frederick arrives near the Austrian position, orders a feint attack near Frovelitz by his advanced guard, in order to deceive the enemy on the real point of attack, and in the mean while he brings his army in the position A A, as shown in the plan. The Austrian left wing is attacked by a superior force, and is defeated. The army of the king advances, continually defeating and outflanking the Austrians, and arrives at B, where the rest of t
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of battle where one wing forms a crotchet: battle of Prague, may 18, 1757. (search)
ry being opposite that of the Prussians. By this movement they leave a space of a few hundred yards between their right wing and main body. The king, perceiving this fault, proceeds with a part of his army to occupy this space; the Austrian right wing, attacked on all sides, is completely separated from the center, and obliged to retreat in an eccentric direction from the main army, which is now attacked in its flank and rear by Frederick's whole forces, and driven into Prague, where it is blockaded for several weeks. This battle, as well as that of Leuthen, shows well that Frederick knew how to fall with his whole force on the weak point of the enemy, and defeat him by a series of small fights. It shows, at the same time, the danger of a crotchet, which, if without any space between it and the main body, is exposed to a very destructive concentric fire. The Austrians, in this battle, lost 16,000 men and 200 pieces of cannon. The Prussian loss amounted to nearly 13,000 men.
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of Napoleon and Grouchy. Diverging lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809. Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank; the geographical character of the theatre
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 4: Logistics.—Subsistence.—Forage.—Marches.—Convoys.—Castrametation (search)
g distances of each other. We find only two instances in the Seven Years War, in which Frederick attempted attacks by several columns at considerable distances from each other; and in both these instances (at Torgau and at Namiest, against Laudon, during the siege of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was to bring his columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form his troops into line at the moment of attack. Such was his order of march at Prague, Kollin, Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. The following is one of Frederick's orders respecting marches, (October 2d, 1760.) The army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. The first column will consist of the first line; the second, of the second line; and the third, of the reserve. The wagons, and hospital wagons, of regiments, will follow their corps. The batteries of heavy calibre will follow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. On passing woods, the regiments of cav
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior, for it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point of the enemy's line, while the weak wing is not only out of reach of immediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in check by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorable point as occasion may require. The most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, under the celebrated Epaminondas; Leuthen, under Frederick; the Pyramids, Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon. (Figure 20.) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning of a battle, as was the army of Frederick at Rosbach, and the Russian army at Kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. An attack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force is vastly superior. At Eylau, Napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one wing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre.
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 7. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Meeting at the White Sulphur Springs. (search)
earful to behold, and that he rushed like a madman on the foe, dealing out death with pistol and sword to all around him — like Hector fighting over the body of Patroclus: Yet, fearless in his strength, now rushing on He dashed amid the fray; now shouting loud, Stood firm; but backward not a step retired. This first fight, as I have said, illustrated the military characteristics of the man, and justified the remark of General Dick Taylor, that he employed the tactics of Frederick at Leuthen and Zorndorf, without even having heard these names. First, his reckless courage in making the attack — a rule which he invariably followed and which tended always to intimidate his adversary. Second, his quick dismounting of his men to fight, showing that he regarded horses mainly as a rapid means of transportation for his troops. Third, his intuitive adoption of the flank attack, so successfully used by Alexander, Hannibal and Tamerlane — so demoralizing to an enemy even in an open fie<
James D. Porter, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, Tennessee (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 12: (search)
redited, and a few days later the army of Tennessee was surrendered, followed by the surrender of the troops in the department commanded by General Taylor. On the 9th of May, General Forrest issued an address of farewell to his command, in which he said, You have been good soldiers, you can be good citizens. Gen. Richard Taylor said of Forrest, Like Lord Clive, nature made him a great soldier. His tactics deserve the closest study of military men. He employed the tactics of Frederick at Leuthen and Zorndorf, though he had never heard these names. The State of Tennessee contributed 115,000 soldiers to the Confederate army, many counties furnishing more men than they had voters. Two hundred and ninety-six battles, combats and skirmishes were fought upon her soil, many of them unimportant and without result, but at all of them brave men were killed or wounded. For four years war was the occupation of her people. The old men and the women dedicated themselves to the service of
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