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Fitzhugh Lee, General Lee, Chapter 17: military character. (search)
nd I will show you one who has never made war. The impartial historian, in reviewing Lee's campaigns and the difficult conditions with which he was always confronted, must at least declare that no commander could have accomplished more. In his favor was, however, that ponderous force known as the spirit of the army, which counterbalanced his enemy's excess of men and guns. Important battles are sometimes lost in spite of the best-conceived plans of the general commanding. The battle of Ligny, with the fate of a great campaign trembling on the result, was not made a decisive victory because Ney, at Quatre-Bras, showed a distrust of his emperor's judgment, was unwilling to take the most obvious step, and finally disobeyed orders; and like behavior of a corps commander at Gettysburg defeated the well-devised designs of Lee. It has been wisely said that man is under no circumstance so nearly independent as he is when the next step is for life or death; and an infinite number of
Fitzhugh Lee, General Lee, Index. (search)
ed, 2. Lee, Lionel, mentioned, 2. Lee, Mary Custis, mentioned, 25, 26, 71, 106, 381, 411, 412. Lee, Philip, 5. Lee, Philip Ludwell, 5, 16. Lee, Richard, 2, 3, 4, 5. Lee, Richard Henry, 6, 8, 83. Lee, Robert, mentioned, 93, 108, 132, 217, 323. Lee, Stephen D., mentioned, 194. Lee, Sydney Smith, mentioned, 36, 37, 45, 76, 89, 139. Lee, Thomas, mentioned, 5, 6. Lees of Virginia, 2, Letcher, Governor, John, mentioned, 90, 101, 126, 318. Liberty Hall Academy, 405. Ligny, battle of, 424. Lincoln, Abraham, elected President, 83; mentioned, 96, 103, 136, 137, 157, 166, 169, 170, 175, 176, 177, 197, 207, 218, 219, 221; warning to Hooker, 240; mentioned, 243, 262, 264; Grant and Lincoln meet, 382; Lincoln in Richmond, 382; assassination of, 400. Little Napoleon-McClellan, 214. Little Round Top-Gettysburg, 274, 280, 282, 283. Logan, General John A., mentioned, 24. Lomax, General L. L., in the Valley, 370. Long, General, mentioned, 28, 276. Lo
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
The sudden attack of Napoleon on Fleurus decided Blucher to receive battle parallelly to the English base, and not to his own, for which he did not appear to trouble himself. This was pardonable, because strictly he could always hope to regain Wesel or at least Nimeguen, and in the last extremity he would have been able even to seek a refuge in Antwerp. But if a Prussian army, deprived of its powerful maritime allies, had committed such a fault, it would have been annihilated. Beaten at Ligny, and a refugee at Gembloux, then at Wavre, Blucher had but three strategical lines to choose, that which led direct to Maestricht, that which went farther to the north towards Venloo, or else that which led to the English army near Mont Saint-Jean. He audaciously took the latter, and triumphed by the application of interior strategic lines, which Napoleon had neglected for the first time, perhaps, in his life. It will be admitted that the line followed, from Gembloux by Wavre, upon Mont Sai
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
nal; in fact the attack upon the centre seconded by a wing that outflanks the enemy, prevents the latter from doing as Hannibal and Marshal Saxe did; that is to say, from rushing upon the assailant taking him in flank ; the hostile wing which is formed pressed between the attack of the centre and that of the extremity, having almost the whole of the assailing masses to combat,will be overwhelmed and probably destroyed. This was the manoeuvre which caused Napoleon to triumph at Wagram and at Ligny; it was what he wished to attempt at Borodino and which only succeeded imperfectly on account of the heroic defense of the troops of the left wing of the Russians, that of the division Paskevitch il the famous redoubt of the centre, then by the arrival of the corps of Baggavout upon the wing which he hoped to outflank. Finally he employed it also at Bantzen where he would have obtained unexampled success but for an incident which deranged the manoeuvre of his left destined to cut off the ro
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of a battle of the offensive defense: battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805. (search)
the greater part of his forces, about 80,000 men, near Fleurus and Ligny — leaving, in this position, his base of operation on the Rhine, toy in marching, and were therefore of no use either in the battle of Ligny or in that of Quatre-Bras. Napoleon, thinking the Prussians had , was already there. This corps had taken no part in the battle of Ligny; and, besides, from the 80,000 men present at the battle of the 16te of Waterloo ; the remainder represents the loss in the battles of Ligny and Quatre-Bras, besides the division of Girard, which was with the, that of Bulow was the only one that took no part in the battle of Ligny on the 16th; the other corps had experienced heavy losses, and the t, and consequently had not experienced any loss, at the battles of Ligny and Quatre-Bras. The loss of the English amounted to 21,000 men;f the Prussians, to 7000. The French estimate their total loss, at Ligny, Quatre-Bras, and Waterloo, at from 25,000 to 30,000 men. The resul
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Mixed operations. (search)
he next day, Kutusoff tried to open himself a passage in the direction of Winterthur; in this attempt he lost a great part of his army. Passage of the Limmat by Massena 25th September 1799. Retreat and pursuit. the moment we leave the battle-field to retreat, our operation becomes one of Strategy as well as of Tactics. The direction in which we retreat is of the utmost importance. In the example of the battle of Waterloo this can easily he seen. If Blucher, after the battle of Ligny, had retreated to Namur, as many a general would have done, Wellington's army would have been lost, and a double defeat the consequence; his retreat to Wavre, and arrival at Belle Alliance, changed the defeat to the most decided victory. The direction of our retreat will depend on many circumstances. If we are co-operating with another army, we should retreat in this direction, to make a junction with it and obtain a central position between the enemy's armies. We may also retreat dir
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
and, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of complete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred and twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty thousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained a most decided advantage over the enemy — an advantage lost by the eccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at Dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the faults of his lieutenants 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and that of Paris, and his operations previous to the battle of Ligny in 1815, are all brilliant examples under this head. To change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and follow accidental lines, is always a delicate affair, and can only be resorted to by a general of great skill, and with dis
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
more than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; but in this instance, the state of the ground rendered the movements so slow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling the allies to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington. Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, Marengo in 1800, Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in 1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this concentration of forces, even with a regular army, cannot be calculated on by the general with any degree of certainty, unless his communications are perfectly secure. And this difficulty is very much increased where the troops are new and undisciplined. When a country like ours is invaded, large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. Not knowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches and countermarc
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
ch precedes it; and all may be combined towards a single object, and extended with the necessary ensemble. At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. Portions of his forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles. (Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the centre and one extremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. Napoleon employed this order at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo. It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders of battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively followed throughout the whole battle. The question must be decided by the general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may be duly weighed. An order well suited to one position might be the worst possible in another. Tactics is in this respect the very reverse of strategy — the latter being subject to m
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., chapter 11 (search)
e Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by the Adda and the canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Prince Eugene could make no use of his horse. If, when master of the bridge of Rittorto, he had been able to charge the French with a body of cavalry, there had been no doubt of his complete success. After a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry is invaluable. If Napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted troops, with an able commander, at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, the results of these victories had been decisive; whereas they were really without consequence. On the other hand, the Prussian army in 1806, after the battle of Jena, and Napoleon's army in 1815 at Waterloo, were completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of a defeated and dispirited foe. The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the American Revolution. Had Washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his surprise and defeat in the lin
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