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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 1: the policy of war. (search)
operations could have contributed also to this result, and in order to be able to deduce certain maxims from this war, it would be necessary to know what would have happened if, after the flight of Dumouriez, the allies, instead of destroying the fortresses with cannon shots, and of taking possession of them in their name, had written to the commandants of those fortresses, that they wanted neither France, nor its places, nor its brave army, and had marched with two hundred thousand men upon Paris. Perhaps, they would there have restored the monarchy, but perhaps also they would not have returned, unless an equal force had protected their retreat upon the Rhine. This is what would be difficult to decide, since the trial was never made, and everything would have depended in this case upon the course which the French army would have taken. The problem then presents two equally grave hypotheses; the campaign of 1793 has resolved it but in one sense: it would be difficult to resolve
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
time, have borne their fruits; the maps recently published at Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Stuttgard, Paris, as well as those of the interesting institute of Herder, at Friburg in Brisgau, assure to futurils of war established in the capitol near the government. Louvois, directed a long time from Paris, the armies of Louis XIV, and did it with success. Carnot directed also from Paris the armies oParis the armies of the Republic; in 1793 he did very well, and saved France; in 1794 he did at first very badly, then repaired his faults by chance; in 1796 he did decidedly very badly. But Louvois and Carnot directouncil, for if it has the pretention to tell the generalissimo not only to march to Vienna or to Paris, but still to indicate to him the manner in which he must manoeuvre in order to arrive there, th a continental nation, which should adopt the manners of the city of London, or of the bourse of Paris, would sooner or later be the prey of its neighbors. It was to the assemblage of civic virtues
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
rs; but under a feeble prince, in a republican State, and still more in a war of opinions, the capital is ordinarily the centre of national power. The taking of Paris by the Allies decided the fate of Napoleon, but this circumstance does not destroy my assertion. Napoleon, without an army, had all Europe upon his back, and the hat his capital was truly at general Headquarters. If this truth could have been called in question, it would have been justified on this occasion. So much in Paris was France, that two-thirds of the nation raised the standard against the government which oppressed it. If, after having beaten the French army at Famars, the Dutld, but favored at least by localities, and which consisted in basing himself upon the belt of fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, opening to the allies the road to Paris. It is certain that had Mortier and Marmont been able to join him, and he had had fifty thousand men more, this project would have been followed by the most decis
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
t by it. France is equally very proper for this kind of war, especially when there does not exist in the country two political parties which may aspire to the possession of the capitol, and render its occupation decisive for the enemy. If the latter penetrate by the Alps, the French can act upon the Rhone and Saone, turning on the frontier to the Moselle on the one side, or to Provence on the other. If it penetrate by Strasburg, Mayence or Valenciennes, it is the same; the occupation of Paris would be impossible, or at least hazardous, so long as a French army intact should remain based upon its girdle of strong places. It is, for the rest, the same for all countries having double fronts of operations. In all these calculations I suppose the forces nearly equal, if the invading army is twice as strong, then it may follow with the half of its troops that which retires parallelly, and carry the other half upon the capital; but with equal forcos that would be impossible. Aus
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and Augereau from Franconia, and the imperial guard arriving from Paris, were found in line upon three parallel routes debouching at the same time between Saalfeld, Gera and Plauen, when no perWellington gave or received fetes at Brussels, both awaiting the signal to invade France, Napoleon, whom they believed at Paris quite occupied with ostentatious political ceremonials, accompanied by his guard, which had just scarcely been reformed ay, the 14th June in the plains of Beaumont upon the borders of the Sambre, (Napoleon had not departed until the 12th from Paris.) The combinations of those two operations reposed upon a skillful strategic calculation; but their execution was undeetween his head quarters and France, that Napoleon owed his astonishing success at Ratisbon in 1809. He was found yet at Paris when the Austrian army passed the Inn at Braunau, for invading Bavaria and piercing his cantonments. Informed in twenty-
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Sketch of the principal maritime expeditions. (search)
those of the Garonne. It is pretended even that Hastings entered the Mediterranean, and ascended the Rhone as far as Avignon, which is at least doubtful. The strength of their armaments is not known, the largest appears to have been three hundred sail. At the commencement of the tenth century, Rollo, descending at first upon England, finds in Alfred a rival who leaves him little hope of success, he allies himself with him, makes a descent upon Nuestria, in 911, and marches by Rouen upon Paris; others corps advance from Nantes upon Chartres. Repulsed from this city, Rollo extends himself into the neighboring provinces and ravages every thing. Charles the Simple, sees no better means of delivering his kingdom from this continual scourge, than of offering to cede to Rollo his beautiful province of Nuestria, on condition of marrying his daughter and becoming a christian, which was eagerly accepted. Thirty years later, the grand son of Rollo, disturbed by the successors of Charle
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 1: Introduction.—Dr. Wayland's arguments on the justifiableness of war briefly examined (search)
t, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase of Indian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement of rivers and harbors, the building of break-waters and sea-walls, for the preservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c., &c.; in fine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the war department, is put down as expenses for military defence. Similar misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example, the new fortifications of Paris are said to have already cost from fifty to seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be required to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost of those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or twelve hundred millions of francs! The facts are these: the works, when done, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the pleasure of examining them not long since, in company with several of the engineer officers employed on the
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
ical importance as well as its military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. It, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national escutcheon. Lines of defence in strategy are either permanent o
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
s his own. Had no other obstacle than the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians, all agree that France must have fallen. In the campaign od to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the operation. Again in 1815, Napol invasion. But again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second abdication. If he had and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached. Paris. But the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way l. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest. Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans besieged it for twory III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding years the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this capital had been strongly fortified in
, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day, besides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. Wishing to form a junction with other troops, for the succor of Paris, he marched his army the distance of seventy-five niles in thirty-six hours; the cavalry marching night and day, and the infantry travelling en poste. On his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched fifty miles tie first day after landing; reached Grenoble through a rough and mountainous country, a distance of two hundred miles, in six days, and reached Paris, a distance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty days! The marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the French Revolution, were much less rapid than those of the armies of Napoleon. Nevertheless, for a single day the English and Spaniards have made some of the most extraordinary marches on record. In 1809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General C
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